#FactCheck: Viral Deepfake Video of Modi, Shah, Jaishankar Apologize for Operation Sindoor Blunder
Executive Summary:
Recently, we came upon some AI-generated deep fake videos that have gone viral on social media, purporting to show Indian political figures Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Home Minister Amit Shah, and External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar apologizing in public for initiating "Operation Sindoor." The videos are fake and use artificial intelligence tools to mimic the leaders' voices and appearances, as concluded by our research. The purpose of this report is to provide a clear understanding of the facts and to reveal the truth behind these viral videos.
Claim:
Multiple videos circulating on social media claim to show Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Central Home Minister Amit Shah, and External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar publicly apologised for launching "Operation Sindoor." The videos, which are being circulated to suggest a political and diplomatic failure, feature the leaders speaking passionately and expressing regret over the operation.



Fact Check:
Our research revealed that the widely shared videos were deepfakes made with artificial intelligence tools. Following the 22 April 2025 Pahalgam terror attack, after “Operation Sindoor”, which was held by the Indian Armed Forces, this video emerged, intending to spread false propaganda and misinformation.
Finding important frames and visual clues from the videos that seemed suspicious, such as strange lip movements, misaligned audio, and facial distortions, was the first step in the fact-checking process. By putting audio samples and video frames in Hive AI Content Moderation, a program for detecting AI-generated content. After examining audio, facial, and visual cues, Hive's deepfake detection system verified that all three of the videos were artificial intelligence (AI) produced.
Below are three Hive Moderator result screenshots that clearly flag the videos as synthetic content, confirming that none of them are authentic or released by any official government source.



Conclusion:
The artificial intelligence-generated videos that claim Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Home Minister Amit Shah, and External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar apologized for the start of "Operation Sindoor" are completely untrue. A purposeful disinformation campaign to mislead the public and incite political unrest includes these deepfake videos. No such apology has been made by the Indian government, and the operation in question does not exist in any official or verified capacity. The public must exercise caution, avoid disseminating videos that have not been verified, and rely on reliable fact-checking websites. Such disinformation can seriously affect national discourse and security in addition to eroding public trust.
- Claim: India's top executives apologize publicly for Operation Sindoor blunder.
- Claimed On: Social Media
- Fact Check: AI Misleads
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Introduction
The unprecedented cyber espionage attempt on the Indian Air Force has shocked the military fraternity in the age of the internet where innovation is vital to national security. The attackers have shown a high degree of expertise in their techniques, using a variant of the infamous Go Stealer and current military acquisition pronouncements as a cover to obtain sensitive information belonging to the Indian Air Force. In this recent cyber espionage revelation, the Indian Air Force faces a sophisticated attack leveraging the infamous Go Stealer malware. The timing, coinciding with the Su-30 MKI fighter jets' procurement announcement, raises serious questions about possible national security espionage actions.
A sophisticated attack using the Go Stealer malware exploits defense procurement details, notably the approval of 12 Su-30 MKI fighter jets. Attackers employ a cunningly named ZIP file, "SU-30_Aircraft_Procurement," distributed through an anonymous platform, Oshi, taking advantage of heightened tension surrounding defense procurement.
Advanced Go Stealer Variant:
The malware, coded in Go language, introduces enhancements, including expanded browser targeting and a unique data exfiltration method using Slack, showcasing a higher level of sophistication.
Strategic Targeting of Indian Air Force Professionals:
The attack strategically focuses on extracting login credentials and cookies from specific browsers, revealing the threat actor's intent to gather precise and sensitive information.
Timing Raises Espionage Concerns:
The cyber attack coincides with the Indian Government's Su-30 MKI fighter jets procurement announcement, raising suspicions of targeted attacks or espionage activities.
The Deceitful ZIP ArchiveSU-30 Aircraft Acquisition
The cyberattack materialised as a sequence of painstakingly planned actions. Using the cleverly disguised ZIP file "SU-30_Aircraft_Procurement," the perpetrators took benefit of the authorisation of 12 Su-30 MKI fighter jets by the Indian Defense Ministry in September 2023. Distributed via the anonymous file storage network Oshi, the fraudulent file most certainly made its way around via spam emails or other forms of correspondence.
The Spread of Infection and Go Stealer Payload:
The infiltration procedure progressed through a ZIP file to an ISO file, then to a.lnk file, which finally resulted in the Go Stealer payload being released. This Go Stealer version, written in the programming language Go, adds sophisticated capabilities, such as a wider range of browsing focussed on and a cutting-edge technique for collecting information using the popular chat app Slack.
Superior Characteristics of the Go Stealer Version
Different from its GitHub equivalent, this Go Stealer version exhibits a higher degree of complexity. It creates a log file in the machine owned by the victim when it is executed and makes use of GoLang utilities like GoReSym for in-depth investigation. The malware focuses on cookies and usernames and passwords from web browsers, with a particular emphasis on Edge, Brave, and Google Chrome.
This kind is unique in that it is more sophisticated. Its deployment's cyber enemies have honed its strengths, increasing its potency and detection resistance. Using GoLang tools like GoReSym for comprehensive evaluation demonstrates the threat actors' careful planning and calculated technique.
Go Stealer: Evolution of Threat
The Go Stealer first appeared as a free software project on GitHub and quickly became well-known for its capacity to stealthily obtain private data from consumers who aren't paying attention. Its effectiveness and stealthy design rapidly attracted the attention of cyber attackers looking for a sophisticated tool for clandestine data exfiltration. It was written in the Go programming language.
Several cutting-edge characteristics distinguish the Go Stealer from other conventional data thieves. From the beginning, it showed a strong emphasis on browser focusing on, seeking to obtain passwords and login information from particular websites including Edge, Brave, and Google Chrome.The malware's initial iteration was nurtured on the GitHub database, which has the Go Stealer initial edition. Threat actors have improved and altered the code to serve their evil goals, even if the basic structure is freely accessible.
The Go Stealer version that has been discovered as the cause of the current internet spying by the Indian Air Force is not limited to its GitHub roots. It adds features that make it more dangerous, like a wider range of browsers that may be targeted and a brand-new way to exfiltrate data via Slack, a popular messaging app.
Secret Communications and Information Expulsion
This variation is distinguished by its deliberate usage of the Slack API for secret chats. Slack was chosen because it is widely used in company networks and allows harmful activity to blend in with normal business traffic. The purpose of the function "main_Vulpx" is specifically to upload compromised information to the attacker's Slack route, allowing for covert data theft and communication.
The Time and Strategic Objective
There are worries about targeted assaults or espionage activities due to the precise moment of the cyberattack, which coincides with the Indian government's declaration of its acquisition of Su-30 MKI fighter fighters. The deliberate emphasis on gathering cookies and login passwords from web browsers highlights the threat actor's goal of obtaining accurate and private data from Indian Air Force personnel.
Using Caution: Preventing Possible Cyber Espionage
- Alertness Against Misleading Techniques: Current events highlight the necessity of being on the lookout for files that appear harmless but actually have dangerous intent. The Su-30 Acquisition ZIP file is a stark illustration of how these kinds of data might be included in larger-scale cyberespionage campaigns.
- Potentially Wider Impact: Cybercriminals frequently plan coordinated operations to target not just individuals but potentially many users and government officials. Compromised files increase the likelihood of a serious cyber-attack by opening the door for larger attack vectors.
- Important Position in National Security: Recognize the crucial role people play in the backdrop of national security in the age of digitalisation. Organised assaults carry the risk of jeopardising vital systems and compromising private data.
- Establish Strict Download Guidelines: Implement a strict rule requiring file downloads to only come from reputable and confirmed providers. Be sceptical, particularly when you come across unusual files, and make sure the sender is legitimate before downloading any attachments.
- Literacy among Government Employees: Acknowledge that government employees are prime targets as they have possession of private data. Enable people by providing them with extensive cybersecurity training and awareness that will increase their cognition and fortitude.
Conclusion
Indian Air Force cyber surveillance attack highlights how sophisticated online dangers have become in the digital era. Threat actors' deliberate and focused approach is demonstrated by the deceptive usage of a ZIP archive that is camouflaged and paired with a sophisticated instance of the Go Stealer virus. An additional level of complication is introduced by integrating Slack for covert communication. Increased awareness, strict installation guidelines, and thorough cybersecurity education for government employees are necessary to reduce these threats. In the digital age, protecting national security necessitates ongoing adaptation as well as safeguards toward ever-more potent and cunning cyber threats.
References
- https://www.overtoperator.com/p/indianairforcemalwaretargetpotential
- https://cyberunfolded.in/blog/indian-air-force-targeted-in-sophisticated-cyber-attack-with-su-30-procurement-zip-file#go-stealer-a-closer-look-at-its-malicious-history
- https://thecyberexpress.com/cyberattack-on-the-indian-air-force/https://therecord.media/indian-air-force-infostealing-malware

Introduction
Over the past few years, the virtual space has been an irreplaceable livelihood platform for content creators and influencers, particularly on major social media platforms like YouTube and Instagram. Yet, if this growth in digital entrepreneurship is accompanied by anything, it is a worrying trend, a steep surge in account takeover (ATO) attacks against these actors. In recent years, cybercriminals have stepped up the quantity and level of sophistication of such attacks, hacking into accounts, jeopardising the follower base, and incurring economic and reputational damage. They don’t just take over accounts to cause disruption. Instead, they use these hijacked accounts to run scams like fake livestreams and cryptocurrency fraud, spreading them by pretending to be the original account owner. This type of cybercrime is no longer a nuisance; it now poses a serious threat to the creator economy, digital trust, and the wider social media ecosystem.
Why Are Content Creators Prime Targets?
Content creators hold a special place on the web. They are prominent users who live for visibility, public confidence, and ongoing interaction with their followers. Their social media footprint tends to extend across several interrelated platforms, e.g., YouTube, Instagram, X (formerly Twitter), with many of these accounts having similar login credentials or being managed from the same email accounts. This interconnectivity of their online presence crosses multiple platforms and benefits workflow, but makes them appealing targets for hackers. One entry point can give access to a whole chain of vulnerabilities. Attackers, once they control an account, can wield its influence and reach to share scams, lead followers to phishing sites, or spread malware, all from the cover of a trusted name.
Popular Tactics Used by Attackers
- Malicious Livestream Takeovers and Rebranding - Cybercriminals hijack high-subscriber channels and rebrand them to mimic official channels. Original videos are hidden or deleted, replaced with scammy streams using deep fake personas to promote crypto schemes.
- Fake Sponsorship Offers - Creators receive emails from supposed sponsors that contain malware-infected attachments or malicious download links, leading to credential theft.
- Malvertising Campaigns - These involve fake ads on social platforms promoting exclusive software like AI tools or unreleased games. Victims download malware that searches for stored login credentials.
- Phishing and Social Engineering on Instagram - Hackers impersonate Meta support teams via DMs and emails. They direct creators to login pages that are cloned versions of Instagram's site. Others pose as fans to request phone numbers and trick victims into revealing password reset codes.
- Timely Exploits and Event Hijacking - During major public or official events, attackers often escalate their activity. Hijacked accounts are used to promote fake giveaways or exclusive live streams, luring users to malicious websites designed to steal personal information or financial data.
Real-World Impact and Case Examples
The reach and potency of account takeover attacks upon content creators are far-reaching and profound. In a report presented in 2024 by Bitdefender, over 9,000 malicious live streams were seen on YouTube during a year, with many having been streamed from hijacked creator accounts and reassigned to advertise scams and fake content. Perhaps the most high-profile incident was a channel with more than 28 million subscribers and 12.4 billion total views, which was totally taken over and utilised for a crypto fraud scheme live streaming. Additionally, Bitdefender research indicated that over 350 scam domains were utilised by cybercriminals, directly connected via hijacked social media accounts, to entice followers into phishing scams and bogus investment opportunities. Many of these pieces of content included AI-created deep fakes impersonating recognisable personalities like Elon Musk and other public figures, providing the illusion of authenticity around fake endorsements (CCN, 2024). Further, attackers have exploited popular digital events such as esports events, such as Counter-Strike 2 (CS2), by hijacking YouTube gaming channels and livestreaming false giveaways or referring viewers to imitated betting sites.
Protective Measures for Creators
- Enable Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)
Adds an essential layer of defence. Even if a password is compromised, attackers can't log in without the second factor. Prefer app-based or hardware token authentication.
- Scrutinize Sponsorships
Verify sender domains and avoid opening suspicious attachments. Use sandbox environments to test files. In case of doubt, verify collaboration opportunities through official company sources or verified contacts.
- Monitor Account Activity
Keep tabs on login history, new uploads, and connected apps. Configure alerts for suspicious login attempts or spikes in activity to detect breaches early. Configure alerts for suspicious login attempts or spikes in activity to detect breaches early.
- Educate Your Team
If your account is managed by editors or third parties, train them on common phishing and malware tactics. Employ regular refresher sessions and send mock phishing tests to reinforce awareness.
- Use Purpose-Built Security Tools
Specialised security solutions offer features like account monitoring, scam detection, guided recovery, and protection for team members. These tools can also help identify suspicious activity early and support a quick response to potential threats.
Conclusion
Account takeover attacks are no longer random events, they're systemic risks that compromise the financial well-being and personal safety of creators all over the world. As cybercriminals grow increasingly sophisticated and realistic in their scams, the only solution is a security-first approach. This encompasses a mix of technical controls, platform-level collaboration, education, and investment in creator-centric cybersecurity technologies. In today's fast-paced digital landscape, creators not only need to think about content but also about defending their digital identity. As digital platforms continue to grow, so do the threats targeting creators. However, with the right awareness, tools, and safeguards in place, a secure and thriving digital environment for creators is entirely achievable.
References
- https://www.bitdefender.com/en-au/blog/hotforsecurity/account-takeover-attacks-on-social-media-a-rising-threat-for-content-creators-and-influencers
- https://www.arkoselabs.com/account-takeover/social-media-account-takeover/
- https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/account-takeover-ato/
- https://www.security.org/digital-safety/account-takeover-annual-report/
- https://www.niceactimize.com/glossary/account-takeover/

Introduction:
CDR is a term that refers to Call detail records, The Telecom Industries holds the call details data of the users. As it amounts to a large amount of data, the telecom companies retain the data for a period of 6 months. CDR plays a significant role in investigations and cases in the courts. It can be used as pivotal evidence in court proceedings to prove or disprove certain facts & circumstances. Power of Interception of Call detail records is allowed for reasonable grounds and only by the authorized authority as per the laws.
Admissibility of CDR’s in Courts:
Call Details Records (CDRs) can be used as effective pieces of evidence to assist the court in ascertaining the facts of the particular case and inquiring about the commission of an offence, and according to the judicial pronouncements, it is made clear that CDRs can be used supporting or secondary evidence in the court. However, it cannot be the sole basis of the conviction. Section 92 of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 provides procedure and empowers certain authorities to apply for court or competent authority intervention to seek the CDR.
Legal provisions to obtain CDR:
The CDR can be obtained under the statutory provisions of law contained in section 92 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Or under section 5(2) of Indian Telegraph Act 1885, read with rule 419(A) Indian Telegraph Amendment rule 2007. The guidelines were also issued in 2016 by Ministry of Ministry of Home Affairs for seeking Call details records (CDRs)
How long is CDR stored with telecom Companies (Data Retention)
Call Data is retained by telecom companies for a period of 6 months. As the data amounts to high storage, almost several Petabytes per year, telecom companies store the call details data for a period of 6 months and archive the rest of it to tapes.
New Delhi 25Cr jewellery heist
Recently, an incident took place where a 25-crore jewellery theft was carried out in a jewellery shop in Delhi, It was planned and executed by a man from Chhattisgarh. After committing the crime, the criminal went back to Chhattisgarh. It was a case of a 25Cr heist, and the police started their search & investigation. Police used technology and analysed the mobile numbers which were active at the crime scene. Delhi police used advanced software to analyse data. The police were able to trace the mobile number of thieves or suspects active at the crime scene. They discovered suspected contacts who were active within the range of the crime scene, and it helped in the arrest of the main suspects. From around 5,000 mobile numbers active around the crime scene, police have used advanced software that analyses huge data, and then police found a number registered outside of Delhi. The surveillance on the number has revealed that the suspected criminal has moved to the MP from Delhi, then moved further to Bhilai Chattisgarh. Police have successfully arrested the suspected criminal. This incident highlights how technology or call data can assist law enforcement agencies in investigating and finding the real culprits.
Conclusion:
CDR refers to call detail records retained by telecom companies for a period of 6 months, it can be obtained through lawful procedure and by competent authorities only. CDR can be helpful in cases before the court or law enforcement agencies, to assist the court and law enforcement agencies in ascertaining the facts of the case or to prove or disprove certain things. It is important to reiterated that unauthorized seeking of CDR is not allowed; the intervention of the court or competent authority is required to seek the CDR from the telecom companies. CDRs cannot be unauthorizedly obtained, and there has to be a directive from the court or competent authority to do so.
References:
- https://indianlegalsystem.org/cdr-the-wonder-word/#:~:text=CDR%20is%20admissible%20as%20secondary,the%20Indian%20Evidence%20Act%2C%201872.
- https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/needle-in-a-haystack-how-cops-scanned-5k-mobile-numbers-to-crack-rs-25cr-heist/articleshow/104055687.cms?from=mdr
- https://www.ndtv.com/delhi-news/just-one-man-planned-executed-rs-25-crore-delhi-heist-another-thief-did-him-in-4436494