#FactCheck-Viral Post Falsely Claims White House Dinner Shooter Was Muslim and Killed
Executive Summary
A social media post about the shooting incident during a dinner event for journalists covering the White House is going viral with the claim that the attacker was a Muslim man who was shot dead by security personnel. The accompanying video shows panic inside a hall and alert security officials responding to the situation. wHowever, research by the CyberPeace Research Wing found that the claim is false and misleading. The video is being shared with incorrect information about the identity and fate of the suspect.
Claim:
An Instagram user shared the video on April 26, 2026, claiming that the attacker who targeted Donald Trump was a “jihadi” named Mohammad Ibrahim and that he was killed after being shot multiple times.

Fact Check:
To verify the claim, relevant keyword searches were conducted online.
A report published by BBC on April 28, 2026, stated that the suspect accused of attempting to assassinate President Donald Trump during the Washington dinner event was identified as Cole Thomas Allen. The report said Allen lived with his parents in Los Angeles and was produced in court on April 28.

According to court documents cited in the report, Allen rushed past a security checkpoint carrying a semi-automatic handgun, a pump-action shotgun, and three knives. Authorities said one Secret Service agent was injured during the incident before Allen was subdued and taken into custody. A separate report published by NBC News on April 26, 2026, also identified the accused as Cole Thomas Allen and included visuals from the incident, showing the suspect after his arrest.

Conclusion:
The claim that the White House dinner party attacker was a Muslim man named Mohammad Ibrahim is false. The accused has been identified as Cole Thomas Allen, and he was arrested after the incident. Claims that he was killed are also incorrect.
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Executive Summary
This report analyses a recently launched social engineering attack that took advantage of Microsoft Teams and AnyDesk to deliver DarkGate malware, a MaaS tool. This way, through Microsoft Teams and by tricking users into installing AnyDesk, attackers received unauthorized remote access to deploy DarkGate that offers such features as credential theft, keylogging, and fileless persistence. The attack was executed using obfuscated AutoIt scripts for the delivery of malware which shows how threat actors are changing their modus operandi. The case brings into focus the need to put into practice preventive security measures for instance endpoint protection, staff awareness, limited utilization of off-ice-connection tools, and compartmentalization to safely work with the new and increased risks that contemporary cyber threats present.
Introduction
Hackers find new technologies and application that are reputable for spreading campaigns. The latest use of Microsoft Teams and AnyDesk platforms for launching the DarkGate malware is a perfect example of how hackers continue to use social engineering and technical vulnerabilities to penetrate the defenses of organizations. This paper focuses on the details of the technical aspect of the attack, the consequences of the attack together with preventive measures to counter the threat.
Technical Findings
1. Attack Initiation: Exploiting Microsoft Teams
The attackers leveraged Microsoft Teams as a trusted communication platform to deceive victims, exploiting its legitimacy and widespread adoption. Key technical details include:
- Spoofed Caller Identity: The attackers used impersonation techniques to masquerade as representatives of trusted external suppliers.
- Session Hijacking Risks: Exploiting Microsoft Teams session vulnerabilities, attackers aimed to escalate their privileges and deploy malicious payloads.
- Bypassing Email Filters: The initial email bombardment was designed to overwhelm spam filters and ensure that malicious communication reached the victim’s inbox.
2. Remote Access Exploitation: AnyDesk
After convincing victims to install AnyDesk, the attackers exploited the software’s functionality to achieve unauthorized remote access. Technical observations include:
- Command and Control (C2) Integration: Once installed, AnyDesk was configured to establish persistent communication with the attacker’s C2 servers, enabling remote control.
- Privilege Escalation: Attackers exploited misconfigurations in AnyDesk to gain administrative privileges, allowing them to disable antivirus software and deploy payloads.
- Data Exfiltration Potential: With full remote access, attackers could silently exfiltrate data or install additional malware without detection.
3. Malware Deployment: DarkGate Delivery via AutoIt Script
The deployment of DarkGate malware utilized AutoIt scripting, a programming language commonly used for automating Windows-based tasks. Technical details include:
- Payload Obfuscation: The AutoIt script was heavily obfuscated to evade signature-based antivirus detection.
- Process Injection: The script employed process injection techniques to embed DarkGate into legitimate processes, such as explorer.exe or svchost.exe, to avoid detection.
- Dynamic Command Loading: The malware dynamically fetched additional commands from its C2 server, allowing real-time adaptation to the victim’s environment.
4. DarkGate Malware Capabilities
DarkGate, now available as a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) offering, provides attackers with advanced features. Technical insights include:
- Credential Dumping: DarkGate used the Mimikatz module to extract credentials from memory and secure storage locations.
- Keylogging Mechanism: Keystrokes were logged and transmitted in real-time to the attacker’s server, enabling credential theft and activity monitoring.
- Fileless Persistence: Utilizing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) and registry modifications, the malware ensured persistence without leaving traditional file traces.
- Network Surveillance: The malware monitored network activity to identify high-value targets for lateral movement within the compromised environment.
5. Attack Indicators
Trend Micro researchers identified several indicators of compromise (IoCs) associated with the DarkGate campaign:
- Suspicious Domains: example-remotesupport[.]com and similar domains used for C2 communication.
- Malicious File Hashes:some text
- AutoIt Script: 5a3f8d0bd6c91234a9cd8321a1b4892d
- DarkGate Payload: 6f72cde4b7f3e9c1ac81e56c3f9f1d7a
- Behavioral Anomalies:some text
- Unusual outbound traffic to non-standard ports.
- Unauthorized registry modifications under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run.
Broader Cyber Threat Landscape
In parallel with this campaign, other phishing and malware delivery tactics have been observed, including:
- Cloud Exploitation: Abuse of platforms like Cloudflare Pages to host phishing sites mimicking Microsoft 365 login pages.
- Quishing Campaigns: Phishing emails with QR codes that redirect users to fake login pages.
- File Attachment Exploits: Malicious HTML attachments embedding JavaScript to steal credentials.
- Mobile Malware: Distribution of malicious Android apps capable of financial data theft.
Implications of the DarkGate Campaign
This attack highlights the sophistication of threat actors in leveraging legitimate tools for malicious purposes. Key risks include:
- Advanced Threat Evasion: The use of obfuscation and process injection complicates detection by traditional antivirus solutions.
- Cross-Platform Risk: DarkGate’s modular design enables its functionality across diverse environments, posing risks to Windows, macOS, and Linux systems.
- Organizational Exposure: The compromise of a single endpoint can serve as a gateway for further network exploitation, endangering sensitive organizational data.
Recommendations for Mitigation
- Enable Advanced Threat Detection: Deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions to identify anomalous behavior like process injection and dynamic command loading.
- Restrict Remote Access Tools: Limit the use of tools like AnyDesk to approved use cases and enforce strict monitoring.
- Use Email Filtering and Monitoring: Implement AI-driven email filtering systems to detect and block email bombardment campaigns.
- Enhance Endpoint Security: Regularly update and patch operating systems and applications to mitigate vulnerabilities.
- Educate Employees: Conduct training sessions to help employees recognize and avoid phishing and social engineering tactics.
- Implement Network Segmentation: Limit the spread of malware within an organization by segmenting high-value assets.
Conclusion
Using Microsoft Teams and AnyDesk to spread DarkGate malware shows the continuous growth of the hackers’ level. The campaign highlights how organizations have to start implementing adequate levels of security preparedness to threats, including, Threat Identification, Training employees, and Rights to Access.
The DarkGate malware is a perfect example of how these attacks have developed into MaaS offerings, meaning that the barrier to launch highly complex attacks is only decreasing, which proves once again why a layered defense approach is crucial. Both awareness and flexibility are still the key issues in addressing the constantly evolving threat in cyberspace.
Reference:

Executive Summary:
A viral video claiming the crash site of Air India Flight AI-171 in Ahmedabad has misled many people online. The video has been confirmed not to be from India or a recent crash, but was filmed at Universal Studios Hollywood on a TV or movie set meant to look like a plane crash set piece for a movie.

Claim:
A video that purportedly shows the wreckage of Air India Flight AI-171 after crashing in Ahmedabad on June 12, 2025, has circulated among social media users. The video shows a large amount of aircraft wreckage as well as destroyed homes and a scene reminiscent of an emergency, making it look genuine.

Fact check:
In our research, we took screenshots from the viral video and used reverse image search, which matched visuals from Universal Studios Hollywood. It became apparent that the video is actually from the most famous “War of the Worlds" set, located in Universal Studios Hollywood. The set features a 747 crash scene that was constructed permanently for Steven Spielberg's movie in 2005. We also found a YouTube video. The set has fake smoke poured on it, with debris scattered about and additional fake faceless structures built to represent a scene with a larger crisis. Multiple videos on YouTube here, here, and here can be found from the past with pictures of the tour at Universal Studios Hollywood, the Boeing 747 crash site, made for a movie.


The Universal Studios Hollywood tour includes a visit to a staged crash site featuring a Boeing 747, which has unfortunately been misused in viral posts to spread false information.

While doing research, we were able to locate imagery indicating that the video that went viral, along with the Universal Studios tour footage, provided an exact match and therefore verified that the video had no connection to the Ahmedabad incident. A side-by-side comparison tells us all we need to know to uncover the truth.


Conclusion:
The viral video claiming to show the aftermath of the Air India crash in Ahmedabad is entirely misleading and false. The video is showing a fictitious movie set from Universal Studios Hollywood, not a real disaster scene in India. Spreading misinformation like this can create unnecessary panic and confusion in sensitive situations. We urge viewers to only trust verified news and double-check claims before sharing any content online.
- Claim: Massive explosion and debris shown in viral video after Air India crash.
- Claimed On: Social Media
- Fact Check: False and Misleading

Introduction
The digital realm is evolving at a rapid pace, revolutionising cyberspace at a breakneck speed. However, this dynamic growth has left several operational and regulatory lacunae in the fabric of cyberspace, which are exploited by cybercriminals for their ulterior motives. One of the threats that emerged rapidly in 2024 is proxyjacking, in which vulnerable systems are exploited by cyber criminals to sell their bandwidth to third-party proxy servers. This cyber threat poses a significant threat to organisations and individual servers.
Proxyjacking is a kind of cyber attack that leverages legit bandwidth sharing services such as Peer2Profit and HoneyGain. These are legitimate platforms but proxyjacking occurs when such services are exploited without user consent. These services provide the opportunity to monetize their surplus internet bandwidth by sharing with other users. The model itself is harmless but provides an avenue for numerous cyber hostilities. The participants install net-sharing software and add the participating system to the proxy network, enabling users to route their traffic through the system. This setup intends to enhance privacy and provide access to geo-locked content.
The Modus Operandi
These systems are hijacked by cybercriminals, who sell the bandwidth of infected devices. This is achieved by establishing Secure Shell (SSH) connections to vulnerable servers. While hackers rarely use honeypots to render elaborate scams, the technical possibility of them doing so cannot be discounted. Cowrie Honeypots, for instance, are engineered to emulate UNIX systems. Attackers can use similar tactics to gain unauthorized access to poorly secured systems. Once inside the system, attackers utilise legit tools such as public docker images to take over proxy monetization services. These tools are undetectable to anti-malware software due to being genuine software in and of themselves. Endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools also struggle with the same threats.
The Major Challenges
Limitation Of Current Safeguards – current malware detection software is unable to distinguish between malicious and genuine use of bandwidth services, as the nature of the attack is not inherently malicious.
Bigger Threat Than Crypto-Jacking – Proxyjacking poses a bigger threat than cryptojacking, where systems are compromised to mine crypto-currency. Proxyjacking uses minimal system resources rendering it more challenging to identify. As such, proxyjacking offers perpetrators a higher degree of stealth because it is a resource-light technique, whereas cryptojacking can leave CPU and GPU usage footprints.
Role of Technology in the Fight Against Proxyjacking
Advanced Safety Measures- Implementing advanced safety measures is crucial in combating proxyjacking. Network monitoring tools can help detect unusual traffic patterns indicative of proxyjacking. Key-based authentication for SSH can significantly reduce the risk of unauthorized access, ensuring that only trusted devices can establish connections. Intrusion Detection Systems and Intrusion Prevention Systems can go a long way towards monitoring unusual outbound traffic.
Robust Verification Processes- sharing services must adopt robust verification processes to ensure that only legitimate users are sharing bandwidth. This could include stricter identity verification methods and continuous monitoring of user activities to identify and block suspicious behaviour.
Policy Recommendations
Verification for Bandwidth Sharing Services – Mandatory verification standards should be enforced for bandwidth-sharing services, including stringent Know Your Customer (KYC) protocols to verify the identity of users. A strong regulatory body would ensure proper compliance with verification standards and impose penalties. The transparency reports must document the user base, verification processes and incidents.
Robust SSH Security Protocols – Key-based authentication for SSH across organisations should be mandated, to neutralize the risk of brute force attacks. Mandatory security audits of SSH configuration within organisations to ensure best practices are complied with and vulnerabilities are identified will help. Detailed logging of SSH attempts will streamline the process of identification and investigation of suspicious behaviour.
Effective Anomaly Detection System – Design a standard anomaly detection system to monitor networks. The industry-wide detection system should focus on detecting inconsistencies in traffic patterns indicating proxy-jacking. Establishing mandatory protocols for incident reporting to centralised authority should be implemented. The system should incorporate machine learning in order to stay abreast with evolving attack methodologies.
Framework for Incident Response – A national framework should include guidelines for investigation, response and remediation to be followed by organisations. A centralized database can be used for logging and tracking all proxy hacking incidents, allowing for information sharing on a real-time basis. This mechanism will aid in identifying emerging trends and common attack vectors.
Whistleblower Incentives – Enacting whistleblower protection laws will ensure the proper safety of individuals reporting proxyjacking activities. Monetary rewards provide extra incentives and motivate individuals to join whistleblowing programs. To provide further protection to whistleblowers, secure communication channels can be established which will ensure full anonymity to individuals.
Conclusion
Proxyjacking represents an insidious and complicated threat in cyberspace. By exploiting legitimate bandwidth-sharing services, cybercriminals can profit while remaining entirely anonymous. Addressing this issue requires a multifaceted approach, including advanced anomaly detection systems, effective verification systems, and comprehensive incident response frameworks. These measures of strong cyber awareness among netizens will ensure a healthy and robust cyberspace.
References
- https://gridinsoft.com/blogs/what-is-proxyjacking/
- https://www.darkreading.com/cyber-risk/ssh-servers-hit-in-proxyjacking-cyberattacks
- https://therecord.media/hackers-use-log4j-in-proxyjacking-scheme