#FactCheck-Viral Video of 'Melted' Traffic Signal in Europe Shared with False Heatwave Claim

Introduction

On May 21st, 2025, the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) launched the Financial Risk Indicator (FRI) feature, marking an important step towards safeguarding mobile phone users from the risks of financial fraud. This was developed as a part of the Digital Intelligence Platform (DIP), which facilitates coordination between stakeholders to curb the misuse of telecom services for conducting cyber crimes.

What is the Financial Risk Indicator (FRI)?

The FRI is a risk-based metric feature that categorises phone numbers into risk, medium risk, and high risk based on their association with financial fraud in the past. The data pool enabling this intelligence sharing includes the Digital Intelligence Unit (DIU) of the DoT, which engages and sends a list of Mobile Numbers that were disconnected (Mobile Number Revocation List - MNRL) to the following stakeholders, creating a network of checks and balances. They are:

1. Intelligence from Non-Banking Finance Companies, and UPI (Unified Payment Interface) gateways.
2. The Chakshu facility- a feature on the Sanchar Saathi portal that enables users to report suspected fraudulent communication (Calls, SMS, WhatsApp messages), which has also been roped in.
3. Complaints from the National Cybercrime Reporting Portal (NCRP) through the I4C (Indian Cyber Coordination Center).

Some other initiatives taken up concerning securing against digital financial fraud are the Citizen Financial Cyber Fraud Reporting and Management System, the International Incoming Spoofed Calls Prevention System, among others.

A United Stance

The ease of payment and increasing digitisation might have enabled the increasing usage of UPI platforms. However, post-adoption, the responsibility of securing the digital payments infrastructure becomes essential. As per a report by CNBC TV18, UPI fraud cases surged by 85% in FY24. The number of incidents have increased from 7.25 lakh in FY23 to 13.42 lakh in FY24. These cases involved a total value of ₹1,087 crore, compared to ₹573 crore in the previous year, and the number continues to increase. 

Nevertheless, UPI platforms are taking their own initiative to combat such crimes. PhonePe, one of the most used digital payment interface as of January 2025 (Statista) has already incorporated the FRI into its PhonePe Protect feature; this blocks transactions with high-risk numbers and issues a warning prior to engaging with numbers that are categorised to be of medium risk. 

CyberPeace Insights

The launch of a feature addressing the growing threat of financial fraud is crucial for creating a network of stakeholders to coordinate with law enforcement to better track and prevent crimes. Publicity of these measures will raise public awareness and keep end-users informed. A secure infrastructure for digital payments is necessary in this age, with a robust base mechanism that can adapt to both current and future threats.

References

• https://www.thehawk.in/news/economy-and-business/centre-launches-financial-fraud-risk-indicator-to-safeguard-mobile-users
• https://telanganatoday.com/government-launches-financial-fraud-risk-indicator-to-safeguard-mobile-users
• https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2130249#:~:text=What%20is%20the%20%E2%80%9CFinancial%20Fraud,High%20risk%20of%20financial%20fraud
• https://www.business-standard.com/industry/news/dot-launches-financial-fraud-risk-indicator-to-aid-cybercrime-detection-125052101912_1.html 
• https://www.cnbctv18.com/business/finance/upi-fraud-cases-rise-85-pc-in-fy24-increase-parliament-reply-data-19514295.htm
• https://www.statista.com/statistics/1034443/india-upi-usage-by-platform/#:~:text=In%20January%202025%2C%20PhonePe%20held%20the%20highest,key%20drivers%20of%20UPI%20adoption%20in%20India
• https://telecom.economictimes.indiatimes.com/amp/news/policy/centre-notifies-draft-rules-for-delicensing-lower-6-ghz-band/121260887?nt

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Introduction

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In today’s cybersecurity landscape, ransomware has emerged as one of the most significant and rapidly growing cyber threats. What began as attacks carried out by individual hackers has evolved into a highly organised criminal enterprise, with groups operating through structured business models and global networks. The emergence of The Gentlemen ransomware group reflects this transformation, demonstrating how modern threat actors can quickly expand their operations and target organisations across multiple sectors. Their rise highlights the increasing sophistication of ransomware campaigns and the growing challenges faced by organisations in defending against them. The attribution of the group's administrator to an identified individual in Izhevsk, Russia, provides a valuable lens through which to examine three interconnected developments: the maturation of ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) business models, the inherent operational security (OPSEC) weaknesses that emerge over the course of cybercriminal careers, and the geopolitical environments that enable such actors to operate with relative impunity. Together, these dynamics illustrate the industrialisation of modern cybercrime.

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The Industrialisation of Ransomware-as-a-Service

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The remarkable rapid rise of The Gentlemen is impossible without discussing the maturation of ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS). RaaS systems utilize network intrusion experts as affiliates who conduct networks intrusions and secure access in exchange for a cut of the total ransoms paid, while a core group builds and maintains the ransomware framework itself. Although Reveton, one of the earliest Raas providers, can be credited with bringing early iterations of RaaS to fruition in 2012, the potential scale was truly evident in the mid-2020s. By 2025 it was estimated that there were over 100 active ransomware gangs operating; this proliferation is the direct result of the franchise-like system, which has lowered the barriers to entry for cybercrime. 

The marketplace surrounding RaaS is intensely competitive, and this is clearly exemplified in the business structure of The Gentlemen: while many of the top ransomware groups provide an 80/20 profit share (with the majority of the profit going to the affiliates), The Gentlemen has an exceptionally profitable 90/10 split (affiliates keep 90% of the profit share) for affiliates, likely to draw experienced operators away from their rivals given recent decreases in victim willingness to pay and corresponding increases in the incentives RaaS platforms are required to offer. 

The operational efficiency of the group is representative of a successful enterprise. They attack vulnerable internet-facing VPNs and firewalls and generally complete the network encryption within a matter of hours, leaving defenders with very little time to respond, as confirmed by Check Point Software, a renowned cybersecurity vendor.

Additionally, PRODAFT reports that the administrator of The Gentlemen, known by the alias Zeta88 (previously known as Hastalamuerte), directly provides affiliates with SSL VPN credentials, often obtained through brutal force attacks or their own private leaked databases, indicating an unusually high level of vertical integration for RaaS groups.

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AI as a Force Multiplier in Ransomware Development

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A particularly significant aspect of the Hastalamuerte case is PRODAFT's finding that the administrator employs artificial intelligence to develop and maintain ransomware, support associated tooling, and assist post-exploitation operations. This reflects a broader trend observed across the 2025–2026 threat landscape, where AI has increasingly lowered the capability threshold for participation in organised cybercrime. Researchers have documented its role in automating stages of intrusion, accelerating malware development cycles, and simplifying the maintenance of malicious infrastructure. These capabilities have been leveraged by both nation-state actors and criminal enterprises.

The trajectory of Hastalamuerte is especially illustrative. Cybersecurity Forum posts during 2019-2020 depict a hacker who is fairly novice at fundamental penetration testing procedures. A subsequent emergence as the operator of a top-tier ransomware-as-a-service operation indicates that AI-assisted development may be responsible for dramatically reducing the skill level and time necessary to create a successful criminal enterprise in cyberspace. The evolution of these tools should make the route from novice forum user to accomplished ransomware operator more attainable for a wider array of perpetrators in the future.

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The OPSEC Paradox: How Cybercriminals Leave a Trail

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The attribution of Hastalamuerte's identity by researchers from Intel 471, Flashpoint, and Constella Intelligence demonstrates the effectiveness of modern open-source and commercial intelligence methodologies. A forum registration traceable to an IP address from Izhevsk, Russia linked a Protonmail address, which linked to an Apple account, a GitHub profile, a Telegram handle, a Russian phone number, and finally to a 36 year old marketing professional named Alexander Andreevich Yapaev who was also living in Izhevsk. Investigators did not use an advanced capability in their attribution, but rather a simple OPSEC mistake of consistently reusing credentials. Every username and email address and every phone number creates a linkage between disparate data points, eventually building into a real-world persona. 

It has also come out in the forum discussion that while training for a penetration testing course in 2020, Hastalamuerte displayed the kind of inexperience that a novice would display in traceable, recorded fashion to intelligence databases. It's an example of a broader rule about attribution; attacker mistakes provide the most value. With Russians the lack of apparent consequences may contribute to a lack of need to maintain tight OPSEC from the start.

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The Russian Safe Haven: Conditional Impunity and Its Limits

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Yapaev's base in Izhevsk is emblematic of the geostrategic situation that has allowed Russian cybercriminality to prosper. Security researchers routinely label Russia's policy as one of "controlled impunity," where the cybercriminality directed at foreign entities is ignored or implicitly condoned, while that directed at Russian interests will prompt a law enforcement response. This constitutes what has been called a "managed market" rather than an "unconditional sanctuary," where many of the named defendants could and likely will continue their illegal enterprise with little fear of reprisal, provided that they do not threaten the interests of the Russian state and do not attempt to move their operations outside of Russian control.

Yet this protection is neither absolute nor permanent. In May 2024, the transnational Operation Endgame campaign highlighted the growing global appetite for damaging the cybercrime ecosystem rooted in Russia. Russian authorities did indeed pursue and seize some assets and operators, but arrests seem largely confined to the lower-rung facilitators of these attacks (hosting providers and payment services), and it seems higher-end ransomware operators continue to evade scrutiny. Selective enforcement thus further bolsters the perception that protection is accorded according to strategic value, not legal standards. For operators such as Hastalamuerte, who possess no publicly documented intelligence connections, growing attribution capabilities, and sustained international pressure may gradually erode the security traditionally associated with operating from within Russia.

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Attribution as a Deterrence Instrument

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The public identification of Alexander Andreevich Yapaev as Hastalamuerte/Zeta88 shows the continued struggle with the utility of attribution in situations where immediate prosecution is not feasible. Its utility is far more extensive than simply an ability to make an arrest. Functionally, public naming forces a perpetrator into an open evidentiary space and can lead to alterations in their operational habits and effectiveness. Strategically, attribution provides future leverage for sanctions, indictments, financial restrictions, or extradition if the target can leave their safe haven country. The logic behind US rewards programs (paying up to $10 million for the capture and conviction of ransomware operators) relies on this principle. The analytical insight provided by the case cannot be understated either. Hastalamuerte's trajectory from a relative amateur forum participant on Nulled and Raidforums in 2019 to leading a significant ransomware operation by 2026 offers an invaluable look into the career progression of a cyber criminal. It confirms one of the lessons learned through deterrence and attribution: pseudonymity is not everlasting, and many years of OPSEC failures can be pieced together to establish a real-world identity.

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Conclusion

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The Gentlemen incident is emblematic of the three broad themes that currently characterise cyber warfare: ransomware-as-a-service through innovative competition, common OPSEC failures that enable attribution, and a new, conditional regime of protection for Russian cybercriminals. The obvious defense lesson: increasing attack surfaces require stronger identity, behavioural monitoring, and intelligence capacities. The policy lesson: effective attribution is still an essential tool for comprehension, deterrence, and disruption in an increasingly industrialised environment of criminals supporting each other's operations in ransomware-as-a-service.

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References

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1. https://krebsonsecurity.com/2026/06/who-runs-the-ransomware-group-the-gentlemen/
2. https://www.recordedfuture.com/
3. https://www.vectra.ai/topics/ransomware-as-a-service
4. https://www.trmlabs.com/es/resources/blog/new-disruption-opportunities-in-the-evolving-ransomware-ecosystem

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Executive Summary:

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Recently, our team came across a widely circulated post on X (formerly Twitter), claiming that the Indian government would abolish paper currency from February 1 and transition entirely to digital money. The post, designed to resemble an official government notice, cited the absence of advertisements in Kerala newspapers as supposed evidence—an assertion that lacked any substantive basis

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Claim:

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The Indian government will ban paper currency from February 1, 2025, and adopt digital money as the sole legal tender to fight black money.

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Fact Check:

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The claim that the Indian government will ban paper currency and transition entirely to digital money from February 1 is completely baseless and lacks any credible foundation. Neither the government nor the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has made any official announcement supporting this assertion.

Furthermore, the supposed evidence—the absence of specific advertisements in Kerala newspapers—has been misinterpreted and holds no connection to any policy decisions regarding currency

During our research, we found that this was the prediction of what the newspaper from the year 2050 would look like and was not a statement that the notes will be banned and will be shifted to digital currency.

Such a massive change would necessitate clear communication to the public, major infrastructure improvements, and precise policy announcements which have not happened. This false rumor has widely spread on social media without even a shred of evidence from its source, which has been unreliable and is hence completely false.

We also found a clip from a news channel to support our research by asianetnews on Instagram. 

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We found that the event will be held in Jain Deemed-to-be University, Kochi from 25th January to 1st February. After this advertisement went viral and people began criticizing it, the director of "The Summit of Future 2025" apologized for this confusion. According to him, it was a fictional future news story with a disclaimer, which was misread by some of its readers.

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The X handle of Summit of Future 2025 also posted a video of the official statement from Dr Tom.

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Conclusion:

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The claim that the Indian government will discontinue paper currency by February 1 and resort to full digital money is entirely false. There's no government announcement nor any evidence to support it. We would like to urge everyone to refer to standard sources for accurate information and be aware to avoid misinformation online.

• Claim: India to ban paper currency from February 1, switching to digital money.
• Claimed On: X (Formerly Known As Twitter)
• Fact Check: False and Misleading