#FactCheck-Video falsely links Lt Gen Rajiv Ghai to party dance clip; actually shows content creator’s father

Introduction

Military equipment used by elite special forces is supposed to be the most tightly secured hardware a country owns, the last place anyone would expect a hidden flaw in its parts supply chain to slip through undetected. Yet that is precisely where one surfaced this August, when The Telegraph, revealed that cameras fitted to the Royal Navy's K3 Scout surveillance drones, equipment used by Britain's Royal Marines and closely associated with the Special Boat Service, the United Kingdom's elite maritime special forces unit, had been secretly transmitting signals to an internet address inside China. The United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence stripped the affected cameras of all internet connectivity the moment the transmissions were discovered, and has spent the days since insisting no sensitive data actually left the country. That distinction, between what was taken and what was exposed, is where this incident becomes genuinely worth examining.

What was actually found, and what was not

The K3 Scout is an 8.4 metre uncrewed surface vessel built by Kraken Technology Group, a British defence manufacturer based in Fareham, Hampshire, capable of reaching 55 knots and remaining at sea for up to 30 days. The Royal Navy purchased roughly 20 of these vessels under Project Beehive, a £12 million programme designed to fold autonomous systems into frontline maritime operations quickly, and the Royal Marines' Coastal Forces Squadron and 47 Commando have operated the fleet since March 2026.

A routine cyber vulnerability assessment, not an external tip off or an adversarial intrusion, is what caught the problem. Investigators found the electro-optical and infrared cameras mounted on the vessels sending what the industry calls heartbeat communications, routine signals a connected device sends simply to confirm it is powered on and functioning, to an IP address located in China. Kraken did not manufacture the cameras in house; the company sourced them from a third party supplier that had reportedly given assurances about their security, assurances the heartbeat traffic now calls directly into question.

Every source, including the UK Ministry of Defence itself, confirms the cameras were sending signals to an IP address in China. What remains unconfirmed is which company actually manufactured the compromised camera components. Neither The Telegraph nor the Ministry of Defence has publicly named the specific camera manufacturer, and an unverified social media claim allegedly identifying a Canadian supplier has since been disputed by that company, with no confirmation from official sources tying it to the incident as of now.

Crucially, the UK Ministry of Defence has been consistent on one point across every statement it has issued: its investigation found no evidence that classified information, government systems, or mission critical data were accessed, compromised, or transmitted outside the country. That is a meaningful distinction, and one worth taking at face value rather than dismissing as reflexive reassurance, since heartbeat signals by design carry connectivity status rather than payload content. But security researchers who reviewed the case have been equally consistent in noting that even metadata this thin has value to a watching adversary. Knowing when and where a piece of specialised military hardware is powered on and actively connected can itself function as a targeting signal, revealing patterns of deployment, operational tempo, and geographic presence without a single classified file ever leaving the device.

Why this particular fleet matters

The timing sharpens the concern considerably. A defence source cited in reporting on the story indicated the K3 Scout fleet was being considered as part of a future British contribution to securing freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, where the United Kingdom has already deployed a warship amid discussions of a multinational security mission. Equipment destined for a contested, strategically sensitive waterway having any unexplained data path back to a systemic rival's territory is not a detail that stays confined to a procurement footnote. The vessels were also tested during a NATO exercise in the Baltic Sea in 2025, meaning any compromised telemetry pattern could theoretically have been observed by the very alliance partners Britain was demonstrating the technology to.

The deeper issue is structural rather than incidental. Modern military hardware, however elite the unit operating it, is rarely built end to end by a single trusted manufacturer. Cameras, sensors, chipsets, and firmware routinely pass through several tiers of suppliers before reaching a finished platform, and each tier is a potential point where the chain of custody and verification can quietly break down. Kraken's own assurances about its camera supplier illustrate exactly how that failure propagates: a manufacturer can act in good faith, rely on a vendor's word, and still end up fielding compromised hardware, because the vulnerability was never introduced at the assembly stage but several layers upstream, in components whose ultimate origin was never fully audited.

CyberPeace View | A wider principle worth naming

There is a broader ethical and legal frame worth applying here, one that extends beyond ordinary cybersecurity practice into the territory international humanitarian law occupies. The core distinction that law draws, between combatants and protected persons, between military objectives and civilian life, depends fundamentally on operators having accurate, uncompromised situational awareness. A surveillance platform is not merely a piece of hardware; it is the sensory apparatus through which decisions with real consequences for human life get made in contested environments. If the integrity of that apparatus cannot be guaranteed, the reliability of everything built on top of it, target verification, proportionality assessments, distinction between combatant and civilian, is quietly weakened at its foundation. This is not a claim that the K3 Scout breach itself caused harm; the Ministry of Defence's own findings suggest it did not. It is a reminder that supply chain integrity in military sensing equipment is not simply a procurement or cybersecurity concern sitting apart from the laws of armed conflict. It sits underneath them, because a compromised sensor is, in a very real sense, a compromised judgment further down the chain.

Where India fits into this story

India has been grappling with functionally the same problem for years, and its response offers a useful point of comparison. Reporting dating back to 2023 revealed that Indian defence officials had quietly barred domestic drone manufacturers from using components sourced from countries sharing a land border with India, an unmistakable, if unstated, reference to China, citing exactly the kind of vulnerability now playing out in Britain's fleet, compromised communication functions, cameras, and operating software capable of leaking intelligence. That policy has hardened considerably since. Earlier this year, the Ministry of Defence in New Delhi finalised a stringent framework requiring that drones procured from domestic manufacturers contain no Chinese origin components or electronics at all, and at least one major drone order was placed on hold after allegations surfaced that the supplier had used Chinese parts despite those restrictions.

The commercial consequence of that caution has been real and acknowledged openly by industry figures; sourcing components outside China raises costs, given that up to 70 percent of the global drone supply chain has historically run through Chinese manufacturing. But India appears to have concluded, well ahead of this particular British incident becoming public, that the cost of auditing and diversifying a supply chain is lower than the cost of fielding compromised sensing equipment inside sensitive military operations. Indian firms have responded by building propulsion, avionics, and camera systems in house specifically to close this gap, treating component provenance as a first order design question rather than an afterthought bolted on after a breach forces the issue. Seen from that vantage point, the K3 Scout episode reads less like a uniquely British failure and more like a case study in a risk India's own defence establishment had already priced in.

Lessons from the breach

A few conclusions follow fairly directly from how this incident unfolded. First, routine cyber vulnerability assessments work, and this case is arguably an argument for doing more of them, more often, rather than a sign that current practice failed; the breach was caught internally, before any confirmed operational harm occurred. Second, a manufacturer's own assurances about a component supplier are not a substitute for independent verification, since Kraken's good faith reliance on its camera vendor's word is precisely where this vulnerability slipped through. Third, and most durably, defence procurement increasingly needs to treat component provenance as inseparable from operational security, not as a compliance checkbox to be satisfied once at contract signing. India's multi-year pivot toward auditing and localising sensitive component supply chains, imperfect and costly as it has been, points toward the direction other defence establishments will likely be pushed in as more incidents like this one surface. The K3 Scout breach did not, on the evidence available, compromise a single mission. What it compromised was the assumption that hardware assurances alone are sufficient, and that assumption was never going to survive close scrutiny forever.

References

1. LBC, "Spy cameras on Navy drones used by UK's elite special forces sending signals to China as security fears grow." https://www.lbc.co.uk/article/royal-navy-spy-drones-sending-signals-to-china-5Hjdfpm_2/
2. Defence Blog, "Royal Navy naval drone cameras secretly sent data to China." https://defence-blog.com/royal-navy-naval-drone-cameras-secretly-sent-data-to-china/
3. The National Interest, "The Royal Navy's Spy Drones May Have Been Spying for China, Too." https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/royal-navys-spy-drones-may-have-been-spying-for-china-too-sa-081026
4. Kyiv Post, "UK Navy Drone Camera Components Were Secretly Communicating With China." https://www.kyivpost.com/post/82061
5. The Defense News, "UK's Royal Navy K3 Scout Drone Cameras Found Sending Data to an IP Address in China." https://www.thedefensenews.com/UKs-Royal-Navy-K3-Scout-Drone-Cameras-Found-Sending-Data-to-an-IP-Address-in-China/
6. The Jerusalem Post, "UK drones sent data to China, raising US, European fears on Chinese components." https://www.jpost.com/international/article-905191
7. Firstpost, "UK military drones fitted with Chinese cameras found sending data to Beijing: Report." https://www.firstpost.com/world/uk-military-drones-fitted-with-chinese-cameras-found-sending-data-to-beijing-report-14037075.html
8. Firstpost, "UK deploys warship to West Asia amid plans for multinational Hormuz security mission." https://www.firstpost.com/world/uk-deploys-warship-to-west-asia-amid-plans-for-multinational-hormuz-security-mission-ws-e-14009471.html
9. Reuters via Inquirer.net, "India bars makers of military drones from using Chinese parts." https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1813810/india-bars-makers-of-military-drones-from-using-chinese-parts
10. The Print, "Amid concerns about use of Chinese parts in drones, Army general urges industry to be transparent." https://theprint.in/defence/amid-concerns-about-use-of-chinese-parts-in-drones-army-general-urges-industry-to-be-transparent/2305866/
11. idrw.org, "India Unveils Drone Security Framework to Eliminate Chinese Components and Strengthen UAV Cyber Defences." https://idrw.org/india-unveils-drone-security-framework-to-eliminate-chinese-components-and-strengthen-uav-cyber-defences/
12. The Week, "The hidden weakness in India's military drones: Zen Technologies says it has fixed the Chinese problem." https://www.theweek.in/news/defence/2026/07/09/the-hidden-weakness-in-indias-military-drones-zen-technologies-says-it-has-fixed-the-chinese-problem.html

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Executive Summary:

The picture of a boy making sand art of Indian Cricketer Virat Kohli spreading in social media, claims to be false. The picture which was portrayed, revealed not to be a real sand art. The analyses using AI technology like 'Hive' and ‘Content at scale AI detection’ confirms that the images are entirely generated by artificial intelligence. The netizens are sharing these pictures in social media without knowing  that it is computer generated by deep fake techniques. 

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Claims:

The collage of  beautiful pictures displays a young boy creating sand art of Indian Cricketer Virat Kohli.

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Fact Check:

When we checked on the posts, we found some anomalies in each photo. Those anomalies are common in AI-generated images.

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The anomalies such as the abnormal shape of the child’s feet, blended logo with sand color in the second image, and the wrong spelling ‘spoot’ instead of ‘sport’n were seen in the picture. The cricket bat is straight which in the case of sand made portrait it’s odd. In the left hand of the child, there’s a tattoo imprinted while in other photos the child's left hand has no tattoo. Additionally, the face of the boy in the second image does not match the face in other images. These made us more suspicious of the images being a synthetic media. 

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We then checked on an AI-generated image detection tool named, ‘Hive’. Hive was found to be 99.99% AI-generated. We then checked from another detection tool named, “Content at scale”

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Hence, we conclude that the viral collage of images is AI-generated but not sand art of any child. The Claim made is false and misleading.

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Conclusion:

In conclusion, the claim that the pictures showing a sand art image of Indian cricket star Virat Kohli made by a child is false. Using an AI technology detection tool and analyzing the photos, it appears that they were probably created by an AI image-generated tool rather than by a real sand artist. Therefore, the images do not accurately represent the alleged claim and creator.

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Claim:  A young boy has created sand art of Indian Cricketer Virat Kohli

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Claimed on: X, Facebook, Instagram

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Fact Check: Fake & Misleading

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Biological data includes biometric information such as fingerprints, facial recognition, DNA sequences, and behavioral traits. Genetic data can be extracted from an individual’s remains long after their death and can continue to identify both that individual and an expanding pool of their living relatives. This persistent identification can significantly reduce privacy over time, revealing genetic characteristics and familial relationships across successive generations.

Key Developments in Privacy Protection for Biological Data:

Legal texts have been created relating to personal data protection and privacy broadly, and can sometimes prove to be poor adaptations specifically for ‘biometric data’ and its safety. Some examples are mentioned below:

1. EU and UK- GDPR

GDPR focuses primarily on biometrics in Biological Data while deciphering the technology's immense potential. The EU describes “personal data” under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) including any identifiable information about a particular person. For example, this can include names, identification numbers, location data, and other structured and unstructured data. In addition, the GDPR has more specific requirements around processing sensitive or “special categories of personal data.” These “special categories” include things like genetic and biometric data. For biometric security to work well, citizens' rights must be protected appropriately, and the data collected by private and public concerns must be managed carefully and sensibly. 

2. USA

California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) grants Californian consumers the right to protect their personal information and biometric data including the right to disclosure or access, the right to be forgotten, and data portability. The sale of personal information and the option of opt-out is also given to consumers. Additionally, it contains the right to take legal action, with penalties imposed for violations.

The California Privacy Rights Act was passed on November 3, 2020, and took effect on January 1, 2023, with a lookback period starting January 1, 2022. It introduces sensitive personal information which includes biometric data and other sensitive details. 

Virginia's Consumer Data Protection Act, effective from January 1, 2023, designates genetic and biometric data as sensitive data that must be protected.

Illinois' Biometric Information Privacy Act is recognised as the most robust biometric privacy law in the United States. The significance of the Rosenbach v. Six Flags case lies in the Illinois Supreme Court's ruling that a plaintiff does not need to demonstrate additional harm to impose penalties on a BIPA violator. A mere loss of statutory biometric privacy rights is sufficient to warrant penalties.

3. India

As per Rule 2(1)(b) of the SPDI Rules, Sensitive Personal Data or Information, including biometric data is included under its meaning. The term ‘biometric data’ has not been defined in the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023. The need for data privacy under the DPDP Act emerges only if such data is subsequently digitised under extraction and manipulation, including notice and consent requirements and penalties. 

The Biotech-PRIDE (Promotion of Research and Innovation through Data Exchange) Guidelines of 2021 are aimed at fostering an exchange of information which would thereby enhance research and innovation among various research groups nationwide. These guidelines do not deal with the generation of biological data but are a mechanism to share and exchange information and knowledge generated according to existing laws, rules, regulations and norms of the country. They will ensure data-sharing benefits, maximise use, avoid duplication, maximise integration, ownership of information, better decision-making and equity of access

How is Biological Data vulnerable?

• Biological data is often immutable, meaning it cannot be altered once compromised. Unlike other authentications that can be changed, compromised biometric data poses a permanent risk, making its protection paramount.
• The use of facial recognition technology by law enforcement agencies and the creation of databases by the same also highlights the urgent need for stringent privacy protections.
• Advances in technology, particularly AI and ML, make it easier to collect, analyse, and utilise biometric data by manipulating biometric data. This in turn is leading to new forms of identity theft and fraud that make it necessary to enhance security measures and ethical considerations to prevent abuse.
• Cross-border data transfers raise serious privacy concerns, especially as countries have varying levels and standards of data protection. 
• Wearable health-related biometric devices lack the required privacy protections which ends up making the data they collect vulnerable to misuse and breaches.

Future Outlook

With the growing use of biological data, there is likely to be increased pressure on regulatory bodies to strengthen privacy protections. This necessitates a need for enhanced security measures to protect users' identities and further prevent any form of unauthorised access. Future developments should be aimed at including strict consent requirements, and enhanced data security measures, especially for wearable devices. A new legal framework specifically designed to address the challenges posed by biometric data would be welcome. Biological data protection is an emerging need in the digital environment that we live in today.

References

• https://www.cnbc.com/2024/08/17/new-privacy-battle-is-underway-as-tech-gadgets-capture-our-brain-waves.html 
• https://www.snrlaw.in/sense-and-sensitivity-sensitive-information-under-indias-new-data-regime/ 
• https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/markets/digital-identity-and-security/government/biometrics/biometric-data‍
• https://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/govt-releases-guideline-to-provide-framework-for-sharing-of-biological-data-121073001467_1.html