#FactCheck- Old CCTV Video Falsely Shared as Killing of LeT’s Amir Hamza
Executive Summary
A CCTV video showing a man being shot is being widely circulated on social media with the claim that it depicts the killing of Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorist Amir Hamza in Pakistan. However, research by the CyberPeace Research Wing found that the claim is misleading. The viral video existed online even before the reported attack on Amir Hamza.
Claim
Social media users are sharing a CCTV clip claiming that Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorist Amir Hamza was shot dead in Pakistan.
Fact Check
To verify the claim, we first searched relevant keywords such as “Maulana Amir Hamza firing Lahore.” This led us to a report published on April 17, 2026, by The Hindu. Citing Pakistani channel 24 News HD TV, the report stated that unidentified attackers opened fire on the car of TV host Justice Nazir Ahmed Ghazi. Amir Hamza was injured in the incident, not killed.
We also reviewed the official social media accounts of 24 News HD TV. A post on its X handle (@24NewsHD) confirmed that Justice Ghazi was safe, while Amir Hamza sustained injuries in the firing incident in Lahore.
For further verification, we extracted keyframes from the viral video and performed a reverse image search. The same clip was found uploaded on March 28, 2026, on a Pakistani Facebook page. According to the post, the CCTV footage was linked to the killing of an individual named Saifullah Malakhel.
Although we could not independently verify the exact origin of the video, our findings clearly indicate that the footage predates the recent attack on Amir Hamza and is unrelated to the incident.
Conclusion
The viral claim is false. Amir Hamza was not killed but reportedly injured in the firing incident, as per credible media reports. The CCTV video being shared in this context is old and unrelated, and has been circulated with a misleading narrative.
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Introduction
Children today are growing up amidst technology, and the internet has become an important part of their lives. The internet provides a wealth of recreational and educational options and learning environments to children, but it also presents extensively unseen difficulties, particularly in the context of deepfakes and misinformation. AI is capable of performing complex tasks in a fast time. However, misuse of AI technologies led to increasing cyber crimes. The growing nature of cyber threats can have a negative impact on children wellbeing and safety while using the Internet.
India's Digital Environment
India has one of the world's fastest-growing internet user bases, and young netizens here are getting online every passing day. The internet has now become an inseparable part of their everyday lives, be it social media or online courses. But the speed at which the digital world is evolving has raised many privacy and safety concerns increasing the chance of exposure to potentially dangerous content.
Misinformation: The raising Concern
Today, the internet is filled with various types of misinformation, and youngsters are especially vulnerable to its adverse effects. With the diversity in the language and culture in India, the spread of misinformation can have a vast negative impact on society. In particular, misinformation in education has the power to divulge young brains and create hindrances in their cognitive development.
To address this issue, it is important that parents, academia, government, industry and civil society start working together to promote digital literacy initiatives that educate children to critically analyse online material which can ease navigation in the digital realm.
DeepFakes: The Deceptive Mirage:
Deepfakes, or digitally altered videos and/or images made with the use of artificial intelligence, pose a huge internet threat. The possible ramifications of deepfake technology are concerning in India, since there is a high level of dependence on the media. Deepfakes can have far-reaching repercussions, from altering political narratives to disseminating misleading information.
Addressing the deepfake problem demands a multifaceted strategy. Media literacy programs should be integrated into the educational curriculum to assist youngsters in distinguishing between legitimate and distorted content. Furthermore, strict laws as well as technology developments are required to detect and limit the negative impact of deepfakes.
Safeguarding Children in Cyberspace
● Parental Guidance and Open Communication: Open communication and parental guidance are essential for protecting children's internet safety. It's a necessity to have open discussions about the possible consequences and appropriate internet use. Understanding the platforms and material children are consuming online, parents should actively participate in their children's online activities.
● Educational Initiatives: Comprehensive programs for digital literacy must be implemented in educational settings. Critical thinking abilities, internet etiquette, and knowledge of the risks associated with deepfakes and misinformation should all be included in these programs. Fostering a secure online environment requires giving young netizens the tools they need to question and examine digital content.
● Policies and Rules: Admitting the threats or risks posed by misuse of advanced technologies such as AI and deepfake, the Indian government is on its way to coming up with dedicated legislation to tackle the issues arising from misuse of deepfake technology by the bad actors. The government has recently come up with an advisory to social media intermediaries to identify misinformation and deepfakes and to make sure of the compliance of Information Technology (IT) Rules 2021. It is the legal obligation of online platforms to prevent the spread of misinformation and exercise due diligence or reasonable efforts are made to identify misinformation and deepfakes. Legal frameworks need to be equipped to handle the challenges posed by AI. Accountability in AI is a complex issue that requires comprehensive legal reforms. In light of various cases reported about the misuse of deepfakes and spreading such deepfake content on social media, It is advocated that there is a need to adopt and enforce strong laws to address the challenges posed by misinformation and deepfakes. Working with technological companies to implement advanced content detection tools and ensuring that law enforcement takes swift action against those who misuse technology will act as a deterrent among cyber crooks.
● Digital parenting: It is important for parents to keep up with the latest trends and digital technologies. Digital parenting includes understanding privacy settings, monitoring online activity, and using parental control tools to create a safe online environment for children.
Conclusion
As India continues to move forward digitally, protecting children in cyberspace has become a shared responsibility. By promoting digital literacy, encouraging open communication and enforcing strong laws, we can create a safer online environment for younger generations. Knowledge, understanding, and active efforts to combat misinformation and deeply entrenched myths are the keys to unlocking the safety net in the online age. Social media Intermediaries or platforms must ensure compliance under IT Rules 2021, IT Act, 2000 and the newly enacted Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023. It is the shared responsibility of the government, parents & teachers, users and organisations to establish safe online space for children.
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Introduction
India’s new Policy for Data Sharing from the National Transport Repository (NTR) released by the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (MoRTH) in August, 2025, can be seen as a constitutional turning point and a milestone in administrative efficiency. The state has established an unprecedentedly large unified infrastructure by combining the records of 390 million vehicles, 220 million driver’s licenses, and the streams from the e-challan, e-DAR, and FASTag systems. Its supporters hail its promise of private-sector innovation, data-driven research, and smooth governance. However, there is a troubling paradox beneath this facade of advancement: the very structures intended to improve citizen mobility may simultaneously strengthen widespread surveillance. Without strict protections, the NTR runs the risk of violating the constitutional trifecta of need, proportionality, and legality as stated in Puttaswamy v. UOI, which brings to light important issues at the nexus of liberty, law, and data.
The other pertinent question to be addressed is as India unifies one of its comprehensive datasets on citizen mobility the question becomes more pressing: while motorised citizens are now in the spotlight for accountability, what about the millions of other datasets that are still dispersed, unregulated, and shared inconsistently in the areas of health, education, telecom, and welfare?
The Legal Backdrop
MoRTH grounds its new policy in Sections 25A and 62B of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Data is consolidated into a single repository since states are required by Section 136A to electronically monitor road safety. According to the policy, it complies with the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023.
The DPDP Act itself, however, is rife with state exclusions, particularly Sections 7 and 17, which give government organisations access to personal information for “any function under any law” or for law enforcement purposes. This is where the constitutional issue lies. Prior judicial supervision, warrants, or independent checks are not necessary. With legislative approval, MoRTH is essentially creating a national vehicle database without any constitutional protections.
Data, Domination and the New Privacy Paradigm
As an efficiency and governance reform, VAHAN, SARATHI, e-challan, eDAR, and FASTag are being consolidated into a single National Transport Repository (NTR). However, centralising extensive mobility and identity-linked records on a large scale is more than just a technical advancement; it also changes how the state and private life interact. The NTR must therefore be interpreted through a more comprehensive privacy paradigm, one that acknowledges that data aggregation is a means of enhancing administrative capacity and has the potential to develop into a long-lasting tool of social control and surveillance unless both technological and constitutional restrictions are placed at the same time.
Two recent doctrinal developments sharpen this concern. First, the Supreme Court’s foundational ruling that privacy is a fundamental right remains the constitutional lodestar, any state interference must satisfy legality, necessity and proportionality (KS Puttaswamy & Anr. vs UOI). Second, as seen by the court’s most recent refusals to normalise ongoing, warrantless location monitoring, such as the ruling overturning bail requirements that required accused individuals to provide a Google maps pin, as movement tracking necessitates closer examination (Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau & Ors.,).When taken as a whole, these authorities maintain that unrestricted, ongoing access to mobility and toll-transaction records is a constitutional issue and cannot be handled as an administrative convenience.
Structural Fault Lines in the NTR Framework
Fundamentally, the NTR policy generates structural vulnerabilities by providing nearly unrestricted access through APIs and even mass transfers on physical media to a broad range of parties, including insurance companies, law enforcement, and intelligence services. This design undermines constitutional protections in three ways: first, it makes it possible to draw conclusions about private life patterns that the Supreme Court has identified as one of the most sensitive data categories by exposing rich mobility trails like FASTag logs and vehicle-linked identities; Second, it allows bulk datasets to circulate outside the ministry’s custodial boundary, which creates the possibility of function creep, secondary use, and monetisation risks reminiscent of the bulk sharing regime that the government itself once abandoned; and third, it introduces coercive exclusion by tying private sector access to Aadhaar-based OTP consent.
Reference
Introduction
In recent years, India has seen tremendous growth in its space industry. The satellite infrastructure of India now provides key services to a variety of sectors, including communication, navigation, broadcasting, disaster management and national security operations. Satellite communications globally will connect remote communities, aid in the delivery of Digital Governance and support India's strategic military capabilities. Given the expanding space ecosystem in India with the involvement of the public sector, private sector and research institutions, the security of satellite communications is becoming increasingly important.
At the same time, as satellite communication technologies become more pervasive, the risk of cyber threats targeting space systems increases. Cyberattacks against satellites, ground terminals or communication networks may critically impact, disrupt, damage, and/or destroy essential services, and expose sensitive information. To mitigate these risks, CERT-In (Computer Emergency Response Team), in collaboration with the SatCom Industry Association of India released a Cyber Security Framework and Guidelines for Space Platforms/Systems, including Satellite Communication, in 2026. This framework aims to establish and enhance cybersecurity measures throughout India's space ecosystem, while guiding how to better prepare for and respond to the growing volume of cyber threat activity targeting Space Systems.
Overview of the CERT-In Space Cybersecurity Framework
CERT-In introduced a dedicated cybersecurity framework for space systems in February 2026. Developed in collaboration with industry stakeholders, the framework provides guidelines to strengthen the security of satellite communication infrastructure across India. Although the guidelines are advisory in nature, they are designed to promote best practices and encourage organisations to adopt robust cybersecurity measures.
The framework targets a wide range of stakeholders involved in satellite communication operations. These include government agencies, satellite operators, ground station operators, equipment manufacturers, technology vendors, and emerging space startups. By outlining cybersecurity principles, technical controls, and governance mechanisms, the framework aims to create a coordinated approach to protecting space assets.
Another key objective of the guidelines is to foster collaboration between the public and private sectors. As India’s space industry expands and private participation increases, maintaining a secure and resilient ecosystem becomes essential. The framework, therefore, emphasises risk management, incident reporting, and continuous monitoring to strengthen the overall cybersecurity posture of the space sector.
Key Components of Satellite Communication Systems
Satellite communication systems are made up of multiple interconnected devices that can be used to deliver communication services. The cybersecurity framework groups these elements into three categories: the space segment, the ground segment, and the user segment.
The space segment is everything related to the satellite itself, including the satellite's onboard systems. This includes the satellite's communication payload, telemetry systems, antennas, power systems, and software that controls its operation. Because satellites operate in remote parts of space with very little opportunity for maintenance, securing these systems is critical in order to guard against unauthorized access to or control of these systems.
The ground segment comprises the terrestrial infrastructure responsible for controlling the satellite's operations. It consists of satellite mission control centres, ground stations, network gateways and data processing facilities. The ground stations send commands to the satellites and receive telemetry data from the satellites, which makes the ground station a very important physical interface point between the satellite asset located in outer space and a terrestrial network.
The user segment contains any device terminal being used by either an individual or an organisation that is accessing a satellite service. Examples of user devices are satellite phones, VSAT terminals, modems, and IoT devices connected to satellite networks. Since these devices connect directly to the communication networks, vulnerabilities in user equipment could also represent a significant threat to the cybersecurity of satellite communications.
Major Cyber Threats to Space Infrastructure
The space systems that support the delivery of satellite communications are being increasingly targeted with multiple types of cyber threats. A major category includes cyber-attacks on communication links between satellites and ground stations. Cyber criminals can attempt to jam the satellite’s communication link, intercept communication signals, or re-transmit previously sent communication signals in order to disrupt the operation of the affected satellites.
Attacks on the systems that control the satellite are serious threats to satellite operations. Cybercriminals and hostile actors can perform command injection attacks where commands are sent to a satellite, and the satellite responds through some undesired action. If cybercriminals are able to gain access to the telemetry or command channels, they can potentially disrupt the operation of the satellite or alter the telemetry data being received from the satellite.
The ground infrastructure that supports satellite communications is still a major target for cybercriminals. Mission control networks and data centres are susceptible to malware, ransomware, phishing, and insider threats. Attackers will frequently target ground stations because they provide a connection point to terrestrial networks and can exploit vulnerabilities from the ground station’s IT systems into the satellite control systems. The combination of these threats illustrates the need for an overall security strategy that encompasses all parts of the satellite communications ecosystem.
Key Security Principles and Measures
A comprehensive overview of multiple principles designed to increase the security of satellite communications is provided in the CERT-In Framework on Cybersecurity for Satellite Communications. The first of these principles, security by design, refers to ensuring that all cybersecurity controls associated with a system are implemented at the time of the system's initial design and development, not afterwards; therefore, security controls should be incorporated throughout the entire lifecycle of a satellite system.
The second principle, which is known as Defense-in-Depth, consists of implementing many different layers or tiers of security controls to protect a system against cyber threats or attacks. An example of the different categories of security controls includes physical security, network security, and access control, among others. By combining security controls across multiple categories, an organisation may be able to reduce the chance that one single vulnerability will result in the loss of the entire system.
The third principle in the Framework, Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): Users and/or devices located within a network should not be able to rely on implicit trust. Therefore, every request for access to the network will be verified and continuously monitored for potential threats.
The previous two principles stated that secure satellite communications should be conducted using strong encryption and authentication methods, as well as secure communications methods, and that an enterprise monitoring system would be put into place to help detect anomalies or suspicious behaviour.
Conclusion
India is taking an important step toward protecting its expanding space ecosystem by creating a cybersecurity framework to safeguard cyberspace systems from cyber threats. The CERT-In guidelines offer a structured means of reducing the likelihood of cyber threats impacting satellite communication infrastructure through secure system design, continuous monitoring of systems and creating consistent partnerships among organisations. As well as providing evidence that both government and private sector organisations share a collective responsibility for the protection of space assets, both sectors participate in a collaborative effort.
India will need to implement rigorous cybersecurity measures as it expands its space infrastructure in order to ensure the continued availability of critical space infrastructure and ultimately develop its existing commercial satellite business operations with the highest level of safety and security.
References
- https://www.cert-in.org.in/s2cMainServlet?pageid=GUIDLNVIEW02&refcode=CISG-2026-01
- https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2233122®=3&lang=1
