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Introduction

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Online dating platforms have become a common way for individuals to connect in today’s digital age. For many in the LGBTQ+ community, especially in environments where offline meeting spaces are limited, these platforms offer a way to find companionship and support. However, alongside these opportunities come serious risks. Users are increasingly being targeted by cybercrimes such as blackmail, sextortion, identity theft, and online harassment. These incidents often go unreported due to stigma and concerns about privacy. The impact of such crimes can be both emotional and financial, highlighting the need for greater awareness and digital safety.

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Cybercrime On LGBTQ+ Dating Apps: A Threat Landscape

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According to the NCRB 2022 report, there has been a 24.4% increase in cybercrimes. But unfortunately, the queer community-specific data is not available.  Cybercrimes that target LGBTQ+ users in very organised and predatory. In several Indian cities, gangs actively monitor dating platforms to the point that potential victims, especially young queers and those who seem discreet about their identity, become targets. Once the contact is established, perpetrators use a standard operating process, building false trust, forcing private exchanges, and then gradually starting blackmail and financial exploitation. Many queer victims are blackmailed with threats of exposure to families or workplaces, often by fake police demanding bribes. Fear of stigma and insensitive policing discourages reporting. Cyber criminal gangs exploit these gaps on dating apps. Despite some arrests, under-reporting persists, and activists call for stronger platform safety.

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Types of Cyber Crimes against Queer Community on Dating Apps

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1. Romance scam or “Lonely hearts scam”: Scammers build trust with false stories (military, doctors, NGO workers) and quickly express strong romantic interest. They later request money, claiming emergencies. They often try to create multiple accounts to avoid profile bans. 
2. Sugar daddy scam: In this type of scam, the fraudster offers money or allowance in exchange for things like chatting, sending photos, or other interactions. They usually offer a specific amount and want to use some uncommon payment gateways. After telling you they will send you a lot of money, they often make up a story like: “My last sugar baby cheated me, so now you must first send me a small amount to prove you are trustworthy.” This is just a trick to make you send them money first.
3. Sextortion / Blackmail scam: Scammers record explicit chats or pretend to be underage, then threaten exposure unless you pay. Some target discreet users. Never send explicit content or pay blackmailers. 
4. Investment Scams: Scammers posing as traders or bankers convince victims to invest in fake opportunities. Some "flip" small amounts to build trust, then disappear with larger sums. Real investors won’t approach you on dating apps. Don’t share financial info or transfer money.
5. Pay-Before-You-Meet scam: Scammer demands upfront payment (gift cards, gas money, membership fees) before meeting, then vanishes. Never pay anyone before meeting in person.
6. Security app registration scam: Scammers ask you to register on fake "security apps" to steal your info, claiming it ensures your safety. Research apps before registering. Be wary of quick link requests.
7. The Verification code scam: Scammers trick you into giving them SMS verification codes, allowing them to hijack your accounts. Never share verification codes with anyone.
8. Third-party app links: Mass spam messages with suspicious links that steal info or infect devices. Don’t click suspicious links or “Google me” messages.
9. Support message scam: Messages pretending to be from application support, offering prizes or fake shows to lure you to malicious sites. 

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Platform Accountability & Challenges 

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The issue of online dating platforms in India is characterised by weak grievance redressal, poor takedown of abusive profiles, and limited moderation practices. Most platforms appoint grievance officers or offer an in-app complaint portal, but complaints are often unanswered or receive only automated and AI-generated responses. This highlights the gap between policy and enforcement on the ground.

Abusive or fake profiles, often used for scams, hate crimes, and outing LGBTQ+ individuals, remain active long after being reported. In India, organised extortion gangs have exploited such profiles to lure, assault, rob, and blackmail queer men. Moderation teams often struggle with backlogs and lack the resources needed to handle even the most serious complaints.

Despite offering privacy settings and restricting profile visibility, moderation practices in India are still weak, leaving large segments of users vulnerable to impersonation, catfishing, and fraud. The concept of pseudonymisation can help protect vulnerable communities, but it is difficult to distinguish authentic users from malicious actors without robust, privacy-respecting verification systems. 

Since many LGBTQ+ individuals prefer to maintain their confidentiality, while others are more vocal about their identities, in either case, the data shared by an individual with an online dating platform must be vigilantly protected. The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, mandates the protection of personal data. Section 8(4) provides: “A Data Fiduciary shall implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure effective observance of the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder.” Accordingly, digital platforms collecting such data should adopt the necessary technical and organisational measures to comply with data protection laws.

Recommendations

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The Supreme Court has been proactive in this regard, through decisions like Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, which decriminalised same-sex relationships. Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India and Ors., acknowledged the right to privacy as a fundamental right, and, most recently, the 2025 affirmation of the right to digital access. However, to protect LGBTQ+ people online, more robust legal frameworks are still required.

There is a requirement for a dedicated commission or an empowered LGBTQ+ cell. Like the National Commission for Women (NCW), which works to safeguard the rights of women, a similar commission would address community-specific issues, including cybercrime, privacy violations, and discrimination on digital platforms. It may serve as an institutional link between the victim, the digital platforms, the government, and the police. Dating Platforms must enhance their security features and grievance mechanisms to safeguard the users.

Best Practices

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Scammers use data sets and plans to target individuals seeking specific interests, such as love, sex, money, or association. Do not make financial transactions, such as signing up for third-party platforms or services. Scammers may attempt to create accounts for others, which can be used to access dating platforms and harm legitimate users. Users should be vigilant about sharing sensitive information, such as private images, contact information, or addresses, as scammers can use this information to threaten users. Stay smart, stay cyber safe. 

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References

1. https://www.hindustantimes.com/htcity/cinema/16yearold-queer-child-pranshu-dies-by-suicide-due-to-bullying-did-we-fail-as-a-society-mental-health-expert-opines-101701172202794.html#google_vignette
2. https://www.ijsr.net/archive/v11i6/SR22617213031.pdf
3. https://help.grindr.com/hc/en-us/articles/1500009328241-Scam-awareness-guide
4. http://meity.gov.in/static/uploads/2024/06/2bf1f0e9f04e6fb4f8fef35e82c42aa5.pdf
5. https://mib.gov.in/sites/default/files/2024-02/IT%28Intermediary%20Guidelines%20and%20Digital%20Media%20Ethics%20Code%29%20Rules%2C%202021%20English.pdf

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Introduction 

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Regulatory agencies throughout Europe have stepped up their monitoring of digital communication platforms because of the increased use of Artificial Intelligence in the digital domain. Messaging services have evolved into being more than just messaging systems, they now serve as a gateway for Artificial Intelligence services, Business Tools and Digital Marketplaces. In light of this evolution, the Competition Authority in Italy has taken action against Meta Platforms and ordered Meta to cease activities on WhatsApp that are deemed to restrict the ability of other companies to sell AI-based chatbots. This action highlights the concerns surrounding Gatekeeping Power, Market Foreclosure and Innovation Suppression. This proceeding will also raise questions regarding the application of Competition Law to the actions of Dominant Digital Platforms, where they leverage their own ecosystems to promote their own AI products to the detriment of competitors.

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Background of the Case

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In December 2025, Italy’s competition authority, the Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (AGCM), ordered Meta Platforms to suspend certain contractual terms governing WhatsApp. These terms allegedly prevented or restricted the operation of third-party AI chatbots on WhatsApp’s platform.

The decision was issued as an interim measure during an ongoing antitrust investigation. According to the AGCM, the disputed terms risked excluding competing AI chatbot providers from accessing a critical digital channel, thereby distorting competition and harming consumer choice.

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Why WhatsApp Matters as a Digital Gateway

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WhatsApp is situated uniquely within the European digital landscape. It has hundreds of millions of users throughout the entire European Union; therefore, it is an integral part of the communication infrastructure that supports communications between individual consumers and companies as well as between companies and their service providers. AI chatbot developers depend heavily upon WhatsApp as it provides the ability to connect directly with consumers in real-time, which is critical to their success as business offers.

According to the Italian regulator's opinion, a corporation that controls the ability to communicate via such a popular platform has a tremendous influence over innovation within that market as it essentially operates as a gatekeeper between the company creating an innovative service and the consumer using that service. If Meta is permitted to stop competing AI chatbot developers while providing more productive and useful offers than those offered by competing developers, it is likely that competing developers will be unable to market and distribute their innovative products at sufficient scale to remain competitive.

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Alleged Abuse of Dominant Position

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Under EU and national competition law, companies holding a dominant market position bear a special responsibility not to distort competition. The AGCM’s concern is that Meta may have abused WhatsApp’s dominance by:

• Restricting market access for rival AI chatbot providers
• Limiting technical development by preventing interoperability
• Strengthening Meta’s own AI ecosystem at the expense of competitors

Such conduct, if proven, could amount to an abuse under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Importantly, the authority emphasised that even contractual terms—rather than explicit bans—can have exclusionary effects when imposed by a dominant platform.

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Meta’s Response and Infrastructure Argument

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Meta has openly condemned the Italian ruling as “fundamentally flawed,” arguing that third-party AI chatbots represent a major economic burden to the infrastructure and risk the performance, safety, and user enjoyment of WhatsApp.

Although the protection of infrastructure is a valid issue of concern, competition authorities commonly look at whether the justifications for such restrictions are appropriate and non-discriminatory. One of the principal legal issues is whether the restrictions imposed by Meta were applied in a uniform manner or whether they were selectively imposed in favour of Meta's AI services. If the restrictions are asymmetrical in application, they may be viewed as anti-competitive rather than as legitimate technical safeguards.

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Link to the EU’s Digital Markets Framework

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The Italian case fits into a wider EU context in relation to their efforts to regulate the actions of large technology companies with the use of prior (ex-ante) regulation as contained in the Digital Markets Act (DMA). The DMA has put in place obligations on a set of gatekeepers to make available to third parties on a non-discriminatory basis in order to maintain equitable access, interoperability and no discrimination against those parties.

While the Italian case has been brought pursuant to an Italian competition law, its philosophy is consistent with that of the DMA in that dominant digital platforms should not undertake actions that use their control over their core products and services to prevent other companies from being able to innovate. The trend with some EU national regulators is to be increasingly willing to take swift action through the application of interim measures rather than await many years for final decisions.

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Implications for AI Developers and Platforms

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The Italian order signifies to developers of AI-based chatbots that competitive access to AI technology via messaging services is an important factor for regulatory bodies. The order also serves as a warning to the large incumbent organisations that are establishing a foothold in the messaging services market to integrate AI into their already established platforms that they will not be protected from competition laws.

Additionally, the overall case showcases the growing consensus amongst regulatory agencies regarding the role of competition in the development of AI. If a handful of large companies are allowed to control both the infrastructure and the AI technology being operated on top of that infrastructure, the result will likely be the development of closed ecosystems that eliminate or greatly reduce the potential for technology diversity.

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Conclusion 

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Italy's move against Meta highlights a significant intersection between competitive laws and artificial intelligence. The Italian antitrust authority has reinforced the principle that digital gatekeepers cannot use contractual methods to block off access to competition in targeting WhatsApp's restrictive terms. As AI becomes a larger part of our day to day digital services, regulatory bodies will likely continue to increase their scrutiny on platform behaviour. The result of this investigation will impact not just the Metaverse's AI strategy, but also create a baseline for future European regulators' methods of balancing innovation versus competition versus consumer choice in an increasingly AI-driven digital marketplace. 

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References 

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1. https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/boards-policy-regulation/italy-watchdog-orders-meta-halt-whatsapp-terms-barring-rival-ai-chatbots-2025-12-24/ 
2. https://techcrunch.com/2025/12/24/italy-tells-meta-to-suspend-its-policy-that-bans-rival-ai-chatbots-from-whatsapp/ 
3. https://www.communicationstoday.co.in/italy-watchdog-orders-meta-to-halt-whatsapp-terms-barring-rival-ai-chatbots/
4. https://www.techinasia.com/news/italy-watchdog-orders-meta-halt-whatsapp-terms-ai-bot 

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Introduction

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In today’s digital era, warfare is being redefined. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh recently stated that “we are in the age of Grey Zone and hybrid warfare where cyber-attacks, disinformation campaigns and economic warfare have become tools to achieve politico-military aims without a single shot being fired.” The crippling cyberattacks on Estonia in 2007, Russia’s interference in the 2016 US elections, and the ransomware strike on the Colonial Pipeline in the United States in 2021 all demonstrate how states are now using cyberspace to achieve strategic goals while carefully circumventing the threshold of open war.

Legal Complexities: Attribution, Response, and Accountability

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Grey zone warfare challenges the traditional notions of security and international conventions on peace due to inherent challenges such as :

• Attribution
  The first challenge in cyber warfare is determining who is responsible. Threat actors hide behind rented botnets, fake IP addresses, and servers scattered across the globe. Investigators can follow digital trails, but those trails often point to machines, not people. That makes attribution more of an educated guess than a certainty. A wrong guess could lead to misattribution of blame, which could beget a diplomatic crisis, or worse, a military one.
• Proportional Response
  Even if attribution is clear, designing a response can be a challenge. International law does give room for countermeasures if they are both ‘necessary’ and ‘proportionate’. But defining these qualifiers can be a long-drawn, contested process. Effectively, governments employ softer measures such as protests or sanctions, tighten their cyber defences or, in extreme cases, strike back digitally.
• Accountability
  States can be held responsible for waging cyber attacks under the UN’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility. But these are non-binding and enforcement depends on collective pressure, which can be slow and inconsistent. In cyberspace, accountability often ends up being more symbolic than real, leaving plenty of room for repeat offences.

International and Indian Legal Frameworks

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Cyber law is a step behind cyber warfare since existing international frameworks are often inadequate. For example, the Tallinn Manual 2.0, the closest thing we have to a rulebook for cyber conflict, is just a set of guidelines. It says that if a cyber operation can be tied to a state, even through hired hackers or proxies, then that state can be held responsible. But attribution is a major challenge. Similarly, the United Nations has tried to build order through its Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) that promotes norms like “don’t attack. However, these norms are not binding, effectively leaving practice to diplomacy and trust.

India is susceptible to routine attacks from hostile actors, but does not yet have a dedicated cyber warfare law.  While Section 66F of the IT ACT, 2000, talks about cyber terrorism, and Section 75 lets Indian courts examine crimes committed abroad if they impact India,  grey-zone tactics like fake news campaigns, election meddling, and influence operations fall into a legal vacuum.

Way Forward

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• Strengthen International Cooperation
  Frameworks like the Tallinn Manual 2.0 can form the basis for future treaties. Bilateral and multilateral agreements between countries are essential to ensure accountability and cooperation in tackling grey zone activities.
• Develop Grey Zone Legislation
  India currently relies on the IT Act, 2000, but this law needs expansion to specifically cover grey zone tactics such as election interference, propaganda, and large-scale disinformation campaigns.
• Establish Active Monitoring Systems
  India must create robust early detection systems to identify grey zone operations in cyberspace. Agencies can coordinate with social media platforms like Instagram, Facebook, X (Twitter), and YouTube, which are often exploited for propaganda and disinformation, to improve monitoring frameworks.
• Dedicated Theatre Commands for Cyber Operations
  Along with the existing Defence Cyber Agency, India should consider specialised theatre commands for grey zone and cyber warfare. This would optimise resources, enhance coordination, and ensure unified command in dealing with hybrid threats.

Conclusion

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Grey zone warfare in cyberspace is no longer an optional tactic used by threat actors but a routine activity. India lacks the early detection systems, robust infrastructure, and strong cyber laws to counter grey-zone warfare. To counter this, India needs sharper attribution tools for early detection and must actively push for stronger international rules in this global landscape. More importantly, instead of merely blaming without clear plans, India should focus on preparing for solid retaliation strategies. By doing so, India can also learn to use cyberspace strategically to achieve politico-military aims without firing a single shot.

References

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• Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations (Michael N. Schmitt)
• UN Document on International Law in Cyberspace (UN Digital Library)
• NATO Cyber Defence Policy
• Texas Law Review: State Responsibility and Attribution of Cyber Intrusions
• Deccan Herald: Defence Minister on Grey Zone Warfare
• VisionIAS: Grey Zone Warfare
• Sachin Tiwari, The Reality of Cyber Operations in the Grey Zone

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