#FactCheck - Debunking Manipulated Photos of Smiling Secret Service Agents During Trump Assassination Attempt

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

A viral video is surfacing claiming to capture an aerial view of Mount Kailash that has breathtaking scenery apparently providing a rare real-life shot of Tibet's sacred mountain. Its authenticity was investigated, and authenticity versus digitally manipulative features were analyzed.

CLAIMS:

The viral video claims to reveal the real aerial shot of Mount Kailash, as if exposing us to the natural beauty of such a hallowed mountain. The video was circulated widely in social media, with users crediting it to be the actual footage of Mount Kailash.

FACTS:

The viral video that was circulated through social media was not real footage of Mount Kailash. The reverse image search revealed that it is an AI-generated video created by Sonam and Namgyal, two Tibet based graphic artists on Midjourney. The advanced digital techniques used helped to provide a realistic lifelike scene in the video.

No media or geographical source has reported or published the video as authentic footage of Mount Kailash. Besides, several visual aspects, including lighting and environmental features, indicate that it is computer-generated.

For further verification, we used Hive Moderation, a deep fake detection tool to conclude whether the video is AI-Generated or Real. It was found to be AI generated.

CONCLUSION:

The viral video claiming to show an aerial view of Mount Kailash is an AI-manipulated creation, not authentic footage of the sacred mountain. This incident highlights the growing influence of AI and CGI in creating realistic but misleading content, emphasizing the need for viewers to verify such visuals through trusted sources before sharing.

• Claim: Digitally Morphed Video of Mt. Kailash, Showcasing Stunning White Clouds
• Claimed On: X (Formerly Known As Twitter), Instagram
• Fact Check: AI-Generated (Checked using Hive Moderation).

Introduction

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Recently, in April 2025, security researchers at Oligo Security exposed a substantial and wide-ranging threat impacting Apple's AirPlay protocol and its use via third-party Software Development Kit (SDK). According to the research, the recently discovered set of vulnerabilities titled "AirBorne" had the potential to enable remote code execution, escape permissions, and leak private data across many different Apple and third-party AirPlay-compatible devices. With well over 2.35 billion active Apple devices globally and tens of millions of third-party products that incorporate the AirPlay SDK, the scope of the problem is enormous. Those wireless-based vulnerabilities pose not only a technical threat but also increasingly an enterprise- and consumer-level security concern.

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Understanding AirBorne: What’s at Stake?

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AirBorne is the title given to a set of 23 vulnerabilities identified in the AirPlay communication protocol and its related SDK utilised by third-party vendors. Seventeen have been given official CVE designations. The most severe among them permit Remote Code Execution (RCE) with zero or limited user interaction. This provides hackers the ability to penetrate home networks, business environments, and even cars with CarPlay technology onboard.

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Types of Vulnerabilities Identified

AirBorne vulnerabilities support a range of attack types, including:

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• Zero-Click and One-Click RCE
• Access Control List (ACL) bypass
• User interaction bypass
• Local arbitrary file read
• Sensitive data disclosure
• Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks
• Denial of Service (DoS)

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Each vulnerability can be used individually or chained together to escalate access and broaden the attack surface.

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Remote Code Execution (RCE): Key Attack Scenarios

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1. MacOS – Zero-Click RCE (CVE-2025-24252 & CVE-2025-24206) These weaknesses enable attackers to run code on a MacOS system without any user action, as long as the AirPlay receiver is enabled and configured to accept connections from anyone on the same network. The threat of wormable malware propagating via corporate or public Wi-Fi networks is especially concerning.
2. MacOS – One-Click RCE (CVE-2025-24271 & CVE-2025-24137) If AirPlay is set to "Current User," attackers can exploit these CVEs to deploy malicious code with one click by the user. This raises the level of threat in shared office or home networks.
3. AirPlay SDK Devices – Zero-Click RCE (CVE-2025-24132) Third-party speakers and receivers through the AirPlay SDK are particularly susceptible, where exploitation requires no user intervention. Upon compromise, the attackers have the potential to play unauthorised media, turn microphones on, or monitor intimate spaces.
4. CarPlay Devices – RCE Over Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, or USB CVE-2025-24132 also affects CarPlay-enabled systems. Under certain circumstances, the perpetrators around can take advantage of predictable Wi-Fi credentials, intercept Bluetooth PINs, or utilise USB connections to take over dashboard features, which may distract drivers or listen in on in-car conversations.

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Other Exploits Beyond RCE

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AirBorne also opens the door for:

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• Sensitive Information Disclosure: Exposing private logs or user metadata over local networks (CVE-2025-24270).
• Local Arbitrary File Access: Letting attackers read restricted files on a device (CVE-2025-24270 group).
• DoS Attacks: Exploiting NULL pointer dereferences or misformatted data to crash processes like the AirPlay receiver or WindowServer, forcing user logouts or system instability (CVE-2025-24129, CVE-2025-24177, etc.).

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How the Attack Works: A Technical Breakdown

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AirPlay sends on port 7000 via HTTP and RTSP, typically encoded in Apple's own plist (property list) form. Exploits result from incorrect treatment of these plists, especially when skipping type checking or assuming invalid data will be valid. For instance, CVE-2025-24129 illustrates how a broken plist can produce type confusion to crash or execute code based on configuration.

A hacker must be within the same Wi-Fi network as the targeted device. This connection might be through a hacked laptop, public wireless with shared access, or an insecure corporate connection. Once in proximity, the hacker has the ability to use AirBorne bugs to hijack AirPlay-enabled devices. There, bad code can be released to spy, gain long-term network access, or spread control to other devices on the network, perhaps creating a botnet or stealing critical data.

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The Espionage Angle

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Most third-party AirPlay-compatible devices, including smart speakers, contain built-in microphones. In theory, that leaves the door open for such devices to become eavesdropping tools. While Oligo did not show a functional exploit for the purposes of espionage, the risk suggests the gravity of the situation.

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The CarPlay Risk Factor

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Besides smart home appliances, vulnerabilities in AirBorne have also been found for Apple CarPlay by Oligo. Those vulnerabilities, when exploited, may enable attackers to take over an automobile's entertainment system. Fortunately, the attacks would need pairing directly through USB or Bluetooth and are much less practical. Even so, it illustrates how networks of connected components remain at risk in various situations, ranging from residences to automobiles.

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How to Protect Yourself and Your Organisation

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1. Immediate Actions:

• Update Devices: Ensure all Apple devices and third-party gadgets are upgraded to the latest software version.
• Disable AirPlay Receiver: If AirPlay is not in use, disable it in system settings.
• Restrict AirPlay Access: Use firewalls to block port 7000 from untrusted IPs.
• Set AirPlay to “Current User” to limit network-based attack.

2. Organisational Recommendations:

• Communicate the patch urgency to employees and stakeholders.
• Inventory all AirPlay-enabled hardware, including in meeting rooms and vehicles.
• Isolate vulnerable devices on segmented networks until updated.

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Conclusion

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The AirBorne vulnerabilities illustrate that even mature systems such as Apple's are not immune from foundational security weaknesses. The extensive deployment of AirPlay across devices, industries, and ecosystems makes these vulnerabilities a systemic threat. Oligo's discovery has served to catalyse immediate response from Apple, but since third-party devices remain vulnerable, responsibility falls to users and organisations to install patches, implement robust configurations, and compartmentalise possible attack surfaces. Effective proactive cybersecurity hygiene, network segmentation, and timely patches are the strongest defences to avoid these kinds of wormable, scalable attacks from becoming large-scale breaches.

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References

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• https://www.oligo.security/blog/airborne
• https://www.wired.com/story/airborne-airplay-flaws/
• https://thehackernews.com/2025/05/wormable-airplay-flaws-enable-zero.html
• https://www.securityweek.com/airplay-vulnerabilities-expose-apple-devices-to-zero-click-takeover/
• https://www.pcmag.com/news/airborne-flaw-exposes-airplay-devices-to-hacking-how-to-protect-yourself
• https://cyberguy.com/security/hackers-breaking-into-apple-devices-through-airplay/

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Introduction

To combat the problem of annoying calls and SMS, telecom regulator TRAI has urged service providers to create a uniform digital platform in two months that will allow them to request, maintain, and withdraw customers’ approval for promotional calls and messages. In the initial stage, only subscribers will be able to initiate the process of registering their consent to receive promotional calls and SMS, and later, business entities will be able to contact customers to seek their consent to receive promotional messages, according to a statement issued by the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) on Saturday.

TRAI Directs Telecom Providers to Set Up Digital Platform

TRAI has now directed all access providers to develop and deploy the Digital Consent Acquisition (DCA) facility for creating a unified platform and process to digitally register customers’ consent across all service providers and principal entities. Consent is received and maintained under the current system by several key entities such as banks, other financial institutions, insurance firms, trading companies, business entities, real estate businesses, and so on.

The purpose, scope of consent, and the principal entity or brand name shall be clearly mentioned in the consent-seeking message sent over the short code,” according to the statement.

It stated that only approved online or app links, call-back numbers, and so on will be permitted to be used in consent-seeking communications.

TRAI issued guidelines to guarantee that all voice-based Telemarketers are brought under a single Distributed ledger technology (DLT) platform for more efficient monitoring of nuisance calls and unwanted communications. It also instructs operators to actively deploy AI/ML-based anti-phishing systems as well as to integrate tech solutions on the DLT platform to deal with malicious calls and texts.

TRAI has issued two separate Directions to Access Service Providers under TCCCPR-2018 (Telecom Commercial Communications Customer Preference Regulations) to ensure that all promotional messages are sent through Registered Telemarketers (RTMs) using approved Headers and Message Templates on Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLT) platform, and to stop misuse of Headers and Message Templates,” the regulator said in a statement.

Users can already block telemarketing calls and texts by texting 1909 from their registered mobile number. By dialing 1909, customers can opt out of getting advertising calls by activating the do not disturb (DND) feature.

Telecom providers operate DLT platforms, and businesses involved in sending bulk promotional or transactional SMS must register by providing their company information, including sender IDs and SMS templates.

According to the instructions, telecom companies will send consent-seeking messages using the common short code 127. The goal, extent of consent, and primary entity/brand name must be clearly stated in the consent-seeking message delivered via the shortcode.

TRAI stated that only whitelisted URLs/APKs (Android package kits file format)/OTT links/call back numbers, etc., shall be used in consent-seeking messages.

Telcos must “ensure that promotional messages are not transmitted by unregistered telemarketers or telemarketers using telephone numbers (10 digits numbers).” Telecom providers have been urged to act against all erring telemarketers in accordance with the applicable regulations and legal requirements.

Users can, however, refuse to receive any consent-seeking messages launched by any significant Telcos have been urged to create an SMS/IVR (interactive voice response)/online service for this purpose.

According to TRAI’s timeline, the consent-taking process by primary companies will begin on September 1.According to a nationwide survey conducted by a local circle, 66% of mobile users continue to receive three or more bothersome calls per day, the majority of which originate from personal cell numbers.

There are scams surfacing on the internet with new types of scams, like WhatsApp international call scams. The latest scam is targeting Delhi police, the scammers pretend to be police officials of Delhi and ask for the personal details of the users and the calling them from a 9-digit number.

A recent scam

A Twitter user reported receiving an automated call from +91 96681 9555, stating, “This call is from Delhi Police.” It went on to ask her to stay in the queue since some of her documents needed to be picked up. Then he said he is a sub-inspector at New Delhi’s Kirti Nagar police station. He then questioned if she had lately misplaced her Aadhaar card, PAN card, or ATM card, to which she replied ‘no’. The fraudster then claims to be a cop and asks her to validate the final four digits of her card because they have discovered a card with her name on it. And so many other people tweeted about this.

The scams are constantly increasing as earlier these scammers asked for account details and claimed to be Delhi police and used 9-digit numbers for scamming people.

TRAI’s new guidelines regarding the consent to receive any promotional calls and messages to telecommunication providers will be able to curb the scams.

The e- KYC is an essential requirement as e-KYC offers a more secure identity verification process in an increasingly digital age that uses biometric technologies to provide quick results.

Conclusion

The aim is to prevent unwanted calls and communications sent to customers via digital methods without their permission. Once this platform is implemented, an organization can only send promotional calls or messages with the customer’s explicit approval. Companies use a variety of methods to notify clients about their products, including phone calls, text messages, emails, and social media. Customers, however, are constantly assaulted with the same calls and messages as a result of this practice. With the constant increase in scams, the new guideline of TRAI will also curb the calling of Scams. digital KYC prevents SIM fraud and offers a more secure identity verification method.