#FactCheck-AI-generated video falsely links ethanol blended fuel (E85) to bees swarming on motorcycle tank

Introduction

For much of the past two decades, India's contribution to the global technology economy was defined by software services and consumer internet platforms, which is a model that built enormous wealth and made the country the world's third-largest startup ecosystem.

That story is changing. More than ever before, the best received pitches in Bengaluru, Hyderabad, and Chennai are for rocket propulsion, semiconductor design, and autonomous hardware, not apps. And this isn't just a style choice of what gets funded. It's the real concentration of money, people, and political support around "deep tech" ventures based on frontier science and engineering breakthroughs as opposed to incremental software work.

The Data Behind the Narrative

The scale of this shift is now visible in hard numbers. In fact, Indian deeptech companies cumulatively raised $11.4 billion in funding between 2015 and mid-2026, according to the Bharat Deep Tech Report 2026 published by the Indian Venture and Alternate Capital Association (IVCA). 2025 was a record year for Indian deeptech firms, which saw a total raise of $2.96 billion across 189 deals, despite a slowdown in funding in the Indian startup ecosystem overall. Analytically speaking, here is what that reveals: investors haven't just raised the tide with the roadmap; they have explicitly taken a far-flung sector-specific decision to reallocate the capital and instead pursue science-and-engineering-led startups, even when pulling back elsewhere.

That very same report further pointed out that over 85% of all the deeptech funding raised in India since 2015 was obtained in the last six years, suggesting that the sector has only very recently come of age and matured from doing mostly early proof-of-concept experiments to delivering products that have undergone verifiable commercialisation. Of all the capital, funding and deals raised, AI and generative AI, followed by electric vehicles and battery technology, were the highest in terms of both dollars and the number of deals, while semiconductors and space tech were identified as the fastest-growing industrial segments and areas of research, consistent with India's national aspirations around technological self-sufficiency. When it comes to the distribution of deals and funding across India, the report found that Bengaluru on its own accounts for nearly 50%, with the rest of the country grabbing less than half. 

Space as the Sector's Proof Point

If any single industry illustrates the credibility of India's hardware pivot, it is private space. Skyroot Aerospace's trajectory offers a useful case study. In May 2026, the Hyderabad-based launch vehicle company raised approximately $60 million in a round co-led by Sherpalo Ventures and GIC, with participation from BlackRock-managed funds, Arkam Ventures, and the Shanghvi Family Office, pushing its valuation to $1.1 billion and making it India's first space-tech unicorn. The round is notable not just for its size but for its composition: sovereign wealth capital (GIC) and global asset managers (BlackRock) backing a hardware company whose Vikram-1 rocket is roughly 95% indigenously built and expected to draw significant demand from the global telecommunications sector, with around 90% of Skyroot's customers based outside India. That the company's valuation nearly doubled in about thirty months also suggests investors are pricing in execution risk more favourably than in earlier cycles, when Indian hardware ventures were often viewed as uninvestable relative to their software counterparts.

This is not the only data point. Alongside Skyroot, companies including Agnikul Cosmos, Dhruva Space, Pixxel and Digantara are working on propulsion, satellite platforms and orbital-debris-tracking technology. Even if all of the Indian space startups do not go on to become businesses on the scale of ISRO, the existence of so many private-sector firms working on these goods and services shows the ecosystem in India is maturing. India's private space startup ecosystem lines up with broader sector reporting that India's private space startup ecosystem is approaching 440 companies as the private-sector push gathers speed through 2026.

Policy Architecture and Patient Capital

A defining characteristic of deeptech like the long R&D cycles, capital-heavy prototyping, and complex regulation makes deeptech firms structurally different from software startups, and Indian policymakers seem to be acknowledging as much. In April 2026, the government announced the Startup India Fund of Funds 2.0, creating a corpus of 10,000 crores to acquire commitments to Alternative Investment Funds, with a focus on deeptech, technology-focused manufacturing and early-growth-stage companies. The intention here, as was articulated, was to increase the supply of institutional capital for companies that diverge from software-investing norms. This complements the operational R & D and Innovation (RDI) Scheme and the India Semiconductor Mission, creating a multilayer public-capital framework for deeptech commercialisation.

Yet the same IVCA survey data complicates any triumphalist reading. Despite these schemes, 40% of surveyed venture funds reported having never engaged with any government capital vehicle, pointing to a persistent gap between policy design and on-the-ground fund utilisation. More critically, the survey identified a structural weak point in the financing pipeline: fund participation drops sharply at the Series B/C stage, with fewer investors able to write larger cheques to growth-stage companies.

Perhaps the single biggest limiting factor for the long term of deeptech in India. Spotting and encouraging deeptech entrepreneurs has definitely begun, but long-term success hinges on an ecosystem that can finance deeptech innovators through the critical scale-up phase – larger-ticket funds that many deeptech firms need to grow from a proof of concept into full-scale commercial products globally. Traditionally, Indian hardware startups have been quickly sold off or listed in foreign markets.

The exit environment reflects this immaturity. IVCA data shows 62% of funds cited exit visibility as their primary challenge, with secondary transactions accounting for 56% of all exits in the period studied, which is a signal that public-market exits (IPOs) remain the exception rather than the rule for deep-tech companies, unlike in India's more established software and fintech sectors.

An Analytical Assessment

Overall, the body of data confirms a measured yet real read on structural change rather than hype about cycles. How funding has focused on AI, semiconductors and spacetech; how some credible unicorns were born using homegrown hardware (like Skyroot); how policy and a fund-of-funds ecosystem were purposefully built – these all led, in Rajat Tandon's words, "from promise to more investible commitments, with an increasingly institutionalised ecosystem play".

However, three analytical caveats temper the enthusiasm. First, India's deep tech capital base,  while growing rapidly in percentage terms, remains small in absolute terms relative to the United States and China, and much of it is still concentrated in early rounds rather than growth-stage financing. Second, geographic concentration in Bengaluru risks under-leveraging engineering talent elsewhere in the country. Third, and most consequentially, cross-border regulatory friction, export controls, dual-use technology restrictions, and the need for internationally recognised IP protection remains a binding constraint for hardware ventures seeking to scale beyond the domestic market, a challenge that policy alone cannot resolve.

Conclusion

India's transition from software exporter to deep-tech engineer is therefore real, measurable, and policy-supported, but it is a transition still in its early-to-middle innings, dependent on whether growth-stage capital and international market access can keep pace with early-stage enthusiasm and government intent.

Sources

1. YourStory — Indian deeptech investments reach $11.4B: Report
2. Outlook Business — India's Deeptech Funding Crosses $11 Bn As Investors Turn To AI, Semiconductors
3. Business Standard — Over 85% of India's deeptech funding raised in past six years: IVCA
4. The Week — Skyroot Aerospace becomes India's first space tech unicorn
5. Outlook Business — Skyroot Aerospace Reaches Unicorn Orbit as Vikram-1 Launch Countdown Begins
6. SatelliteToday — Skyroot Secures $60M in Funding, Becoming India's First Space 'Unicorn'
7. Convergence Now — India's Startup Funding Map: AI, Sustainability & Deeptech Leading the Next Wave
8. Seafund — DeepTech Startups in India: Funding & Innovation 2026
9. YourStory (original reference article) — From software to satellites: Why India's next venture opportunity lies in deeptech

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Executive Summary

A video is being widely shared on social media with the claim that the Chinese Army has entered 60 kilometres inside Arunachal Pradesh and occupied Indian territory. In the video, a man appears to be recording the situation using his selfie camera, while soldiers can be seen standing face-to-face and arguing with each other in the background. The CyberPeace Research Wing found that the claim is false. The viral video is not from Arunachal Pradesh. It shows a confrontation between India’s Border Security Force (BSF) and Bangladesh’s Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) along the India-Bangladesh border.

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Claim 

A Facebook user shared the video with the caption:

"China is entering 60 km inside India and occupying Arunachal Pradesh. China is turning Arunachal Pradesh into its territory. Where are Prime Minister Modi, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and Home Minister Amit Shah?"

Post link:

https://www.facebook.com/reel/1736825064305394 

https://archive.ph/rZvuH 

https://www.facebook.com/reel/1736825064305394 

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FactCheck

Our research found no credible news report confirming that Chinese troops had entered 60 kilometres inside Arunachal Pradesh or occupied Indian territory.

The people in the viral video can be heard speaking in Bengali, suggesting that the footage could be from the India-Bangladesh border rather than Arunachal Pradesh.

A reverse image search of keyframes from the viral video led us to an identical video posted on the Facebook page of Bangladeshi news channel Jamuna TV on June 20. According to the caption, the incident took place along the Chapainawabganj border in Bangladesh, where personnel of India’s BSF and Bangladesh’s BGB had confronted each other.

https://www.facebook.com/reel/1049262804595610 

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We also found reports from Bangladeshi media outlet Prothom Alo about the incident. According to the reports, Bangladeshi security personnel had stopped around 20 people who were attempting to return to Bangladesh from India, following which a verbal altercation took place between BSF and BGB personnel.

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https://www.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/district/syzkfootaq 

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Conclusion

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The viral claim is false. The video does not show Chinese troops entering or occupying 60 kilometres of territory inside Arunachal Pradesh. It actually shows a confrontation between BSF and BGB personnel along the India-Bangladesh border in the Chapainawabganj area of Bangladesh. The footage is being circulated with a false Arunachal Pradesh-related narrative.

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Introduction
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In June 2026, the Government of India temporarily restricted access to Telegram amid concerns that the platform had been used to facilitate examination related malpractice, including the alleged circulation of leaked question papers during the NEET UG re examination. The move reignited a familiar debate about the responsibility of digital platforms for unlawful activities carried out through them.

Critics of such restrictions raise a fundamental question: if a traffic accident occurs on a road, do we shut down the road? If theft takes place inside a shopping mall, do we close the entire mall? By the same logic, is it reasonable to block a communication platform because some individuals misuse it? These questions lie at the heart of a broader conflict between state interests in maintaining public order and the protection of digital rights, privacy, and freedom of communication in an increasingly interconnected world.

The controversy surrounding Telegram therefore extends beyond a single examination or messaging application. It raises a deeper and more pressing question: who should bear responsibility for illegal acts committed through encrypted digital platforms, and where should the law draw the line between effective enforcement and the preservation of fundamental digital freedoms?

Beyond mere communication for millions of students in India, Telegram is a classroom in the digital sense, an archive for their notes, practice papers, lecture recordings, and community groups that hundreds of millions of candidates refer to every single day. Therefore, why on a routine day in June 2026 did the messaging app top every other channel? Temporary internet restriction on the platform had become necessary to stop examination-related malpractice like leakage of question papers and was temporarily suspended, with reports suggesting that this move by the government was on the occasion of the NEET-UG re-examination.

This ban once again brings up a bigger question that cannot be contained within one particular examination. When has it become okay to hold a communication platform responsible and accountable for illegal acts committed over it? Or are the perpetrators solely to blame, and the service can be prohibited? Ultimately, where is the line drawn between public interest, law enforcement, and digital rights and privacy? 

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End-to-End Encryption: Architecture and Benefits
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At the heart of these discussions of Telegram and other apps lies a technology referred to as "end-to-end encryption" or "E2EE." Quite literally, it means a message is locked with cryptography on the sender's device and can only be unlocked by the intended recipient. Not even the tech platform running the communication app can decipher it for everyone else; it just looks like random gibberish.

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The Process
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This kind of modern communication relies on public key cryptography. Each person has a public key they can share with anyone and a private key that stays only on their devices. When they send you a message, it is scrambled with crypto that can be unlocked by only your private key. WhatsApp and Signal, for example, use the Signal Protocol, which features "perfect forward secrecy" and is designed to protect communications from ever being unlocked even if one key is compromised. Telegram's approach is a bit unique. By default, Telegram messages aren't encrypted with end-to-end crypto; this only comes via an optional feature called "Secret Chats," a key difference in the regulatory debate.

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The Dark Side: Crime, Misuse, and the Moderation Dilemma

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The very features that make end-to-end messaging popular among everyday people are privacy, speed, anonymity, and mass reach which also make end-to-end messaging popular among criminals. That, unfortunately, is the catch for policymakers globally: The technology designed to protect innocent users is also the technology that facilitates criminal activity.

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3.1 Criminal Abuse

Telegram, in particular, has frequently come under fire for its role in hosting a spectrum of criminal activities, most notably in the recent controversy in India regarding NEET-UG 2026 examination papers where channels allegedly advertised leaked question papers for enormous sums, convincing desperate candidates. In these instances, messages could be altered or deleted using Telegram’s message editing feature, fabricating evidence of prior leaks. However, this extends to illicit marketplaces, drug trafficking, financial fraud, money laundering, and distributing other prohibited content. Telegram's usage in disseminating extremist propaganda and aiding criminal organizations is also frequently cited, leading to bans or restrictions in countries ranging from Brazil to Nepal to Somalia to Vietnam.

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3.2 The Moderation Dilemma

But the difficulty is not just with misuse; it’s also about effective moderation. Moderation, however, requires content transparency. Strong encryption is built to obscure just that. Many end-to-end messaging services like Signal and WhatsApp emphasize that even if they wanted to, they would have been able to decipher the content of a user’s message due to their architecture. Telegram has been in scrutiny for years due to its limited cooperation with law enforcement agencies because its default chats are not completely end-to-end encrypted, though there has been an attempt by Pavel Durov, the platform’s founder, to increase cooperation following his 2024 arrest in France.

This gives policymakers the following challenge: How can governments require increased access to fight crime without forcing tech companies to weaken security for everyone? As cryptographers point out, a specific "backdoor" intended to allow access to law enforcement officials can be easily exploited by hackers, foreign governments, and any other actor with nefarious intent.

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Comparison of Regulatory Approaches Worldwide

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4.1 Authoritarian Countries' Responses

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China, for instance, has had the app blocked as part of its strategy to control access to the internet since 2015, and Iran did so in 2018 when the app was used to help organize protests against the government. An infamous Russian bid to block Telegram in 2018 turned into a cautionary story. Trying to censor the service disrupted the IPs of millions of computers, including significant services like those run by Amazon and Google. The move was met by a surge of users turning to VPNs to get access. It’s an expensive, disruptive, and incomplete form of censorship.

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4.2 Democratic Countries' Approaches

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Democratic jurisdictions generally prefer targeted interventions. Telegram was suspended in Brazil in 2022 and 2023, though again, only in response to a judge’s order in relation to particular investigations, and was lifted when it came into compliance. The EU’s approach has been to build on an established approach of regulation by use of a broader legislative framework, including the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act, aimed at platform liability rather than outlawing encryption outright.

 Meanwhile, the proposed scanning of encrypted communications has run into strong judicial headwinds, with the European courts stressing the danger of backdoors to privacy.

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4.3 The United Kingdom Approach

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The UK offers a middle way. With its Investigatory Powers Act, the government can oblige tech companies to collaborate in legitimate investigations. But this came to a head earlier this year with the case of Apple and the government's attempts to force it to unlock encrypted iCloud backups. Apple not only refused to reduce its encryption but also decided instead to disable some of its features for British users. This has created a problem for democracies across the world: how to balance access for investigators against the need to maintain the security that makes our systems safer.

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Judicial and Legislative Perspectives: India and Beyond

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In the Indian context, to have a perspective about the legal frameworks concerning content moderation, let’s explore some of the foundational decisions from the Supreme Court. Three decisions have laid the building block for digital rights laws: the first being Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015), where Section 69A of the IT Act, 2000, was upheld, but only by laying rigorous conditions on the review process and chance of challenging the said decision. Another important decision in this sphere is Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) which stated that the right to privacy is fundamental in nature under Article 21 of the Constitution and stipulated the constitutional requirements of legality, legitimacy, and proportionality against the state’s interventions in fundamental rights. The most recent important case law to consider, in this context, would be Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020) which set certain limitations, such as any internet shut-downs or orders have to be temporary, proportional, and have scope for appeal. Further, the Supreme Court demanded transparency around any and all orders of blocking.

These principles of proportionality and legal limitations are highly pertinent to the Telegram issue, especially since Section 69A confers powers to block information in case of concerns about public order, national security, etc., but activists often cite this power to target specific content rather than entire platforms like Telegram. The ban on Telegram in June 2026 and disabling of message editing will force authorities to justify not only their statutory authority but also the need for proportionate means.

These aspects are amplified by IT Rules, 2021, which mandate that some instant messaging platforms may require identification of the ‘first originator’ of messages, and the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, to protect digital personal data by ensuring it does not undermine national security exceptions to this end. 

Moreover, the use of encryption to ensure secure and private communications is becoming an important point of legal discourse globally. Recently, the European Court of Human Rights in Podchasov v. Russia (2024) held that mandating decryption on devices as a tool of investigative power constituted a disproportionate interference with an individual's right to privacy implying that while states may indeed have authority to regulate communication and digital services, any such measures limiting the scope of encryption will have to meet strict requirements of legality, necessity, and proportionality to be legally justifiable.

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Constitutional Validity of the Ban

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The government's case for a constitutional ban on Telegram rests upon its ability to satisfy the proportionality framework established by Puttaswamy and Anuradha Bhasin.

1. Legitimate aim:  The state's strong suit. This is the government's best argument. Protection of the integrity of NEET-UG, a high-stakes test with close to 2.4 million students, can indeed be a legitimate state objective. Given that there is evidence of channels that allegedly were involved in selling leaked question papers, the action is presumably justifiable under section 69A for preventing the incitement or occurrence of public disorder or preventing cognizable offenses.
2. Necessity: The National Testing Agency (NTA) itself admitted that localized removal of suspicious accounts on Telegram had already mitigated the risks, while Telegram insisted that it had independently taken down numerous channels. The fact that the block affected more than 150 million users in India, where the medium is widely used for personal communication and is also utilized on other platforms like WhatsApp, Discord, and Instagram to a similar or higher extent, raises the responsibility to justify a strict platform-wide ban. Moreover, there is a significant legal question regarding the state’s authority under section 69A to direct Telegram to disable its message-editing capability.
3. Proportionality and process: The block, even though it was temporary and intended to ensure fairness in the examination system, severely undermined legitimate uses of the platform by students who used it to share educational materials and organize study groups. Moreover, the opaqueness around the section 69A order is itself hard to reconcile with the transparency requirements set out in Anuradha Bhasin. 

Thus, while the objectives of preventing exam fraud may be legitimate, the necessity and proportionality of single platform-wide bans remain highly suspect under Indian constitutional law.

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Policy Recommendations and the Path Forward

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The Telegram controversy points to the need for a better balancing act in platform governance in India. Firstly, instead of blanket platform shutdowns, action should target specific channels, bots, or URLs, as may be the case. Secondly, any attempt to dictate changes to features, such as disabling message editing, should be based on specific statutory provisions, not an expansive reading of Section 69A. Furthermore, there is a dire need for increased transparency; blocking orders must state the justification for the order, what is being blocked, and for how long, as far as possible. In the long run, stricter cross-border cooperation via streamlined MLATs, or through the appointment of local legal representatives by foreign platforms, would facilitate easier enforcement. Ultimately, all major blocking decisions must be accompanied by proportionality assessments. Lastly, India must resist pressure to provide access to encryption backdoors; while this might ease investigative burdens, doing so would severely jeopardise the cybersecurity of India, its businesses, and citizens.

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Conclusion

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The Telegram ban is an example of the tricky equilibrium between protection of public interest and protection of digital liberties in our hyper-connected world. While the intent to counter exam fraud is justifiable, a blanket ban on any platform has much broader implications on questions of necessity, proportionality and transparency. India has a well-developed constitutional and legal framework to deal with this issue already, and the challenge will be to see if those powers are used appropriately.

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References

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Cases:

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• Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) 5 SCC 1 — Supreme Court of India
• Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1 — Supreme Court of India (Nine-Judge Bench)
• Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020) 3 SCC 637 — Supreme Court of India
• Podchasov v. Russia, European Court of Human Rights (Application No. 33696/19, February 2024)
• Apple Inc. v. United States (In re Search of an Apple iPhone, C.D. Cal. 2016)
• Telegram Messenger Inc. v. Union of India & Anr., Delhi High Court (June 2026) — Sub judice

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Legislation & Rules:

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• Information Technology Act, 2000 (India) — Sections 69A, 79
• IT (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking Access to Information by Public) Rules, 2009
• IT (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021
• Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (India) & DPDP Rules, 2025
• EU Digital Services Act, 2022 (Regulation 2022/2065)
• EU Digital Markets Act, 2022 (Regulation 2022/1925)
• EU Child Sexual Abuse Regulation (CSAR) Proposal — In Trilogue, June 2026
• UK Investigatory Powers Act, 2016

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Policy Sources:

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• Internet Freedom Foundation, Statement on Telegram Block, 16 June 2026
•  European Commission, ProtectEU Security Strategy, June 2025
•  MeitY Section 69A Blocking Order re: Telegram (June 2026)
•  NTA Press Release on NEET-UG 2026 Re-Examination, 16 June 2026

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