#FactCheck-AI-Generated Image Falsely Shows Donald Trump Raising Fist During Washington Incident

Introduction

Rajeev Chandrasekhar, Minister of State at the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, has emphasised the need for an open internet. He stated that no platform can deny content creators access to distribute and monetise content and that large technology companies have begun to play a significant role in the digital evolution. Chandrasekhar emphasised that the government does not want the internet or monetisation to be in the purview of just one or two companies and does not want 120 crore Indians on the internet in 2025 to be catered to by big islands on the internet.

The Voice for Open Internet 

India's Minister of State for IT, Rajeev Chandrasekhar, has stated that no technology company or social media platform can deny content creators access to distribute and monetise their content. Speaking at the Digital News Publishers Association Conference in Delhi, Chandrasekhar emphasized that the government does not want the internet or monetization of the internet to be in the hands of just one or two companies. He argued that the government does not like monopoly or duopoly and does not want 120 crore Indians on the Internet in 2025 to be catered to by big islands on the internet.

Chandrasekhar highlighted that large technology companies have begun to exert influence when it comes to the dissemination of content, which has become an area of concern for publishers and content creators. He stated that if any platform finds it necessary to block any content, they need to give reasons or grounds to the creators, stating that the content is violating norms.

As India tries to establish itself as an innovator in the technology sector, a recent corpus of Rs 1 lakh crore was announced by the government in the interim Budget of 2024-25. As big companies continue to tighten their stronghold on the sector, content moderation has become crucial. Under the IT Rules Act, 11 types of categories are unlawful under IT Act and criminal law. Platforms must ensure no user posts content that falls under these categories, take down any such content, and gateway users to either de-platforming or prosecuting. Chandrasekhar believes that the government has to protect the fundamental rights of people and emphasises legislative guardrails to ensure platforms are accountable for the correctness of the content.

Monetizing Content on the Platform

No platform can deny a content creator access to the platform to distribute and monetise it,' Chandrasekhar declared, boldly laying down a gauntlet that defies the prevailing norms. This tenet signals a nascent dawn where creators may envision reaping the rewards borne of their creative endeavours unfettered by platform restrictions.

An increasingly contentious issue that shadows this debate is the moderation of content within the digital realm. In this vast uncharted expanse, the powers that be within these monolithic platforms assume the mantle of vigilance—policing the digital avenues for transgressions against a conscribed code of conduct. Under the stipulations of India's IT Rules Act, for example, platforms are duty-bound to interdict user content that strays into territories encompassing a spectrum of 11 delineated unlawful categories. Violations span the gamut from the infringement of intellectual property rights to the propagation of misinformation—each category necessitating swift and decisive intervention. He raised the alarm against misinformation—a malignant growth fed by the fertile soils of innovation—a phenomenon wherein media reports chillingly suggest that up to half of the information circulating on the internet might be a mere fabrication, a misleading simulacrum of authenticity.

The government's stance, as expounded by Chandrasekhar, pivots on an axis of safeguarding citizens' fundamental rights, compelling digital platforms to shoulder the responsibility of arbiters of truth. 'We are a nation of over 90 crores today, a nation progressing with vigour, yet we find ourselves beset by those who wish us ill,' 

Upcoming Digital India Act

Awaiting upon the horizon, India's proposed Digital India Act (DIA), still in its embryonic stage of pre-consultation deliberation, seeks to sculpt these asymmetries into a more balanced form. Chandrasekhar hinted at the potential inclusion within the DIA of regulatory measures that would sculpt the interactions between platforms and the mosaic of content creators who inhabit them. Although specifics await the crucible of public discourse and the formalities of consultation, indications of a maturing framework are palpable.

Conclusion 

It is essential that the fable of digital transformation reverberates with the voices of individual creators, the very lifeblood propelling the vibrant heartbeat of the internet's culture. These are the voices that must echo at the centre stage of policy deliberations and legislative assembly halls; these are the visions that must guide us, and these are the rights that we must uphold. As we stand upon the precipice of a nascent digital age, the decisions we forge at this moment will cascade into the morrow and define the internet of our future. This internet must eternally stand as a bastion of freedom, of ceaseless innovation and as a realm of boundless opportunity for every soul that ventures into its infinite expanse with responsible use. 

References 

• https://www.financialexpress.com/business/brandwagon-no-platform-can-deny-a-content-creator-access-to-distribute-and-monetise-content-says-mos-it-rajeev-chandrasekhar-3386388/
• https://indianexpress.com/article/india/meta-content-monetisation-social-media-it-rules-rajeev-chandrasekhar-9147334/
• https://www.medianama.com/2024/02/223-rajeev-chandrasekhar-content-creators-publishers/

‍

Introduction

Military equipment used by elite special forces is supposed to be the most tightly secured hardware a country owns, the last place anyone would expect a hidden flaw in its parts supply chain to slip through undetected. Yet that is precisely where one surfaced this August, when The Telegraph, revealed that cameras fitted to the Royal Navy's K3 Scout surveillance drones, equipment used by Britain's Royal Marines and closely associated with the Special Boat Service, the United Kingdom's elite maritime special forces unit, had been secretly transmitting signals to an internet address inside China. The United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence stripped the affected cameras of all internet connectivity the moment the transmissions were discovered, and has spent the days since insisting no sensitive data actually left the country. That distinction, between what was taken and what was exposed, is where this incident becomes genuinely worth examining.

What was actually found, and what was not

The K3 Scout is an 8.4 metre uncrewed surface vessel built by Kraken Technology Group, a British defence manufacturer based in Fareham, Hampshire, capable of reaching 55 knots and remaining at sea for up to 30 days. The Royal Navy purchased roughly 20 of these vessels under Project Beehive, a £12 million programme designed to fold autonomous systems into frontline maritime operations quickly, and the Royal Marines' Coastal Forces Squadron and 47 Commando have operated the fleet since March 2026.

A routine cyber vulnerability assessment, not an external tip off or an adversarial intrusion, is what caught the problem. Investigators found the electro-optical and infrared cameras mounted on the vessels sending what the industry calls heartbeat communications, routine signals a connected device sends simply to confirm it is powered on and functioning, to an IP address located in China. Kraken did not manufacture the cameras in house; the company sourced them from a third party supplier that had reportedly given assurances about their security, assurances the heartbeat traffic now calls directly into question.

Every source, including the UK Ministry of Defence itself, confirms the cameras were sending signals to an IP address in China. What remains unconfirmed is which company actually manufactured the compromised camera components. Neither The Telegraph nor the Ministry of Defence has publicly named the specific camera manufacturer, and an unverified social media claim allegedly identifying a Canadian supplier has since been disputed by that company, with no confirmation from official sources tying it to the incident as of now.

Crucially, the UK Ministry of Defence has been consistent on one point across every statement it has issued: its investigation found no evidence that classified information, government systems, or mission critical data were accessed, compromised, or transmitted outside the country. That is a meaningful distinction, and one worth taking at face value rather than dismissing as reflexive reassurance, since heartbeat signals by design carry connectivity status rather than payload content. But security researchers who reviewed the case have been equally consistent in noting that even metadata this thin has value to a watching adversary. Knowing when and where a piece of specialised military hardware is powered on and actively connected can itself function as a targeting signal, revealing patterns of deployment, operational tempo, and geographic presence without a single classified file ever leaving the device.

Why this particular fleet matters

The timing sharpens the concern considerably. A defence source cited in reporting on the story indicated the K3 Scout fleet was being considered as part of a future British contribution to securing freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, where the United Kingdom has already deployed a warship amid discussions of a multinational security mission. Equipment destined for a contested, strategically sensitive waterway having any unexplained data path back to a systemic rival's territory is not a detail that stays confined to a procurement footnote. The vessels were also tested during a NATO exercise in the Baltic Sea in 2025, meaning any compromised telemetry pattern could theoretically have been observed by the very alliance partners Britain was demonstrating the technology to.

The deeper issue is structural rather than incidental. Modern military hardware, however elite the unit operating it, is rarely built end to end by a single trusted manufacturer. Cameras, sensors, chipsets, and firmware routinely pass through several tiers of suppliers before reaching a finished platform, and each tier is a potential point where the chain of custody and verification can quietly break down. Kraken's own assurances about its camera supplier illustrate exactly how that failure propagates: a manufacturer can act in good faith, rely on a vendor's word, and still end up fielding compromised hardware, because the vulnerability was never introduced at the assembly stage but several layers upstream, in components whose ultimate origin was never fully audited.

CyberPeace View | A wider principle worth naming

There is a broader ethical and legal frame worth applying here, one that extends beyond ordinary cybersecurity practice into the territory international humanitarian law occupies. The core distinction that law draws, between combatants and protected persons, between military objectives and civilian life, depends fundamentally on operators having accurate, uncompromised situational awareness. A surveillance platform is not merely a piece of hardware; it is the sensory apparatus through which decisions with real consequences for human life get made in contested environments. If the integrity of that apparatus cannot be guaranteed, the reliability of everything built on top of it, target verification, proportionality assessments, distinction between combatant and civilian, is quietly weakened at its foundation. This is not a claim that the K3 Scout breach itself caused harm; the Ministry of Defence's own findings suggest it did not. It is a reminder that supply chain integrity in military sensing equipment is not simply a procurement or cybersecurity concern sitting apart from the laws of armed conflict. It sits underneath them, because a compromised sensor is, in a very real sense, a compromised judgment further down the chain.

Where India fits into this story

India has been grappling with functionally the same problem for years, and its response offers a useful point of comparison. Reporting dating back to 2023 revealed that Indian defence officials had quietly barred domestic drone manufacturers from using components sourced from countries sharing a land border with India, an unmistakable, if unstated, reference to China, citing exactly the kind of vulnerability now playing out in Britain's fleet, compromised communication functions, cameras, and operating software capable of leaking intelligence. That policy has hardened considerably since. Earlier this year, the Ministry of Defence in New Delhi finalised a stringent framework requiring that drones procured from domestic manufacturers contain no Chinese origin components or electronics at all, and at least one major drone order was placed on hold after allegations surfaced that the supplier had used Chinese parts despite those restrictions.

The commercial consequence of that caution has been real and acknowledged openly by industry figures; sourcing components outside China raises costs, given that up to 70 percent of the global drone supply chain has historically run through Chinese manufacturing. But India appears to have concluded, well ahead of this particular British incident becoming public, that the cost of auditing and diversifying a supply chain is lower than the cost of fielding compromised sensing equipment inside sensitive military operations. Indian firms have responded by building propulsion, avionics, and camera systems in house specifically to close this gap, treating component provenance as a first order design question rather than an afterthought bolted on after a breach forces the issue. Seen from that vantage point, the K3 Scout episode reads less like a uniquely British failure and more like a case study in a risk India's own defence establishment had already priced in.

Lessons from the breach

A few conclusions follow fairly directly from how this incident unfolded. First, routine cyber vulnerability assessments work, and this case is arguably an argument for doing more of them, more often, rather than a sign that current practice failed; the breach was caught internally, before any confirmed operational harm occurred. Second, a manufacturer's own assurances about a component supplier are not a substitute for independent verification, since Kraken's good faith reliance on its camera vendor's word is precisely where this vulnerability slipped through. Third, and most durably, defence procurement increasingly needs to treat component provenance as inseparable from operational security, not as a compliance checkbox to be satisfied once at contract signing. India's multi-year pivot toward auditing and localising sensitive component supply chains, imperfect and costly as it has been, points toward the direction other defence establishments will likely be pushed in as more incidents like this one surface. The K3 Scout breach did not, on the evidence available, compromise a single mission. What it compromised was the assumption that hardware assurances alone are sufficient, and that assumption was never going to survive close scrutiny forever.

References

1. LBC, "Spy cameras on Navy drones used by UK's elite special forces sending signals to China as security fears grow." https://www.lbc.co.uk/article/royal-navy-spy-drones-sending-signals-to-china-5Hjdfpm_2/
2. Defence Blog, "Royal Navy naval drone cameras secretly sent data to China." https://defence-blog.com/royal-navy-naval-drone-cameras-secretly-sent-data-to-china/
3. The National Interest, "The Royal Navy's Spy Drones May Have Been Spying for China, Too." https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/royal-navys-spy-drones-may-have-been-spying-for-china-too-sa-081026
4. Kyiv Post, "UK Navy Drone Camera Components Were Secretly Communicating With China." https://www.kyivpost.com/post/82061
5. The Defense News, "UK's Royal Navy K3 Scout Drone Cameras Found Sending Data to an IP Address in China." https://www.thedefensenews.com/UKs-Royal-Navy-K3-Scout-Drone-Cameras-Found-Sending-Data-to-an-IP-Address-in-China/
6. The Jerusalem Post, "UK drones sent data to China, raising US, European fears on Chinese components." https://www.jpost.com/international/article-905191
7. Firstpost, "UK military drones fitted with Chinese cameras found sending data to Beijing: Report." https://www.firstpost.com/world/uk-military-drones-fitted-with-chinese-cameras-found-sending-data-to-beijing-report-14037075.html
8. Firstpost, "UK deploys warship to West Asia amid plans for multinational Hormuz security mission." https://www.firstpost.com/world/uk-deploys-warship-to-west-asia-amid-plans-for-multinational-hormuz-security-mission-ws-e-14009471.html
9. Reuters via Inquirer.net, "India bars makers of military drones from using Chinese parts." https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1813810/india-bars-makers-of-military-drones-from-using-chinese-parts
10. The Print, "Amid concerns about use of Chinese parts in drones, Army general urges industry to be transparent." https://theprint.in/defence/amid-concerns-about-use-of-chinese-parts-in-drones-army-general-urges-industry-to-be-transparent/2305866/
11. idrw.org, "India Unveils Drone Security Framework to Eliminate Chinese Components and Strengthen UAV Cyber Defences." https://idrw.org/india-unveils-drone-security-framework-to-eliminate-chinese-components-and-strengthen-uav-cyber-defences/
12. The Week, "The hidden weakness in India's military drones: Zen Technologies says it has fixed the Chinese problem." https://www.theweek.in/news/defence/2026/07/09/the-hidden-weakness-in-indias-military-drones-zen-technologies-says-it-has-fixed-the-chinese-problem.html

‍

Introduction:

This Op-ed sheds light on the perspectives of the US and China regarding cyber espionage. Additionally, it seeks to analyze China's response to the US accusation regarding cyber espionage.

What is Cyber espionage?

Cyber espionage or cyber spying is the act of obtaining personal, sensitive, or proprietary information from individuals without their knowledge or consent. In an increasingly transparent and technological society, the ability to control the private information an individual reveals on the Internet and the ability of others to access that information are a growing concern. This includes storage and retrieval of e-mail by third parties, social media, search engines, data mining, GPS tracking, the explosion of smartphone usage, and many other technology considerations. In the age of big data, there is a growing concern for privacy issues surrounding the storage and misuse of personal data and non-consensual mining of private information by companies, criminals, and governments. 

Cyber espionage aims for economic, political, and technological gain. Fox example Stuxnet (2010) cyber-attack by the US and its allies Israel against Iran’s Nuclear facilities. Three espionage tools were discovered connected to Stuxnet, such as Gauss, FLAME and DuQu, for stealing data such as passwords, screenshots, Bluetooth, Skype functions, etc.

Cyber espionage is one of the most significant and intriguing international challenges globally. Many nations and international bodies, such as the US and China, have created their definitions and have always struggled over cyber espionage norms.

The US Perspective

In 2009, US officials (along with other allied countries) mentioned that cyber espionage was acceptable if it safeguarded national security, although they condemned economically motivated cyber espionage. Even the Director of National Intelligence said in 2013 that foreign intelligence capabilities cannot steal foreign companies' trade secrets to benefit their firms. This stance is consistent with the Economic Espionage Act (EEA) of 1996, particularly Section 1831, which prohibits economic espionage. This includes the theft of a trade secret that "will benefit any foreign government, foreign agent or foreign instrumentality. 

Second, the US advocates for cybersecurity market standards and strongly opposes transferring personal data extracted from the US Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to cybercrime markets. Furthermore, China has been reported to sell OPM data on illicit markets. It became a grave concern for the US government when the Chinese government managed to acquire sensitive details of 22.1 million US government workers through cyber intrusions in 2014.

Third, Cyber-espionage is acceptable unless it’s utilized for Doxing, which involves disclosing personal information about someone online without their consent and using it as a tool for political influence operations. However, Western academics and scholars have endeavoured to distinguish between doxing and whistleblowing. They argue that whistleblowing, exemplified by events like the Snowden Leaks and Vault 7 disclosures, serves the interests of US citizens. In the US, being regarded as an open society, certain disclosures are not promoted but rather required by mandate.

Fourth, the US argues that there is no cyber espionage against critical infrastructure during peacetime. According to the US, there are 16 critical infrastructure sectors, including chemical, nuclear, energy, defence, food, water, and so on. These sectors are considered essential to the US, and any disruption or harm would impact security, national public health and national economic security.

The US concern regarding China’s cyber espionage

According to James Lewis (a senior vice president at the Center for US-China Economic and Security Review Commission), the US faces losses between $ 20 billion and $30 billion annually due to China’s cyberespionage. The 2018 U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Section 301 report highlighted instances, where the Chinese government and executives from Chinese companies engaged in clandestine cyber intrusions to obtaining commercially valuable information from the U.S. businesses, such as in 2018 where officials from China’s Ministry of State Security, stole trade from General Electric aviation and other aerospace companies.    

China's response to the US accusations of cyber espionage

China's perspective on cyber espionage is outlined by its 2014 anti-espionage law, which was revised in 2023. Article 1 of this legislation is formulated to prevent, halt, and punish espionage actions to maintain national security. Article 4 addresses the act of espionage and does not differentiate between state-sponsored cyber espionage for economic purposes and state-sponsored cyber espionage for national security purposes. However, China doesn't make a clear difference between government-to-government hacking (spying) and government-to-corporate sector hacking, unlike the US. This distinction is less apparent in China due to its strong state-owned enterprise (SOE) sector. However, military spying is considered part of the national interest in the US, while corporate spying is considered a crime.

China asserts that the US has established cyber norms concerning cyber espionage to normalize public attribution as acceptable conduct. This is achieved by targeting China for cyber operations, imposing sanctions on accused Chinese individuals, and making political accusations, such as blaming China and Russia for meddling in US elections. Despite all this, Washington D.C has never taken responsibility for the infamous Flame and Stuxnet cyber operations, which were widely recognized as part of a broader collaborative initiative known as Operation Olympic Games between the US and Israel. Additionally, the US takes the lead in surveillance activities conducted against China, Russia, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, and several French presidents. Surveillance programs such as Irritant Horn, Stellar Wind, Bvp47, the Hive, and PRISM are recognized as tools used by the US to monitor both allies and adversaries to maintain global hegemony.

China urges the US to cease its smear campaign associated with Volt Typhoon’s cyberattack for cyber espionage, citing the publication of a report titled “Volt Typhoon: A Conspiratorial Swindling Campaign Targets with U.S. Congress and Taxpayers Conducted by U.S. Intelligence Community” by China's National Computer Virus Emergency Response Centre and the 360 Digital Security Group on 15 April. According to the report, 'Volt Typhoon' is a ransomware cyber criminal group self-identified as the 'Dark Power' and is not affiliated with any state or region. Multiple cybersecurity authorities in the US collaborated to fabricate this story just for more budgets from Congress. In the meantime, Microsoft and other U.S. cybersecurity firms are seeking more big contracts from US cybersecurity authorities. The reality behind “Volt Typhoon '' is a conspiratorial swindling campaign to achieve two objectives by amplifying the "China threat theory" and cheating money from the U.S. Congress and taxpayers.

Beijing condemned the US claims of cyber espionage without any solid evidence. China also blames the US for economic espionage by citing the European Parliament report that the National Security Agency (NSA) was also involved in assisting Boeing in beating Airbus for a multi-billion dollar contract. Furthermore, Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff also accused the US authorities of spying against the state-owned oil company “Petrobras” for economic reasons.

Conclusion

In 2015, the US and China marked a milestone as both President Xi Jinping and Barack Obama signed an agreement, committing that neither country's government would conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of trade secrets, intellectual property, or other confidential business information to grant competitive advantages to firms or commercial sectors. However, the China Cybersecurity Industry Alliance (CCIA) published a report titled 'US Threats and Sabotage to the Security and Development of Global Cyberspace' in 2024, highlighting the US escalating cyber-attack and espionage activities against China and other nations. Additionally, there has been a considerable increase in the volume and sophistication of Chinese hacking since 2016. According to a survey by the Center for International and Strategic Studies, out of 224 cyber espionage incidents reported since 2000, 69% occurred after Xi assumed office. Therefore, China and the US must address cybersecurity issues through dialogue and cooperation, utilizing bilateral and multilateral agreements.

‍