#FactCheck -AI-Generated Crowd Video Falsely Tied to Epstein Files Release

Introduction

The Department of Telecommunications on 28th October 2024 notified an amendment to the Flight and Maritime Connectivity Rules, 2018 (FMCR 2018). 

Rule 9 of the principle rules in FMCR 2018 stated: 

 “Restrictions–(1) The IFMC service provider shall provide the operation of mobile communication services in aircraft at minimum height of 3000 meters in Indian airspace to avoid interference with terrestrial mobile networks. (2) Internet services through Wi-Fi in aircraft shall be made available when electronic devices are permitted to be used only in airplane mode.”

In 2022, an amendment was made to the attached form in the Rules for obtaining authorisation to provide IFMC services. 

Subsequently, the 2024 amendment substitutes sub-rule (2), namely : 

“ (2)  Notwithstanding the minimum height in Indian airspace referred to in sub-rule (1), internet services through Wi-Fi in aircraft shall be made available when electronic devices are permitted to be used in the aircraft.”

Highlights of the Amendment 

These rules govern the use of Wi-Fi in airplanes and ships within or above India or Indian territorial waters through In Flight and Maritime Connectivity (IFMC) services provided by IFMC service providers responsible for establishing and maintaining them.

Airplanes are equipped with antennas, onboard servers, and routers to connect to signals received from ground towers via Direct Air-to-Ground Communications (DA2GC) or through satellites. The DA2GC system offers connectivity through various communication methods, supporting services like in-flight Internet access and mobile multimedia. Licensed In-Flight Mobile Connectivity (IFMC) providers must adhere to standards set by international organizations such as the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), or by international forums like the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) to offer In-Flight Connectivity. Providers using Indian or foreign satellite systems must obtain approval from the Department of Space.

The IFMC service provider must operate mobile communication services on aircrafts at a minimum altitude of 3,000 meters within Indian airspace to prevent interference with terrestrial mobile networks. However, Wi-Fi access can be enabled at any point during the flight when device use is permitted, not just after reaching 3,000 meters. This flexibility is intended to allow passengers to connect to Wi-Fi earlier in the flight. This amendment aims to ensure that passengers can access the internet while maintaining the safety standards critical to in-flight communication systems.

Implications

1. Increased Data Security Needs:  There will be a need for robust cybersecurity measures against potential threats and data breaches. 
2. Increased Costs: Airplanes will have to incur the initial costs for installing antennae. Since airfare pricing in India is market-driven and largely unregulated, these costing changes might find their way into ticket prices, making flight tickets more expensive. 
3. Interference Management: A framework regarding the conditions under which  Wi-FI must be switched off to avoid interference with terrestrial communication systems can be determined by stakeholders and communicated to passengers. 
4. Enhanced Connectivity Infrastructure: Airlines may need to invest in better flight-connectivity infrastructure to handle increased network traffic as more passengers access Wi-fi at lower altitudes and for longer durations. 

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Conclusion

The  Flight and Maritime Connectivity (Amendment) Rules, 2024, enhance passenger convenience and align India with global standards for in-flight connectivity while complying with international safety protocols. Access to the internet during flights and at sea provides valuable real-time information, enhances safety, and offers access to health support during aviation and maritime operations.  However, new challenges including the need for robust cybersecurity measures, cost implications for airlines and passengers, and management of interference with terrestrial networks will have to be addressed through a collaborative approach between airlines, IFMC providers, and regulatory authorities. 

Sources 

• https://dot.gov.in/sites/default/files/2018_12_17%20AS%20IFMC_2.pdf?download=1 
• https://dot.gov.in/sites/default/files/Amendment%20dated%2004112024%20in%20flight%20and%20maritime%20connectivity%20rules%202018%20to%20IFMC%20Service%20Provider.pdf  
• https://www.t-mobile.com/dialed-in/wireless/how-does-airplane-wifi-work 
• https://tec.gov.in/public/pdf/Studypaper/DA2GC_Paper%2008-10-2020%20v2.pdf 
• https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/wifi-use-flights-no-longer-linked-altitude-now-subject-permission-2628118-2024-11-05  
• https://pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1843408#:~:text=With%20the%20repeal%20of%20Air,issue%20directions%20to%20such%20airline. 

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Introduction

Misinformation and disinformation are significant issues in today's digital age. The challenge is not limited to any one sector or industry, and has been seen to affect everyone that deals with data of any sort. In recent times, we have seen a rise in misinformation about all manner of subjects, from product and corporate misinformation to manipulated content about regulatory or policy developments.  

Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) play an important role in economies, particularly in developing nations, by promoting employment, innovation, and growth. However, in the evolving digital landscape, they also confront tremendous hurdles, such as the dissemination of mis/disinformation which may harm reputations, disrupt businesses, and reduce consumer trust. MSMEs are particularly susceptible since they have minimal resources at their disposal and cannot afford to invest in the kind of talent, technology and training that is needed for a business to be able to protect itself in today’s digital-first ecosystem. Mis/disinformation for MSMEs can arise from internal communications, supply chain partners, social media, competitors, etc. To address these dangers, MSMEs must take proactive steps such as adopting frameworks to counter misinformation and prioritising best practices like digital literacy and training, monitoring and social listening, transparency protocols and robust communication practices.

Assessing the Impact of Misinformation on MSMEs

To assess the impact of misinformation on MSMEs, it is essential to get a full sense of the challenges. To begin with, one must consider the categories of damage which can include financial loss, reputational damage, operational damages, and regulatory noncompliance. Various assessment methodologies can be used to analyze the impact of misinformation, including surveys, interviews, case studies, social media and news data analysis, and risk analysis practices.

Policy Framework and Gaps in Addressing Misinformation

The Digital India Initiative, a flagship program of the Government of India, aims to transform India into a digitally empowered society and knowledge economy. The Information Technology Act, 2000 and the rules made therein govern the technology space and serve as the legal framework for cyber security and data protection. The Bhartiya Nyay Sanhita, 2023 also contains provisions regarding ‘fake news’. The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 is a brand new law aimed at protecting personal data. Fact-check units (FCUs) are government and private independent bodies that verify claims about government policies, regulations, announcements, and measures. However, these policy measures are not sector-specific and lack specific guidelines, which have limited impact on their awareness initiatives on misinformation and insufficient support structure for MSMEs to verify information and protect themselves.

Recommendations for Countering Misinformation in the MSME Sector

To counter misinformation for MSMEs, recommendations include creating a dedicated Misinformation Helpline, promoting awareness campaigns, creating regulatory support and guidelines, and collaborating with tech platforms and expert organisations for the identification and curbing of misinformation. 

Organisational recommendations include the Information Verification Protocols for the consumers of Information for the verification of critical information before acting upon it, engaging in employee training for regular training on the identification and management of misinformation, creating a crisis management plan to deal with misinformation crisis, form collaboration networks with other MSMEs to share verified information and best practices. 

Engage with technological solutions like AI and ML tools for the detection and flagging of potential misinformation along with fact-checking tools and engaging with cyber security measures to prevent misinformation via digital channels.

Conclusion: Developing a Vulnerability Assessment Framework for MSMEs

Creating a vulnerability assessment framework for misinformation in Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) in India involves several key components which include the understanding of the sources and types of misinformation, assessing the impact on MSMEs, identifying the current policies and gaps, and providing actionable recommendations. The implementation strategy for policies to counter misinformation in the MSME sector can be by starting with pilot programs in key MSME clusters, and stakeholder engagement by involving industry associations, tech companies and government bodies. Initiating a feedback mechanism for constant improvement of the framework and finally, developing a plan to scale successful initiatives across the country.

References

• https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/48849/1/wp_tse_1516.pdf 
• https://techinformed.com/how-misinformation-can-impact-businesses/ 
• https://pib.gov.in/aboutfactchecke.aspx 

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The UN established its first permanent Global Mechanism for cybersecurity which will begin operations in March 2026. The policy framework for Western countries exists because their current strategies are being developed. The situation in India presents greater complexity and higher levels of interest than any other country.

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The Fence That Became a Vantage Point
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The United Nations cybersecurity talks have seen India actively participate since their start. India brought its proposal for an open and inclusive multilateral framework which was supported by Western states who wanted to establish universal norms and responsible state behaviour but India did not accept their geopolitical viewpoint.

India did not support the Russia-led bloc which wanted a permanent open-ended working group that would focus only on plenary meetings and the country also rejected the European Union's Program of Action. India maintained its previous stance by supporting multilateralism as a general principle while showing hesitation about backing specific power structures.

The fence now provides an advantage because it no longer serves as a point of vulnerability. India's non-alignment provides him with operational power because the body operates through decision-making which requires all members to agree.

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Sovereignty First, Norms Second
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The digital sovereignty framework which defines India's long-standing cybersecurity diplomatic activities serves as the country's fundamental cybersecurity diplomatic framework. New Delhi has been reluctant to endorse frameworks that could constrain how it manages its own cyberspace, whether through content regulation, surveillance architecture, or incident response. The Indian government establishes its control over internet governance through its implementation of VPN regulations and CERT-In reporting requirements and data localization discussions. 

The new Global Mechanism creates a situation which India must handle because it creates an uncommon diplomatic situation. The framework's five pillars, threats, norms, international law, confidence-building measures, and capacity-building, each carry embedded assumptions that don't sit neatly with India's domestic policy posture. India supports the norm which prohibits countries from attacking each other's critical infrastructure while developing offensive cyber abilities and keeping its cyber response strategies secret.

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The Capacity-Building Opening
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The Indian government has a definite interest in dedicated thematic group 2 which focuses on building cybersecurity capacity. India exists in two opposing states because it operates as a developing nation which lacks basic national cybersecurity systems while also maintaining advanced cyber defense capabilities. The donor table exists as a platform which gives India both funding rights and complete rights to speak for developing nations. India should serve as a connecting force for DTG 2 by sharing its experience with CERT-In development and its sectoral frameworks for finance and telecom and its National Cyber Coordination Centre programs which train cybersecurity professionals while requesting capacity-building programs that follow demand-based needs assessment and local context understanding and which do not include the typical restrictions that accompany Western technical assistance.

India has done this before in other multilateral settings. The organization maintains its independence through its role as a credible Global South representative which it uses to speak for the Global South without aligning with any particular alliance.

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The DTG 1 Question: Critical Infrastructure and Strategic Ambiguity
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The DTG 1 study about ICT security challenges shows how resilience and cooperation and stability work together as different themes but creates complex challenges for India.

The 2020 Mumbai power grid incident which some researchers attribute to Chinese state-linked actors has become one of three major attacks against India's critical infrastructure together with AIIMS Delhi incidents in 2022 and ongoing cyber intrusions into defence and government networks. The international standards which govern critical infrastructure protection require actual implementation from India because the country possesses vital national assets.

India has not yet established formal processes for cyberattack attribution while its officials avoid the norm-enforcement diplomacy which Western countries practice through their coordinated attribution and sanction procedures. 

India must either develop deeper transparency about its operations or create specialized operational plans which can keep its needed information undercover if it wants to participate in DTG 1 about cross-border interdependencies and incident response collaboration. India will likely engage selectively, supporting the idea of critical infrastructure norms while resisting mechanisms that operationalise accountability.

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Geopolitical Triangulation
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The new Global Mechanism needs countries to implement their national policies because states must stop merely restating their positions. Multilateral cybersecurity forums operate as Geopolitical triangulation platforms for India. India's security system must protect its interests against its two main cyber adversaries which include China and Pakistan-based groups. 

The US and EU strategic partnership between India and these Western governments requires India to show closer ties with democratic nations through its participation in international forums. The new Global Mechanism will require India to pursue its current position by participating in capacity-building activities while developing common norms through its work on general norms language. 

India will maintain its current position between Western liberal order enforcement and Russia-China sovereignty-maximalist counter-narrative through its capacity-building activities and general norms language work.

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What India Should Actually Do
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The document establishes core argument which states early DTG development needs to be established for proper assessment of future results which applies to Indian territory and European territory. India has the credibility and technical foundation and diplomatic ties which enable it to establish itself as an agenda-setter who takes proactive actions instead of following others. India should take the following actions to achieve its goals: lead or co-lead DTG 2 discussions which focus on the capacity requirements of the Global South while advancing DG 1 areas that protect developing nations from actual threats and establish South-South cybersecurity agreements through this system which will help them bypass Western capacity development restrictions. The Global Mechanism offers an essential multilateral platform which provides advantages to countries that take initial actions. India has the ability to make an impact because it possesses strategic advantages which will be activated through its choice between active participation and total disengagement.

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References
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• http://interface-eu.org/publications/the-new-united-nations-mechanism-on-cybersecurity#a-european-strategy-for-the-dtgs
• https://disarmament.unoda.org/en/our-work/emerging-challenges/developments-field-information-and-telecommunications-context
• https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/redecho-targeting-indian-power-sector
• https://www.saikrishnaassociates.com/cert-in-issues-directions-for-information-security-practices-procedure-prevention-response-and-reporting-of-cyber-incidents/

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