#FactCheck: Viral AI video being shared online claiming Iran has destroyed Tel Aviv Ben Gurion Airport in an Iranian missile strike

Background

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Cyber slavery and online trafficking have become alarming challenges in Southeast Asia. Against this backdrop, India successfully rescued 197 of its citizens from Mae Sot in Thailand on November 10, 2025, using two Indian Air Force flights. The evacuees had fled Myanmar’s Myawaddy region in October after intense military operations forced them to escape. This was India’s second rescue effort within a week, following the November 6 mission that brought back 270 nationals from similar conditions. The operations were coordinated by the Indian Embassy in Bangkok and the Consulate in Chiang Mai, with crucial assistance from the Royal Thai Government.

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The Operation and Bilateral Cooperation

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The operation was carried out with the presence and supervision of Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul of Thailand and Indian Ambassador Nagesh Singh, who were both present at the ceremony in Mae Sot. This way, the two countries have not only proved but also cemented their bond to fight the crimes which were mentioned before and more than that, they have even promised to facilitate communication between their authorities. Prime Minister Charnvirakul thanked India for the quick intervention and added that Thailand would be giving the needed support for the repatriation of the other victims as well.

“Both parties reaffirmed their strong commitment to the fight against cross-border crimes, including cyber scams and human trafficking, in the region and to improving cooperation among the relevant agencies in both countries.”, Embassy of India, Bangkok.

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The Cyber Scam Network

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The Myawaddy area in Myanmar has made a quick shift to become a hotspot for the entire world of cybercrimes. Moreover, the crimes are especially committed by the organised criminal groups that take advantage of foreign nationals. After the Myanmar military imposed a restriction in late October, over 1,500 people from 28 nations moved to Thailand because of the KK Park cyber hub and other centres being raided.

A UN report (2025) indicated that this fraud activity is part of a larger network that extends the countries populated with very low-tech criminals who target the most naïve, and they are the very ones who end up being tortured. The trafficked persons often belong to the local population or come from neighbouring countries and are recruited with the promise of high salaries as IT or customer service agents, only to be imprisoned in a compound where they are forced to perform phishing, investment fraud, and cryptocurrency scams aimed at the victims all over the globe. These centres operate in border territories having poor governance, easy-to-cross borders, and little police presence, hence making human trafficking a major factor contributing to cybercrime.

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India’s Response and Preventive Measures

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The Indian Embassy in Thailand worked hand in hand with the Thai government to facilitate bringing back and repatriating the Indian citizens who had entered Thailand illegally when they were escaping Myanmar.

The embassy was far from helpless in the matter. In the case of the embassy's advisory, they suggested to the citizens that:

• It is mandatory to check the authenticity of the job offers and the agents before securing employment in other countries.
• Such employment by means of tourist or visa-free entry permits should be avoided, as such entries allow only for a short-duration visit or tourism.
• Be careful of ads claiming high pay for online or remote work in Southeast Asia.

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The embassy reiterated the Government of India’s commitment to ensuring easy access to assistance for citizens overseas and to addressing the growing intersection between cyber fraud and human trafficking.

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CyberPeace Analysis and Advisory

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The case of Myawaddy demonstrates that cybercrime and human trafficking have grappled to become a complicated global threat. The scam centres gradually come to depend on the trafficked labour of people who are being forced to commit the fraud digitally under coercion. This underlines the requirement for the cybersecurity measures that consider the rights of humans and the protection of the victims, not only the technical defence.

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1. Cybercrime–Human Trafficking Convergence: 

Cybercrime has moved up to the level of a human trafficking operation. The unwilling victims of such fraud schemes are scared for their very lives or even more, not of a reliable way out. This situation is such that one cannot tell where cyber exploitation ends and forced labour begins.

2. Cross-Border Enforcement Challenges:

To effectively carry out their unlawful acts, the criminals use legal and jurisdictional loopholes that are present across borders. Dismantling such networks requires the regional cooperation of India, Thailand, and ASEAN countries.

3. Socioeconomic Vulnerability:

The situation with unemployment being stagnant and the public not being educated about the situation makes people, especially the youth, very prone to scams of getting hired overseas. Thus, to prevent this uneducated flocking to the fraudsters, it is necessary to constantly implant in them the knowledge of online literacy and the importance of verification of job offers.

4. Public–Private Coordination: 

The scammers’ mode of operation usually includes online recruitment through social media and encrypted platforms where their victims can be found and contacted. In this regard, cooperation among government institutions, tech platforms, and civil society is imperative to put an end to the operation of these digital trafficking channels.

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CyberPeace Expert Advisory

To lessen the possibility of such incidents, CyberPeace suggests the following preventive and policy measures:

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Individuals:

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• Trust but verify: Before giving your approval to anything, always verify the job offer by official embassy websites or MEA-approved recruiting agencies first.
• Watch out for red flags: If a recruiter offers a very high salary for almost no work, asks for tourist visas, or gives no written contract, be very careful and pull out immediately.
• Protect your documents: Give a trusted person the responsibility of keeping both digital and physical copies of your passport and visa, and also register your travel with the MADAD portal.
• Report if in doubt: If an agent looks suspicious, contact the nearest Indian Embassy or Consulate or report it to cybercrime.gov.in or the 1930 Helpline.

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Policymakers and Agencies:

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• Strengthen Bilateral Task Forces: Set up armed forces of cyber and human trafficking enforcement units in South and Southeast Asian countries.
• Support Regional Awareness Campaigns: In addition to targeted advisories in local languages, the most vulnerable job seekers in Tier-2 and Tier-3 cities should also receive such awareness in their languages.
• Overseas Employment Advertising should be regulated: All digital job postings should be made to meet transparency standards and fraudulent recruitment should be punished with heavy fines.
• Invest in Digital Forensics and Intelligence Sharing: Create common databases for monitoring international cybercriminal groups.

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Conclusion

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The return of Indian citizens from Thailand represents a significant humanitarian and diplomatic milestone and highlights that cybercrime, though carried out through digital channels, remains deeply human in nature. International cooperation, well-informed citizens, and a rights-based cybersecurity approach are the minimum requirements for a global campaign against the new breed of cybercrime that is characterised by fraud and trafficking working hand in hand. CyberPeace reminds everyone that digital vigilance, verification, and collaboration across borders are the most effective ways to prevent online abuse and such crimes.

Reference

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• https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/197-indians-repatriated-from-thailand-by-special-indian-air-force-flights-9611934
• https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-airlifts-citizens-who-worked-in-myanmar-cybercrime-hub-from-thailand/article70264322.ece
• https://www.mea.gov.in/Images/attach/03-List-4-2024.pdf

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Executive Summary:

A circulating picture which is said to be of United States President Joe Biden wearing military uniform during a meeting with military officials has been found out to be AI-generated. This viral image however falsely claims to show President Biden authorizing US military action in the Middle East. The Cyberpeace Research Team has identified that the photo is generated by generative AI and not real. Multiple visual discrepancies in the picture mark it as a product of AI.

Claims:

A viral image claiming to be US President Joe Biden wearing a military outfit during a meeting with military officials has been created using artificial intelligence. This picture is being shared on social media with the false claim that it is of President Biden convening to authorize the use of the US military in the Middle East.

Similar Post:

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Fact Check:

CyberPeace Research Team discovered that the photo of US President Joe Biden in a military uniform at a meeting with military officials was made using generative-AI and is not authentic. There are some obvious visual differences that plainly suggest this is an AI-generated shot.

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Firstly, the eyes of US President Joe Biden are full black, secondly the military officials face is blended, thirdly the phone is standing without any support.

We then put the image in Image AI Detection tool

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The tool predicted 4% human and 96% AI, Which tells that it’s a deep fake content.

Let’s do it with another tool named Hive Detector.

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Hive Detector predicted to be as 100% AI Detected, Which likely to be a Deep Fake Content.

Conclusion:

Thus, the growth of AI-produced content is a challenge in determining fact from fiction, particularly in the sphere of social media. In the case of the fake photo supposedly showing President Joe Biden, the need for critical thinking and verification of information online is emphasized. With technology constantly evolving, it is of great importance that people be watchful and use verified sources to fight the spread of disinformation. Furthermore, initiatives to make people aware of the existence and impact of AI-produced content should be undertaken in order to promote a more aware and digitally literate society.

• Claim: A circulating picture which is said to be of United States President Joe Biden wearing military uniform during a meeting with military officials
• Claimed on: X
• Fact Check: Fake

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Introduction
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The Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MEITy) released the Draft Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Second Amendment Rules, 2026 on March 30, 2026, inviting public comments with a response window closing on April 14. This is a limited 15-day period for public input on proposed rules that will have major constitutional impacts. The brevity and timing of this opportunity demonstrate debatable commitment to stakeholder engagement and meaningful consultation by the drafting agency.

While MEITY describes the proposed amendments as "clarificatory and procedural nature," an analysis shows they will have substantive effects. Collectively, the amended language changes significantly how online speech will be regulated in India by providing the executive with more concentrated regulatory authority, limiting the required transparency of content enforcement, mandating greater retention of data without proportionality-based safeguards, and placing excessive compliance burden on intermediaries. Each of these changes has consequences beyond just changes in process and together, these changes collectively raise substantial concerns regarding compliance with Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution of India.

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The Constitutional Baseline: Shreya Singhal and the Limits of Intermediary Liability
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India’s Supreme Court decision in Shreya Singhal v Union of India (2015) 5 SCC 1 provides the foundation for intermediary liability, wherein the Court read down Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act, 2000, holding that intermediaries are required to act upon receiving actual knowledge only through a court order or a valid notification by the appropriate government authority. The Supreme Court’s decision intended to provide a constitutional protection to intermediaries from being subjected to informal, unverified executive pressure to take down content by requiring that any such order be subject to some level of legal objective credibility or threshold.

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Rule 3(4) of the proposed amendments places that balance under significant strain. By requiring intermediaries to comply with advisories, directions, standard operating procedures, codes of practice, and guidelines issued by the Ministry — and tying non-compliance to the loss of safe harbour — the draft effectively lowers the constitutional threshold that Shreya Singhal was designed to maintain. Compliance obligations now potentially arise from instruments that carry no judicial sanction and no mandatory public disclosure.

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Rule 3(4): Delegated Legislation or Executive Overreach
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The rule-making power conferred on the Central Government under Section 87 of the IT Act is limited to carrying out the provisions of the Act. It does not authorise the creation of new substantive obligations. This principle has been consistently affirmed in Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India (1985) 1 SCC 641 and Confederation of Ex-Servicemen Associations v. Union of India (2006) 8 SCC 399, where the Court held that delegated legislation must remain within the four corners of the parent statute.

Rule 3(4) tests those limits. It converts executive advisories into binding compliance instruments without a clear statutory foundation in either Section 79 or Section 87. Although the proposed rule requires that such instruments specify their legal basis, there is no requirement that they be published or made publicly accessible. This creates a framework in which legality risks becoming circular — instruments claimed to be lawful solely by reference to a provision that does not clearly authorise them, shielded from scrutiny by their own opacity. Justice Chandurkar’s judgment in Kunal Kamra v. Union of India identified precisely this defect in the Fact Check Unit amendment. Rule 3(4) replicates the structural problem in a broader form.

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Compliance Pressure and the Logic of Over-Censorship
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The practical consequence of Rule 3(4) lies not only in its legality but in how it reshapes incentive structures for platforms. An intermediary facing the permanent threat of safe harbour loss will not wait to assess the legal merit of each advisory. The rational calculation is to comply early, broadly, and without friction. Lawful content — particularly satire, political commentary, and journalism — becomes vulnerable not because it is unlawful, but because it presents regulatory risk.

This dynamic was visible on 18 March 2026, when stand-up comedian Pulkit Mani (@hunnywhoisfunny) found his satirical Instagram reel being restricted across India. The video had accumulated over 16.5 million views. Users encountered a notice citing Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act. No reasons were publicly provided. No prior hearing was offered. The same night, several political parody and satire accounts were withheld on X. 

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Data Retention, Privacy, and the Proportionality Test
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The amendments to Rules 3(1)(g) and 3(1)(h) extend data retention obligations by making them additional to requirements under any other law. The existing 180-day floor for retained user data — covering removed content, registration information, and associated records — becomes a minimum rather than a ceiling. No maximum is specified, and no proportionality requirement accompanies the extension.

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This raises direct concerns under Article 21 as interpreted in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1, which held that any state intrusion into privacy must satisfy the triple test of legality, necessity, and proportionality. Undefined retention periods, with no statutory ceiling and no requirement of purpose limitation, risk failing all three. The longer user data is held, including metadata, device information, and records of removed content,  the greater the exposure to surveillance, unauthorised access, and use beyond the original justification.

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Circumventing Judicial Scrutiny Through Procedural Redesign
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The Bombay High Court, in its August 2021 order, stayed provisions of the IT Rules’ oversight mechanism as prima facie violative of Article 19(1)(a). The Madras High Court in T.M. Krishna v. Union of India affirmed that stay, cautioning that government-controlled media oversight risked undermining press independence. Both matters remain pending before the Delhi High Court.

The amendments to Rules 8(1) and 14 restructure the same oversight machinery through a modified procedural design. By extending the Inter-Departmental Committee’s jurisdiction to cover “matters” referred by the Ministry with no requirement of a complainant, no defined subject matter, and no guaranteed prior hearing, the proposed rules effectively reconstitute what courts found constitutionally suspect. Individual users posting news and current affairs content are now brought within reach of blocking mechanisms originally designed for institutional publishers.

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Conclusion
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As seen above, the Draft IT Rules 2026 are unable to meet the constitutional and judicial requirements to regulate free speech. What the proposed amendments construct is a durable system in which platforms self-censor under liability pressure, data is retained without proportionate justification, and content oversight expands through procedural adjustment rather than parliamentary legislation. Regulation of the digital public sphere is both legitimate and necessary. But it must be anchored in law, not in the quiet authority of executive advisories. The law must ultimately remain anchored in constitutional values, guided by the enduring principles of justice, equity, and good conscience.

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The comment period closes on 14 April 2026. 

Submissions may be sent to itrules.consultation@meity.gov.in.

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References
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1. https://www.meity.gov.in/static/uploads/2026/03/30591fc6e322dcbcc9dae84a0f02e9e7.pdf 
2. https://www.meity.gov.in/static/uploads/2026/03/a71a21d35c107f2e528363d3eb17646a.pdf 
3. https://www.meity.gov.in/static/uploads/2026/02/550681ab908f8afb135b0ad42816a1c9.pdf 
4. https://neopolitico.com/india/government-blocks-viral-satirical-reel-impersonating-pm-modi-raising-fresh-questions-on-free-speech-and-digital-regulation/
5. https://internetfreedom.in/sound-the-alarm-iffs-first-read-on-meitys-draft-it-rules-second-amendment-2026/ 

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