#FactCheck -AI-Manipulated Video Falsely Claims ₹50 Crore Deal Involving Bhupen Bora

Introduction

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India’s new Policy for Data Sharing from the National Transport Repository (NTR) released by the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (MoRTH) in August, 2025, can be seen as a constitutional turning point and a milestone in administrative efficiency. The state has established an unprecedentedly large unified infrastructure by combining the records of 390 million vehicles, 220 million driver’s licenses, and the streams from the e-challan, e-DAR, and FASTag systems. Its supporters hail its promise of private-sector innovation, data-driven research, and smooth governance. However, there is a troubling paradox beneath this facade of advancement: the very structures intended to improve citizen mobility may simultaneously strengthen widespread surveillance. Without strict protections, the NTR runs the risk of violating the constitutional trifecta of need, proportionality, and legality as stated in Puttaswamy v. UOI, which brings to light important issues at the nexus of liberty, law, and data.  

The other pertinent question to be addressed is as India unifies one of its comprehensive datasets on citizen mobility the question becomes more pressing: while motorised citizens are now in the spotlight for accountability, what about the millions of other datasets that are still dispersed, unregulated, and shared inconsistently in the areas of health, education, telecom, and welfare?

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The Legal Backdrop

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MoRTH grounds its new policy in Sections 25A and 62B of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Data is consolidated into a single repository since states are required by Section 136A to electronically monitor road safety. According to the policy, it complies with the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023. 

The DPDP Act itself, however, is rife with state exclusions, particularly Sections 7 and 17, which give government organisations access to personal information for “any function under any law” or for law enforcement purposes. This is where the constitutional issue lies. Prior judicial supervision, warrants, or independent checks are not necessary. With legislative approval, MoRTH is essentially creating a national vehicle database without any constitutional protections. 

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Data, Domination and the New Privacy Paradigm

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As an efficiency and governance reform, VAHAN, SARATHI, e-challan, eDAR, and FASTag are being consolidated into a single National Transport Repository (NTR). However, centralising extensive mobility and identity-linked records on a large scale is more than just a technical advancement; it also changes how the state and private life interact. The NTR must therefore be interpreted through a more comprehensive privacy paradigm, one that acknowledges that data aggregation is a means of enhancing administrative capacity and has the potential to develop into a long-lasting tool of social control and surveillance unless both technological and constitutional restrictions are placed at the same time. 

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Two recent doctrinal developments sharpen this concern. First, the Supreme Court’s foundational ruling that privacy is a fundamental right remains the constitutional lodestar, any state interference must satisfy legality, necessity and proportionality (KS Puttaswamy & Anr. vs UOI). Second, as seen by the court’s most recent refusals to normalise ongoing, warrantless location monitoring, such as the ruling overturning bail requirements that required accused individuals to provide a Google maps pin, as movement tracking necessitates closer examination (Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau & Ors.,).When taken as a whole, these authorities maintain that unrestricted, ongoing access to mobility and toll-transaction records is a constitutional issue and cannot be handled as an administrative convenience. 

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Structural Fault Lines in the NTR Framework

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Fundamentally, the NTR policy generates structural vulnerabilities by providing nearly unrestricted access through APIs and even mass transfers on physical media to a broad range of parties, including insurance companies, law enforcement, and intelligence services. This design undermines constitutional protections in three ways: first, it makes it possible to draw conclusions about private life patterns that the Supreme Court has identified as one of the most sensitive data categories by exposing rich mobility trails like FASTag logs and vehicle-linked identities; Second, it allows bulk datasets to circulate outside the ministry’s custodial boundary, which creates the possibility of function creep, secondary use, and monetisation risks reminiscent of the bulk sharing regime that the government itself once abandoned; and third, it introduces coercive exclusion by tying private sector access to Aadhaar-based OTP consent. 

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Reference

• https://morth.nic.in/sites/default/files/circulars_document/Data-Sharing-policy-20082025-merged.pdf

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Introduction
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In April 2026, Anthropic revealed Claude Mythos, an artificial intelligence application capable of finding security flaws in computer networks more effectively than human beings. The corporation claimed to have found hundreds of thousands of substantially serious vulnerabilities in established desktop operating systems and web-based browsers that have not been used for at least 20 years. This news has greatly alarmed those responsible for leading financial organisations, banks, and governments throughout the world. Nevertheless, this news demonstrates a much larger problem: we do not have enough cybersecurity professionals trained to do this kind of work. At the current estimate, there are 4.8 million cyber security professionals short of what is needed globally. There is a need to develop different kinds of workforce training programs to help prepare these professionals as we continue to see the emergence of new AI technologies.

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What Is Claude Mythos ?
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Anthropic created Claude Mythos as part of its Claude AI system, competing against ChatGPT and Google Gemini. In April 2026, expert testing revealed Mythos excelled at identifying problems in legacy code and suggested exploitation methods. It found a vulnerability that had existed for 27 years. Because of these advanced capabilities, Anthropic restricted access through “Project Glasswing,” giving it only to 12 major tech companies and 40 organizations managing critical software. Canadian Finance Minister François-Philippe Champagne called it an “unknown unknown.” Andrew Bailey of the Bank of England said regulators needed to examine what Mythos could mean for financial attacks. The European Union raised concerns. India’s Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman warned at SEBI’s Foundation Day on April 25, 2026, that cybersecurity is the single most pressing challenge facing markets today. She stated a single successful cyberattack on a major exchange or large broker could disrupt markets nationally and shake public confidence for years. Sitharaman emphasized that AI tools make attacks faster, more adaptive, and autonomous, capable of discovering system vulnerabilities and manipulating code.

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The Real Problem: Discovery Versus Fixing
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Mythos highlights a fundamental mismatch in cybersecurity. Finding a vulnerability does not guarantee it will be fixed. Organizations face challenges patching systems. Many use obsolete technology, and updates can break dependent components. Organizations in developing nations often lack financial resources for repairs or downtime. Critical systems like hospitals, banks, and power grids cannot go offline. Before Mythos, human hackers found vulnerabilities slowly. Now AI tools find weaknesses faster than they can be fixed, creating a dangerous gap. Ciaran Martin, former head of the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre, explained that Mythos is “a really good hacker” against unprotected systems. Organizations following basic security practices—regular updates, strong passwords, network protection, trained staff can likely defend against it. The UK AI Safety Institute concluded Mythos poses the biggest threat to poorly defended systems, noting: “We cannot say for sure whether Mythos Preview would be able to attack well-defended systems.”

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The Workforce Challenge
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The Mythos announcement exposes the real problem: we lack enough trained cybersecurity workers. There is a global shortage of 4.8 million workers against a current workforce of 5.5 million. In AI security specifically, 34 percent of needed skills are missing. But the harder problem is that AI is changing needed skills. Entry-level jobs monitoring security alerts are being automated. These were traditional career starting points. Young people learned basic skills and moved to advanced roles. Now these positions disappear while new AI security jobs emerge for which nobody has training. Organizations cannot hire fast enough for new AI roles because few people have these skills. This leads to a vicious cycle. With fewer entry-level positions available, there will be fewer young adults entering the job market which results in even fewer workers with this skill set; thus, the shortage of qualified applicants increases; this thereby increases organizations’ vulnerability. Without action taken immediately, this issue will continue to worsen 

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Way Forward
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1. Clarify What Skills We Need

Governments and industry must work together to define what cybersecurity workers need in an AI world. Currently, aspiring professionals study networking, software, and vulnerability finding, but AI security training barely exists. Governments should work with universities and companies to clarify needed skills: understanding what AI tools can and cannot do in security, finding and fixing AI system problems.

2. Support Workers Who Lose Jobs To Automation

Workers who find themselves losing their jobs due to automation will require government support. All too often without an alternative, these skilled and trained workers will leave their profession forever. The government will need to provide funding for training of displaced employees, support for those changing careers to become cyber security professionals.

3. Create Clear Rules For AI Security Tools

When companies create powerful security tools, governments must understand their capabilities and risks. Companies should be required to thoroughly test tools before release, clearly explain what tools can do and their limitations, and explain safety and misuse prevention plans. Governments should monitor actual tool usage, not simply trust voluntary compliance.

4. Focus On Basic Security First

Most attacks do not need advanced AI tools. They succeed because organizations have not implemented basic security. Some never update software, train employees, use strong passwords, protect data properly, or test defenses. Governments should require organizations, especially those managing critical systems, to implement these basics.

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Conclusion
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Claude Mythos matters not because it is a weapon of destruction, but because it forces hard questions: Do we have enough skilled workers? Are our systems well-protected? The answer is no. We face a shortage of 4.8 million cybersecurity workers and lack AI security training. Yet this is also an opportunity. Governments can invest in training, strengthen defenses, and create clear rules for AI security tools. Governments, organizations and educational institutions must collaborate to create viable Cybersecurity career pathways. We can act through either creating panic or creating a trained and prepared workforce to meet today’s challenges. The time is now.

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References 
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1. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/crk1py1jgzko
2. https://red.anthropic.com/2026/mythos-preview/ 
3. https://www.anthropic.com/project/glasswing 
4. https://www.aisi.gov.uk/blog/our-evaluation-of-claude-mythos-previews-cyber-capabilities 
5. https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/people/ciaran-martin 
6. https://www.isc2.org/Insights/2024/10/Cybersecurity-Workforce-INSIGHTS-October-2024 
7. https://decrypt.co/364141/anthropic-claude-mythos-serious-threat-overhyped-ai-security-institute 
8. https://www.businesstoday.in/latest/economy/story/fm-nirmala-sitharaman-wants-sebi-regulated-entities-to-remain-exceptionally-vigilant-heres-why-527437-2026-04-25 
9. https://www.theweek.in/news/biz-tech/2026/04/25/sebi-38th-anniversary-cybersecurity-concerns.html 

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Introduction

Cybercrimes have been traversing peripheries and growing at a fast pace. Cybercrime is known to be an offensive action that either targets or operates through a computer, a computer network or a networked device, according to Kaspersky.  In the “Era of globalisation” and a “Digitally coalesced world”, there has been an increase in International cybercrime. Cybercrime could be for personal or political objectives. Nevertheless, Cybercrime aims to sabotage networks for motives other than gain and be carried out either by organisations or individuals. Some of the cybercriminals have no national boundaries and are considered a global threat. They are likewise inordinately technically adept and operate avant-garde strategies. 

The 2023 Global Risk Report points to exacerbating geopolitical apprehensions that have increased the advanced persistent threats (APTs), which are evolving globally as they are ubiquitous. Christine Lagarde, the president of the European Central Bank and former head of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in 2020 cautioned that a cyber attack could lead to a severe economic predicament. Contemporary technologies and hazardous players have grown at an exceptional gait over the last few decades. Also, cybercrime has heightened on the agenda of nation-states, establishments and global organisations, as per the World Economic Forum (WEF). 

The Role of the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee 

In two shakes, the United Nations (UN) has a major initiative to develop a new and more inclusive approach to addressing cybercrime and is presently negotiating a new convention on cybercrime. The following convention seeks to enhance global collaboration in the combat against cybercrime. The UN has a central initiative to develop a unique and more inclusive strategy for addressing cybercrime. The UN passed resolution 74/247, which designated an open-ended ad hoc committee (AHC) in December 2019 entrusted with setting a broad global convention on countering the use of information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) for illicit pursuits. 

The Cybercrime treaty, if adopted by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) would be the foremost imperative UN mechanism on a cyber point. The treaty could further become a crucial international legal framework for global collaboration on arraigning cyber criminals, precluding and investigating cybercrime. There have correspondingly been numerous other national and international measures to counter the criminal use of ICTs. However, the UN treaty is intended to tackle cybercrime and enhance partnership and coordination between states. The negotiations of the Ad Hoc Committee with the member states will be completed by early 2024 to further adopt the treaty during the UNGA in September 2024.

However, the following treaty is said to be complex. Some countries endorse a treaty that criminalises cyber-dependent offences and a comprehensive spectrum of cyber-enabled crimes.  The proposals of Russia, Belarus, China, Nicaragua and Cuba have included highly controversial recommendations. Nevertheless, India has backed for criminalising crimes associated with ‘cyber terrorism’ and the suggestions of India to the UN Ad Hoc committee are in string with its regulatory strategy in the country. Similarly, the US, Japan, the UK, European Union (EU) member states and Australia want to include core cyber-dependent crimes. 

Nonetheless, though a new treaty could become a practical instrument in the international step against cybercrime, it must conform to existing global agencies and networks that occupy similar areas. This convention will further supplement the "Budapest Cybercrime Convention" on cybercrime that materialised in the 1990s and was signed in Budapest in the year 2001.

Conclusion

According to Cyber Security Ventures, global cybercrime is expected to increase by 15 per cent per year over the next five years, reaching USD 10.5 trillion annually by 2025, up from USD 3 trillion in 2015. The UN cybercrime convention aims to be more global. That being the case, next-generation tools should have state-of-the-art technology to deal with new cyber crimes and cyber warfare. The global crevasse in nation-states due to cybercrime is beyond calculation. It could lead to a great cataclysm in the global economy and threaten the political interest of the countries on that account. It is crucial for global governments and international organisations. It is necessary to strengthen the collaboration between establishments (public and private) and law enforcement mechanisms. An “appropriately designed policy” is henceforward the need of the hour.

References

• https://www.kaspersky.co.in/resource-center/threats/what-is-cybercrime
• https://www.cyberpeace.org/
• https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Cybercrime
• https://www.bizzbuzz.news/bizz-talk/ransomware-attacks-on-startups-msmes-on-the-rise-in-india-cyberpeace-foundation-1261320
• https://www.financialexpress.com/business/digital-transformation-cyberpeace-foundation-receives-4-million-google-org-grant-3282515/
• https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/08/what-un-cybercrime-treaty-and-why-does-it-matter
• https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2023/01/global-rules-crack-down-cybercrime/
• https://www.weforum.org/publications/global-risks-report-2023/
• https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2021/03/global-cyber-threat-to-financial-systems-maurer.htm
• https://www.eff.org/issues/un-cybercrime-treaty#:~:text=The%20United%20Nations%20is%20currently,of%20billions%20of%20people%20worldwide.
• https://cybersecurityventures.com/hackerpocalypse-cybercrime-report-2016/
• https://www.coe.int/en/web/cybercrime/the-budapest-convention
• https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/technology/counter-use-of-technology-for-cybercrime-india-tells-un-ad-hoc-group/articleshow/92237908.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst
• https://consultation.dpmc.govt.nz/un-cybercrime-convention/principlesandobjectives/supporting_documents/Background.pdf
• https://unric.org/en/a-un-treaty-on-cybercrime-en-route/

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