#FactCheck - AI-Generated Image Falsely Linked to Doda Army Vehicle Accident

Executive Summary:

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A video circulating on Social media has claimed that Iran has launched a missile strike destroying Ben Gurion Airport in Tel Aviv. With rising tensions in geopolitics, the video quickly became popular. However, our research has detailed inspections through digital verification tools and visual analysis showed that the video is AI-generated. No incident or damage ever occurred. 

Claim:

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A viral video circulating on social media platforms claims to show Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion Airport destroyed following an Iranian missile strike. The video is being shared with captions suggesting it is the last recorded visuals from the attack, with some users asserting it as evidence of escalating conflict between Iran and Israel.

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Fact Check:

After looking into the video that purported to show the destruction of Tel Aviv's Ben Gurion Airport in an Iranian missile strike, we researched the topic whether the claim is accurate or not. The video depicts a damaged airport terminal, with debris and fires, but a visual analysis determined that there were a number of suspicious characteristics: asymmetrical layout, artificial-looking smoke patterns, and the absence of activity or humans—those are all typical indications of AI generation. Our research traced the origins of the video to an Instagram post, with a date of May 27, 2025, made by what seems to be a user who frequently shares AI-generated images. 

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In order to verify our conclusions, we used Hive Moderation, an AI content detection tool, which produced a result of an 80% probability that the video is altered, and this level of probability strongly supports the idea that the footage is not real. Additionally, reports from popular organizations like India Today and Reuters supported these results. All findings resulting from our research established that the video is synthetic and unrelated to any event occurring at Ben Gurion Airport, and therefore debunked a false narrative propagated on social media. 

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To confirm, we also compared the visuals with a real aerial image of Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion Airport available on aviation stock sites.

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Fig: Google Maps image of Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion Airport

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The visuals from the viral video are not real locations or scenes of Aviv’s Ben Gurion Airport's true location and configuration therefore it is fake and misleading.

Conclusion:

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After thorough research it is concluded that the viral video is fake and it is not an actual missile strike at Ben Gurion Airport. The video is made with AI, and posted by a content creator of synthetic content well before any conflict update. There is no official confirmation or credible news coverage to substantiate the claim, with a high probability of AI-detection, and it has been proven to be digitally manipulated. Therefore, the claim is untrue and misleading.

• Claim: A video shows Iran's missile strike destroying Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion Airport.
• Claimed On: Social Media
• Fact Check: False and Misleading

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Introduction 

Public infrastructure has traditionally served as the framework for civilisation, transporting people, money, and ideas across time and space, from the iron veins of transcontinental railroads to the unseen arteries of the internet. In democracies where free markets and public infrastructure co-exist, this framework has not only facilitated but also accelerated progress. Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI), which powers inclusiveness, fosters innovation, and changes citizens from passive recipients to active participants in the digital age, is emerging as the new civic backbone as we move away from highways and towards high-speed data. 

DPI makes it possible for innovation at the margins and for inclusion at scale by providing open-source, interoperable platforms for identities, payments, and data exchange. Examples of how the Global South is evolving from a passive consumer of technology to a creator of globally replicable governance models are India’s Aadhaar (digital identification), UPI (real-time payments), and DigiLocker (data empowerment). As the ‘digital commons’ emerges, DPI does more than simply link users; it also empowers citizens, eliminates inefficiencies from the past, and reimagines the creation and distribution of public value in the digital era. 

Securing the Digital Infrastructure: A Contemporary Imperative

As humans, we are already the inhabitants of the future, we stand at the temporal threshold for reform. Digital Infrastructure is no longer just a public good. It’s now a strategic asset, akin to oil pipelines in the 20th century. India is recognised globally for the introduction of “India Stack”, through which the face of digital payments has also been changed. The economic value contributed by DPIs to India’s GDP is predicted to reach 2.9-4.2 percent by 2030, having already reached 0.9% in 2022. Its role in India’s economic development is partly responsible for its success; among emerging market economies, it helped propel India to the top of the revenue administrations’ digitalisation index. The other portion has to do with how India’s social service delivery has changed across the board. By enabling digital and financial inclusion, it has increased access to education (DIKSHA) and is presently being developed to offer agricultural (VISTAAR) and digital health (ABDM) services. 

Securing the Foundations: Emerging Threats to Digital Public Infrastructure

The rising prominence of DPI is not without its risks, as adversarial forces are developing with comparable sophistication. The core underpinnings of public digital systems are the target of a new generation of cyber threats, ranging from hostile state actors to cybercriminal syndicates. The threats pose a great risk to the consistent development endeavours of the government. To elucidate, targeted attacks on Biometric databases, AI-based Misinformation and Psychological Warfare, Payment System Hacks, State-sponsored malware, cross-border phishing campaigns, surveillance spyware and Sovereign Malware are modern-day examples of cyber threats. 

To secure DPI, a radical rethink beyond encryption methods and perimeter firewalls is needed. It requires an understanding of cybersecurity that is systemic, ethical, and geopolitical. Democracy, inclusivity, and national integrity are all at risk from DPI. To preserve the confidence and promise of digital public infrastructure, policy frameworks must change from fragmented responses to coordinated, proactive and people-centred cyber defence policies.

CyberPeace Recommendations

Powering Progress, Ignoring Protection: A Precarious Path

The Indian government is aware that cyberattacks are becoming more frequent and sophisticated in the nation. To address the nation’s cybersecurity issues, the government has implemented a number of legislative, technical, and administrative policy initiatives. While the initiatives are commendable, there are a few Non-Negotiables that need to be in place for effective protection: 

• DPIs must be declared Critical Information Infrastructure. In accordance with the IT Act, 2000, the DPI (Aadhaar, UPI, DigiLocker, Account Aggregator, CoWIN, and ONDC) must be designated as Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) and be supervised by the NCIIPC, just like the banking, energy, and telecom industries. Give NCIIPC the authority to publish required security guidelines, carry out audits, and enforce adherence to the DPI stack, including incident response protocols tailored to each DPI. 
• To solidify security, data sovereignty, and cyber responsibility, India should spearhead global efforts to create a Global DPI  Cyber Compact through the “One Future Alliance” and the G20. To ensure interoperable cybersecurity frameworks for international DPI projects, promote open standards, cross-border collaboration on threat intelligence, and uniform incident reporting guidelines. 
• Establish a DPI Threat Index to monitor vulnerabilities, including phishing attacks, efforts at biometric breaches, sovereign malware footprints, spikes in AI misinformation, and patterns in payment fraud. Create daily or weekly risk dashboards by integrating data from state CERTs, RBI, UIDAI, CERT-In, and NPCI. Use machine learning (ML) driven detection systems. 
• Make explainability audits necessary for AI/ML systems used throughout DPI to make sure that the decision-making process is open, impartial, and subject to scrutiny (e.g., welfare algorithms, credit scoring). Use the recently established IndiaAI Safety Institute in line with India’s AI mission to conduct AI audits, establish explanatory standards, and create sector-specific compliance guidelines. 

References

• https://orfamerica.org/newresearch/dpi-catalyst-private-sector-innovation?utm_source=chatgpt.com 
• https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/expressions/indias-digital-public-infrastructure-success-story-world 
• https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2116341 
• https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2033389 
• https://www.governancenow.com/news/regular-story/dpi-must-ensure-data-privacy-cyber-security-citizenfirst-approach 

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Introduction

In an era where digitalization is transforming every facet of life, ensuring that personal data is protected becomes crucial. The enactment of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (DPDP Act) is a significant step that has been taken by the Indian Parliament which sets forth a comprehensive framework for Digital Personal Data. The Draft Digital Personal Data Protection Rules, 2025 has recently been released for public consultation to supplement the Act and ensure its smooth implementation once finalised. Though noting certain positive aspects, there is still room for addressing certain gaps and multiple aspects under the draft rules that require attention. The DPDP Act, 2023 recognises the individual’s right to protect their personal data providing control over the processing of personal data for lawful purposes. This Act applies to data which is available in digital form as well as data which is not in digital form but is digitalised subsequently. While the Act is intended to offer wide control to the individuals (Data Principal) over their personal information, its impact on vulnerable groups such as ‘Persons with Disabilities’ requires closer scrutiny. 

Person with Disabilities as data principal

The term ‘data principal’ has been defined under the DPDP Act under Section 2(j) as a person to whom the personal data is related to, which also includes a person with a disability. A lawful guardian acting on behalf of such person with disability has also been included under the ambit of this definition of Data Principal. As a result, a lawful guardian acting on behalf of a person with disability will have the same rights and responsibilities as a data principal under the Act. 

• Section 9 of the DPDP Act, 2023 states that before processing the personal data of a person with a disability who has a lawful guardian, the data fiduciary must obtain verifiable consent from that guardian, ensuring proper protection of the person with disability's data privacy.
• The data principal has the right to access information about personal data under Section 11 which is being processed by the data fiduciary.
• Section 12 provides the right to correction and erasure of personal data by making a request in a manner prescribed by the data fiduciary. 
• A right to grievance redressal must be provided to the data principal in respect of any act or omission of performance of obligations by the data fiduciary or the consent manager. 
• Under Section 14, the data principal has the right to nominate any other person to exercise the rights provided under the Act in case of death or incapacity. 

Provision of consent and its implication

The three key components of Consent that can be identified under the DPDP Act, are:

• Explicit and Informed Consent: Consent given for the processing of data by the data principal or a lawful guardian in case of persons with disabilities must be clear, free and informed as per section 6 of the Act. The data fiduciary must specify the itemised description of the personal data required along with the specified purpose and description of the goods or services that would be provided by such processing of data. (Rule 3 under Draft Digital Personal Data Protection Rules)

• Verifiable Consent: Section 9 of the DPDP Act provides that the data fiduciary needs to obtain verifiable consent of the lawful guardian before processing any personal data of such a person with a disability.  Rule 10 of the Draft Rules obligates the data fiduciary to adopt measures to ensure that the consent given by the lawful guardian is verifiable before the is processed. 
• Withdrawal of Consent: Data principal or such lawful guardian has the option to withdraw consent for the processing of data at any point by making a request to the data fiduciary.   

Although the Act includes certain provisions that focus on the inclusivity of persons with disability, the interpretation of such sections says otherwise. 

Concerns related to provisions for Persons with Disabilities under the DPDP Act:

• Lack of definition of ‘person with disabilities’: The DPDP Act or the Draft Rules does not define the term ‘persons with disabilities’. This will create confusion as to which categories of disability are included and up to what percentage.  The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 clearly defines ‘person with benchmark disability’, ‘person with disability’ and ‘person with disability having high support needs’. This categorisation is essential to determine up to what extent a person with disability needs a lawful guardian which is missing under the DPDP Act.   
• Lack of autonomy: Though the definition of data principal includes persons with disabilities however the decision-making authority has been given to the lawful guardian of such individuals. The section creates ambiguity for people who have a lower percentage of disability and are capable of making their own decisions and have no autonomy in making decisions related to the processing of their personal data because of the lack of clarity in the definition of ‘persons with disabilities’. 
• Safeguards for abuse of power by lawful guardian: The lawful guardian once verified by the data fiduciary can make decisions for the persons with disabilities. This raises concerns regarding the potential abuse of power by lawful guardians in relation to the handling of personal data. The DPDP Act does not provide any specific protection against such abuse.
• Difficulty in verification of consent: The consent obtained by the Data Fiduciary must be verified. The process that will be adopted for verification is at the discretion of the data fiduciary according to Rule 10 of the Draft Data Protection Rules. The authenticity of consent is difficult to determine as it is a complex process which lacks a standard format. Also, with the technological advancements, it would be challenging to identify whether the information given to verify the consent is actually true. 

CyberPeace Recommendations

The DPDP Act, 2023 is a major step towards making the data protection framework more comprehensive, however, the provisions related to persons with disabilities and powers given to lawful guardians acting on their behalf still need certain clarity and refinement within the DPDP Act framework. 

• Consonance of DPDP with Rights of Persons with Disabilities (RPWD) Act, 2016: The RPWD and DPDP Act should supplement each other and can be used to clear the existing ambiguities. Such as the definition of ‘persons with disabilities’ under the RPWD Act can be used in the context of the DPDP Act, 2023. 
• Also, there must be certain mechanisms and safeguards within the Act to prevent abuse of power by the lawful guardian. The affected individual in case of suspected abuse of power should have an option to file a complaint with the Data Protection Board and the Board can further take necessary actions to determine whether there is abuse of power or not. 
• Regulatory oversight and additional safeguards are required to ensure that consent is obtained in a manner that respects the rights of all individuals, including those with disabilities. 

References:

• https://www.meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/Digital%20Personal%20Data%20Protection%20Act%202023.pdf
• https://www.meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/259889.pdf 
• https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/15939/1/the_rights_of_persons_with_disabilities_act%2C_2016.pdf 
• https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/consent-disability-rights-and-data-protection-3143441
• https://www.pacta.in/digital-data-protection-consent-protocols-for-disability.pdf
• https://www.snrlaw.in/indias-new-data-protection-regime-tracking-updates-and-preparing-for-compliance/ 

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