#FactCheck- Viral video of massive fire falsely linked to Israel-Iran conflict; actually from Dagestan gas pipeline blast
Executive Summary
A video showing a massive fire with thick black smoke is being widely shared on social media with the claim that it depicts a recent Israeli attack on Iran. CyberPeace Research Wing research found that the claim is false. The viral video is not related to Iran or any Israel-Iran conflict. It actually shows a gas pipeline fire in Kizilyurt city of Russia’s Dagestan region.
Claim:
A video circulating on X shows a large fire breaking out at a location with thick black smoke rising. The clip is being shared with a caption claiming, “Israel has carried out more than 500 surgical strikes on Iran in the last 24 hours.” Post link: https://x.com/ocjain4/status/2064700017361985702, https://x.com/ocjain4/status/2064700017361985702
Fact Check:
A reverse image search using keyframes from the viral video led to visuals published in a report on a Dagestan-based media outlet dated June 9. The report stated that the Russian Emergency Situations Ministry’s Dagestan department received reports of three explosions at a methane gas station.
https://riadagestan.ru/news/incidents/v_dagestane_vzorvalas_azs
Further research found that several Russian media outlets also published the same visuals on June 9, describing them as a pipeline explosion and fire in Kizilyurt, Dagestan
We also found a report published by DW on June 9, 2026, which stated that three explosions occurred on the Mozdok–Kazimagomed gas pipeline in Kizilyurt, Dagestan, resulting in a massive fire with flames rising up to 15 meters. According to local authorities, no casualties or injuries were reported..
https://www.dw.com/ru/na-gazoprovode-v-dagestane-progremeli-tri-vzryva-voznik-pozar/a-77481599
Conclusion:
The research clearly shows that the viral video is unrelated to the Israel-Iran conflict. It actually depicts a gas pipeline fire in Russia’s Dagestan region, which has been falsely shared as a recent Israeli strike on Iran.
Related Blogs
Executive Summary
A video is being widely shared on social media and linked to protests that allegedly took place in Lucknow after the reported killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.Users claim that police in the capital of Uttar Pradesh baton-charged people who were protesting against the United States and Israel. The video is being widely circulated across social media platforms with this claim. However, research by CyberPeace found the claim to be false. Our verification revealed that the video is not from Lucknow but from Bareilly, and it is related to an incident that took place on September 26, 2025, when Uttar Pradesh Police baton-charged protesters during a rally held in support of the “I Love Mohammad” campaign.
Claim Post:
On March 3, 2026, an X (formerly Twitter) user shared the viral video claiming that the Uttar Pradesh Police took action against people blocking roads in Lucknow and creating unrest in support of Ali Khamenei.
Fact Check
To verify the claim, we extracted key frames from the viral video and conducted a reverse image search using Google Lens. During the search, we found a similar video posted on Instagram on September 26, 2025, indicating that the footage predates the current claim.
Further research led us to the same video on the website of Aaj Tak, where it was published on September 26, 2025.
According to the report, protests erupted in Bareilly after Friday prayers over a controversy related to “I Love Mohammad” posters. Hundreds of people took to the streets carrying banners and posters. The report further stated that protesters, responding to a call by cleric Maulana Tauqeer Raza, attempted to break police barricades and move forward. Police initially tried to persuade the crowd to disperse, but when the situation escalated and the crowd refused to back down, officers resorted to baton-charging to control the situation. The incident reportedly led to tension in the area.
Conclusion:
Our research found that the viral video being shared as police action on protesters in Lucknow after the alleged killing of Ali Khamenei is misleading. The footage is actually from Bareilly and shows a police baton-charge during a protest rally held on September 26, 2025 in support of the “I Love Mohammad” campaign.
Introduction
A Reuters investigation has uncovered an elephant in the room regarding Meta Platforms' internal measures to address online fraud and illicit advertising. The confidential documents that Reuters reviewed disclosed that Meta was planning to generate approximately 10% of its 2024 revenue, i.e., USD 16 billion, from ads related to scams and prohibited goods. The findings point out a disturbing paradox: on the one hand, Meta is a vocal advocate for digital safety and platform integrity, while on the other hand, the internal logs of the company indicate the existence of a very large area allowing the shunning of fraudulent advertisement activities that exploit users throughout the world.
The Scale of the Problem
Internal Meta projections show that its platforms, Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp, are displaying a staggering 15 billion scam ads per day combined. The advertisements include deceitful e-commerce promotions, fake investment schemes, counterfeit medical products, and unlicensed gambling platforms.
Meta has developed sophisticated detection tools, but even then, the system does not catch the advertisers until they are 95% certain to be fraudsters. By having at least that threshold for removing an ad, the company is unlikely to lose much money. As a result, instead of turning the fraud adjacent advertisers down, it charges them higher ad rates, which is the strategy they call “penalty bids” internally.
Internal Acknowledgements & Business Dependence
Internal documents that date between 2021 and 2025 reveal that the financial, safety, and lobbying divisions of Meta were cognizant of the enormity of revenues generated from scams. One of the 2025 strategic papers even describes this revenue source as "violating revenue," which implies that it includes ads that are against Meta's policies regarding scams, gambling, sexual services, and misleading healthcare products.
The company's top executives consider the cost-benefit scenario of stricter enforcement. According to a 2024 internal projection, Meta's half-yearly earnings from high-risk scam ads were estimated at USD 3.5 billion, whereas regulatory fines for such violations would not exceed USD 1 billion, thus making it a tolerable trade-off from a commercial viewpoint. At the same time, the company intends to scale down scam ad revenue gradually, thus from 10.1% in 2024 to 7.3% by 2025, and 6% by 2026; however, the documents also reveal a planned slowdown in enforcement to avoid "abrupt reductions" that could affect business forecasts.
Algorithmic Amplification of Scams
One of the most alarming situations is the fact that Meta's own advertising algorithms amplify scam content. It has been reported that users who click on fraudulent ads are more likely to see other similar ads, as the platform's personalisation engine assumes user "interest."
This scenario creates a self-reinforcing feedback loop where the user engagement with scam content dictates the amount of such content being displayed. Thus, a digital environment is created which encourages deceptive engagement and consequently, user trust is eroded and systemic risk is amplified.
An internal presentation in May 2025 was said to put a number on how deeply the platform's ad ecosystem was intertwined with the global fraud economy, estimating that one-third of the scams that succeeded in the U.S. were due to advertising on Meta's platforms.
Regulatory & Legal Implications
The disclosures arrived at the same time as the US and UK governments started to closely check the company's activities more than ever before.
- The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is said to be looking into whether Meta has had any part in the promotion of fraudulent financial ads.
- The UK’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) found that Meta’s platforms were the main sources of scams related to online payments and claimed that the amount of money lost was more than all the other social platforms combined in 2023.
Meta’s spokesperson, Andy Stone, at first denied the accusations, stating that the figures mentioned in the leak were “rough and overly-inclusive”; nevertheless, he conceded that the company’s consistent efforts toward enforcement had negatively impacted revenue and would continue to do so.
Operational Challenges & Policy Gaps
The internal documents also reveal the weaknesses in Meta's day-to-day operations when it comes to the implementation of its own policies.
- Because of the large number of employees laid off in 2023, the whole department that dealt with advertiser-brand impersonation was said to have been dissolved.
- Scam ads were categorised as a "low severity" issue, which was more of a "bad user experience" than a critical security risk.
- At the end of 2023, users were submitting around 100,000 legitimate scam reports per week, of which Meta dismissed or rejected 96%.
Human Impact: When Fraud Becomes Personal
The financial and ethical issues have tangible human consequences. The Reuters investigation documented multiple cases of individuals defrauded through hijacked Meta accounts.
One striking example involves a Canadian Air Force recruiter, whose hacked Facebook account was used to promote fake cryptocurrency schemes. Despite over a hundred user reports, Meta failed to act for weeks, during which several victims, including military colleagues, lost tens of thousands of dollars.
The case underscores not just platform negligence, but also the difficulty of law enforcement collaboration. Canadian authorities confirmed that funds traced to Nigerian accounts could not be recovered due to jurisdictional barriers, a recurring issue in transnational cyber fraud.
Ethical and Cybersecurity Implications
The research has questioned extremely important things at least from the perspective of cyber policy:
- Platform Accountability: Meta, by its practice, is giving more importance to the monetary aspect rather than the truth, and in this way, it is going against the principles of responsible digital governance.
- Transparency in Ad Ecosystems: The lack of transparency in digital advertising systems makes it very easy for dishonest actors to use automated processes with very little supervision.
- Algorithmic Responsibility: The use of algorithms that impact the visibility of misleading content and targeting can be considered the direct involvement of the algorithms in the fraud.
- Regulatory Harmonisation: The presence of different and disconnected enforcement frameworks across jurisdictions is a drawback to the efforts in dealing with cross-border cybercrime.
- Public Trust: Users’ trust in the digital world is mainly dependent on the safety level they see and the accountability of the companies.
Conclusion
Meta’s records show a very unpleasant mix of profit, laxity, and failure in the policy area concerning scam-related ads. The platform’s readiness to accept and even profit from fraudulent players, though admitting the damage they cause, calls for an immediate global rethinking of advertising ethics, regulatory enforcement, and algorithmic transparency.
With the expansion of its AI-driven operations and advertising networks, protecting the users of Meta must evolve from being just a public relations goal to being a core business necessity, thus requiring verifiable accountability measures, independent audits, and regulatory oversight. It is an undeniable fact that there are billions of users who count on Meta’s platforms for their right to digital safety, which is why this right must be respected and enforced rather than becoming optional.
References
- https://www.reuters.com/investigations/meta-is-earning-fortune-deluge-fraudulent-ads-documents-show-2025-11-06/?utm_source=chatgpt.com
- https://www.indiatoday.in/technology/news/story/leaked-docs-claim-meta-made-16-billion-from-scam-ads-even-after-deleting-134-million-of-them-2815183-2025-11-07
Introduction
The Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MEITy) released the Draft Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Second Amendment Rules, 2026 on March 30, 2026, inviting public comments with a response window closing on April 14. This is a limited 15-day period for public input on proposed rules that will have major constitutional impacts. The brevity and timing of this opportunity demonstrate debatable commitment to stakeholder engagement and meaningful consultation by the drafting agency.
While MEITY describes the proposed amendments as "clarificatory and procedural nature," an analysis shows they will have substantive effects. Collectively, the amended language changes significantly how online speech will be regulated in India by providing the executive with more concentrated regulatory authority, limiting the required transparency of content enforcement, mandating greater retention of data without proportionality-based safeguards, and placing excessive compliance burden on intermediaries. Each of these changes has consequences beyond just changes in process and together, these changes collectively raise substantial concerns regarding compliance with Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution of India.
The Constitutional Baseline: Shreya Singhal and the Limits of Intermediary Liability
India’s Supreme Court decision in Shreya Singhal v Union of India (2015) 5 SCC 1 provides the foundation for intermediary liability, wherein the Court read down Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act, 2000, holding that intermediaries are required to act upon receiving actual knowledge only through a court order or a valid notification by the appropriate government authority. The Supreme Court’s decision intended to provide a constitutional protection to intermediaries from being subjected to informal, unverified executive pressure to take down content by requiring that any such order be subject to some level of legal objective credibility or threshold.
Rule 3(4) of the proposed amendments places that balance under significant strain. By requiring intermediaries to comply with advisories, directions, standard operating procedures, codes of practice, and guidelines issued by the Ministry — and tying non-compliance to the loss of safe harbour — the draft effectively lowers the constitutional threshold that Shreya Singhal was designed to maintain. Compliance obligations now potentially arise from instruments that carry no judicial sanction and no mandatory public disclosure.
Rule 3(4): Delegated Legislation or Executive Overreach
The rule-making power conferred on the Central Government under Section 87 of the IT Act is limited to carrying out the provisions of the Act. It does not authorise the creation of new substantive obligations. This principle has been consistently affirmed in Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India (1985) 1 SCC 641 and Confederation of Ex-Servicemen Associations v. Union of India (2006) 8 SCC 399, where the Court held that delegated legislation must remain within the four corners of the parent statute.
Rule 3(4) tests those limits. It converts executive advisories into binding compliance instruments without a clear statutory foundation in either Section 79 or Section 87. Although the proposed rule requires that such instruments specify their legal basis, there is no requirement that they be published or made publicly accessible. This creates a framework in which legality risks becoming circular — instruments claimed to be lawful solely by reference to a provision that does not clearly authorise them, shielded from scrutiny by their own opacity. Justice Chandurkar’s judgment in Kunal Kamra v. Union of India identified precisely this defect in the Fact Check Unit amendment. Rule 3(4) replicates the structural problem in a broader form.
Compliance Pressure and the Logic of Over-Censorship
The practical consequence of Rule 3(4) lies not only in its legality but in how it reshapes incentive structures for platforms. An intermediary facing the permanent threat of safe harbour loss will not wait to assess the legal merit of each advisory. The rational calculation is to comply early, broadly, and without friction. Lawful content — particularly satire, political commentary, and journalism — becomes vulnerable not because it is unlawful, but because it presents regulatory risk.
This dynamic was visible on 18 March 2026, when stand-up comedian Pulkit Mani (@hunnywhoisfunny) found his satirical Instagram reel being restricted across India. The video had accumulated over 16.5 million views. Users encountered a notice citing Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act. No reasons were publicly provided. No prior hearing was offered. The same night, several political parody and satire accounts were withheld on X.
Data Retention, Privacy, and the Proportionality Test
The amendments to Rules 3(1)(g) and 3(1)(h) extend data retention obligations by making them additional to requirements under any other law. The existing 180-day floor for retained user data — covering removed content, registration information, and associated records — becomes a minimum rather than a ceiling. No maximum is specified, and no proportionality requirement accompanies the extension.
This raises direct concerns under Article 21 as interpreted in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1, which held that any state intrusion into privacy must satisfy the triple test of legality, necessity, and proportionality. Undefined retention periods, with no statutory ceiling and no requirement of purpose limitation, risk failing all three. The longer user data is held, including metadata, device information, and records of removed content, the greater the exposure to surveillance, unauthorised access, and use beyond the original justification.
Circumventing Judicial Scrutiny Through Procedural Redesign
The Bombay High Court, in its August 2021 order, stayed provisions of the IT Rules’ oversight mechanism as prima facie violative of Article 19(1)(a). The Madras High Court in T.M. Krishna v. Union of India affirmed that stay, cautioning that government-controlled media oversight risked undermining press independence. Both matters remain pending before the Delhi High Court.
The amendments to Rules 8(1) and 14 restructure the same oversight machinery through a modified procedural design. By extending the Inter-Departmental Committee’s jurisdiction to cover “matters” referred by the Ministry with no requirement of a complainant, no defined subject matter, and no guaranteed prior hearing, the proposed rules effectively reconstitute what courts found constitutionally suspect. Individual users posting news and current affairs content are now brought within reach of blocking mechanisms originally designed for institutional publishers.
Conclusion
As seen above, the Draft IT Rules 2026 are unable to meet the constitutional and judicial requirements to regulate free speech. What the proposed amendments construct is a durable system in which platforms self-censor under liability pressure, data is retained without proportionate justification, and content oversight expands through procedural adjustment rather than parliamentary legislation. Regulation of the digital public sphere is both legitimate and necessary. But it must be anchored in law, not in the quiet authority of executive advisories. The law must ultimately remain anchored in constitutional values, guided by the enduring principles of justice, equity, and good conscience.
The comment period closes on 14 April 2026.
Submissions may be sent to itrules.consultation@meity.gov.in.
References
- https://www.meity.gov.in/static/uploads/2026/03/30591fc6e322dcbcc9dae84a0f02e9e7.pdf
- https://www.meity.gov.in/static/uploads/2026/03/a71a21d35c107f2e528363d3eb17646a.pdf
- https://www.meity.gov.in/static/uploads/2026/02/550681ab908f8afb135b0ad42816a1c9.pdf
- https://neopolitico.com/india/government-blocks-viral-satirical-reel-impersonating-pm-modi-raising-fresh-questions-on-free-speech-and-digital-regulation/
- https://internetfreedom.in/sound-the-alarm-iffs-first-read-on-meitys-draft-it-rules-second-amendment-2026/
