#FactCheck - Old Japanese Earthquake Footage Falsely Linked to Tibet

Introduction

In September 2024, the Australian government announced the  Communications Legislation Amendment (Combatting Misinformation and Disinformation) Bill 2024 ( CLA Bill 2024 hereon), to provide new powers to the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA), the statutory regulatory body for Australia's communications and media infrastructure, to combat online misinformation and disinformation. It proposed allowing the ACMA to hold digital platforms accountable for the “seriously harmful mis- and disinformation” being spread on their platforms and their response to it, while also balancing freedom of expression. However, the Bill was subsequently withdrawn, primarily over concerns regarding the possibility of censorship by the government. This development is reflective of the global contention on the balance between misinformation regulation and freedom of speech. 

Background and Key Features of the Bill

According to the BBC’s Global Minds Survey of 2023, nearly 73% of Australians struggled to identify fake news and AI-generated misinformation. There has been a substantial rise in misinformation on platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and TikTok since the COVID-19 pandemic, especially during major events like the bushfires of 2020 and the 2022 federal elections. The government’s campaign against misinformation was launched against this background, with the launch of The Australian Code of Practice on Disinformation and Misinformation in 2021. The main provisions of the CLA Bill, 2024 were: 

1. Core Transparency Obligations of Digital Media Platforms: Publishing current media literacy plans,  risk assessment reports, and policies or information on their approach to addressing mis- and disinformation. The ACMA would also be allowed to make additional rules regarding complaints and dispute-handling processes.
2. Information Gathering and Record-Keeping Powers: The ACMA would form rules allowing it to gather consistent information across platforms and publish it. However, it would not have been empowered to gather and publish user information except in limited circumstances.
3. Approving Codes and Making Standards: The ACMA would have powers to approve codes developed by the industry and make standards regarding reporting tools, links to authoritative information, support for fact-checking, and demonetisation of disinformation. This would make compliance mandatory for relevant sections of the industry. 
4. Parliamentary Oversight: The transparency obligations, codes approved and standards set by ACMA under the Bill would be subject to parliamentary scrutiny and disallowance. ACMA would be required to report to the Parliament annually. 
5. Freedom of Speech Protections: End-users would not be required to produce information for ACMA unless they are a person providing services to the platform, such as its employees or fact-checkers. Further,  it would not be allowed to call for removing content from platforms unless it involved inauthentic behavior such as bots. 
6. Penalties for Non-Compliance: ACMA would be required to employ a “graduated, proportionate and risk-based approach” to non-compliance and enforcement in the form of formal warnings, remedial directions, injunctions, or significant civil penalties as decided by the courts, subject to review by the Administrative Review Tribunal (ART). No criminal penalties would be imposed.

Key Concerns

• Inadequacy of Freedom of Speech Protections: The biggest contention on this Bill has been regarding the issue of possible censorship, particularly of alternative opinions that are crucial to the health of a democratic system. To protect the freedom of speech, the Bill defined mis- and disinformation, what constitutes “serious harm” (election interference, harming public health, etc.), and what would be excluded from its scope. However, reservations among the Opposition persisted due to the lack of a clear mechanism to protect divergent opinions from the purview of this Bill. 
• Efficacy of Regulatory Measures: Many argue that by allowing the digital platform industry to make its codes, this law lets it self-police. Big Tech companies have no incentive to curb misinformation effectively since their business models allow them to reap financial benefits from the rampant spread of misinformation. Unless there are financial non- or dis- incentives to curb misinformation, Big Tech is not likely to address the situation at war footing.  Thus, this law would run the risk of being toothless. Secondly, the Bill did not require platforms to report on the “prevalence of” false content which, along with other metrics,  is crucial for researchers and legislators to track the efficacy of the current misinformation-curbing practices employed by platforms.  
• Threat of Government Overreach:  The Bill sought to expand the ACMA’s compliance and enforcement powers concerning misinformation and disinformation on online communication platforms by giving it powers to form rules on information gathering, code registration, standard-making powers, and core transparency obligations. However, even though the ACMA as a regulatory authority is answerable to the Parliament, the Bill was unclear in defining limits to these powers. This raised concerns from civil society about potential government overreach in a domain filled with contextual ambiguities regarding information.

Conclusion

While the Communications Legislation Amendment (Combatting Misinformation and Disinformation) Bill sought to equip the ACMA with tools to hold digital platforms accountable and mitigate the harm caused by false information, its critique highlights the complexities of regulating such content without infringing on freedom of speech. Legislations and proposals regarding the matter all over the world are having to contend with this challenge. Globally, legislation and proposals addressing this issue face similar challenges, emphasizing the need for a continuous discourse at the intersection of platform accountability, regulatory restraint, and the protection of diverse viewpoints.

To regulate Big Tech effectively, governments can benefit from adopting a consultative, incremental, and cooperative approach, as exemplified by the European Union’s Digital Services Act 2023. Such a framework provides for a balanced response, fostering accountability while safeguarding democratic freedoms.

Resources

• https://www.infrastructure.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/factsheet-misinformation-disinformation-bill.pdf 
• https://www.infrastructure.gov.au/have-your-say/new-acma-powers-combat-misinformation-and-disinformation 
• https://www.mi-3.com.au/07-02-2024/over-80-australians-feel-they-may-have-fallen-fake-news-says-bbc 
• https://www.hrlc.org.au/news/misinformation-inquiry 
• https://humanrights.gov.au/our-work/legal/submission/combatting-misinformation-and-disinformation-bill-2024 
• https://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/what-is-the-misinformation-bill-and-why-has-it-triggered-worries-about-freedom-of-speech/4n3ijebde 
• https://www.hrw.org/report/2023/06/14/no-internet-means-no-work-no-pay-no-food/internet-shutdowns-deny-access-basic#:~:text=The%20Telegraph%20Act%20allows%20authorities,preventing%20incitement%20to%20the%20commission 
• https://www.hrlc.org.au/submissions/2024/11/8/submission-combatting-misinformation?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Media%20Release%20Senate%20Committee%20to%20hear%20evidence%20calling%20for%20Albanese%20Government%20to%20regulate%20and%20hold%20big%20tech%20accountable%20for%20misinformation&utm_content=Media%20Release%20Senate%20Committee%20to%20hear%20evidence%20calling%20for%20Albanese%20Government%20to%20regulate%20and%20hold%20big%20tech%20accountable%20for%20misinformation+Preview+CID_31c6d7200ed9bd2f7f6f596ba2a8b1fb&utm_source=Email%20campaign&utm_term=Read%20the%20Human%20Rights%20Law%20Centres%20submission%20to%20the%20inquiry

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Executive Summary:

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Recently, we came upon some AI-generated deep fake videos that have gone viral on social media, purporting to show Indian political figures Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Home Minister Amit Shah, and External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar apologizing in public for initiating "Operation Sindoor." The videos are fake and use artificial intelligence tools to mimic the leaders' voices and appearances, as concluded by our research. The purpose of this report is to provide a clear understanding of the facts and to reveal the truth behind these viral videos.

Claim:

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Multiple videos circulating on social media claim to show Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Central Home Minister Amit Shah, and External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar publicly apologised for launching "Operation Sindoor." The videos, which are being circulated to suggest a political and diplomatic failure, feature the leaders speaking passionately and expressing regret over the operation.

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Fact Check:

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Our research revealed that the widely shared videos were deepfakes made with artificial intelligence tools. Following the 22 April 2025 Pahalgam terror attack, after “Operation Sindoor”, which was held by the Indian Armed Forces, this video emerged, intending to spread false propaganda and misinformation. 

Finding important frames and visual clues from the videos that seemed suspicious, such as strange lip movements, misaligned audio, and facial distortions, was the first step in the fact-checking process. By putting audio samples and video frames in Hive AI Content Moderation, a program for detecting AI-generated content. After examining audio, facial, and visual cues, Hive's deepfake detection system verified that all three of the videos were artificial intelligence (AI) produced.

Below are three Hive Moderator result screenshots that clearly flag the videos as synthetic content, confirming that none of them are authentic or released by any official government source.

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Conclusion:

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The artificial intelligence-generated videos that claim Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Home Minister Amit Shah, and External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar apologized for the start of "Operation Sindoor" are completely untrue. A purposeful disinformation campaign to mislead the public and incite political unrest includes these deepfake videos. No such apology has been made by the Indian government, and the operation in question does not exist in any official or verified capacity. The public must exercise caution, avoid disseminating videos that have not been verified, and rely on reliable fact-checking websites. Such disinformation can seriously affect national discourse and security in addition to eroding public trust.

• Claim: India's top executives apologize publicly for Operation Sindoor blunder.
• Claimed On: Social Media
• ‍Fact Check: AI Misleads

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Introduction 

The pervasive issue of misinformation in India is a multifaceted challenge with profound implications for democratic processes, public awareness, and social harmony. The Election Commission of India (ECI) has taken measures to counter misinformation during the 2024 elections. ECI has launched campaigns to educate people and urge them to verify election-related content and share responsibly on social media. In response to the proliferation of fake news and misinformation online, the ECI has introduced initiatives such as ‘Myth vs. Reality’ and  'VerifyBeforeYouAmplify' to clear the air around fake news being spread on social media. EC measures aim to ensure that the spread of misinformation is curbed, especially during election time, when voters consume a lot of information from social media. It is of the utmost importance that voters take in facts and reliable information and avoid any manipulative or fake information that can negatively impact the election process. 

EC Collaboration with Tech Platforms

In this new age of technology, the Internet and social media continue to witness a surge in the spread of misinformation, disinformation, synthetic media content, and deepfake videos. This has rightly raised serious concerns. The responsible use of social media is instrumental in maintaining the accuracy of information and curbing misinformation incidents. 

The ECI has collaborated with Google to empower the citizenry by making it easy to find critical voting information on Google Search and YouTube. In this way, Google supports the 2024 Indian General Election by providing high-quality information to voters, safeguarding platforms from abuse, and helping people navigate AI-generated content. The company connects voters to helpful information through product features that show data from trusted organisations across its portfolio. YouTube showcases election information panels, including how to register to vote, how to vote, and candidate information. YouTube's recommendation system prominently features content from authority sources on the homepage, in search results, and in the "Up Next" panel. YouTube highlights high-quality content from authoritative news sources during key moments through its Top News and Breaking News shelves, as well as the news watch page. 

Google has also implemented strict policies and restrictions regarding who can run election-related advertising campaigns on its platforms. They require all advertisers who wish to run election ads to undergo an identity verification process, provide a pre-certificate issued by the ECI or anyone authorised by the ECI for each election ad they want to run where necessary, and have in-ad disclosures that clearly show who paid for the ad. Additionally, they have long-standing ad policies that prohibit ads from promoting demonstrably false claims that could undermine trust or participation in elections.

CyberPeace Countering Misinformation

CyberPeace Foundation, a leading organisation in the field of cybersecurity works to promote digital peace for all. CyberPeace is working on the wider ecosystem to counter misinformation and develop a safer and more responsible Internet. CyberPeace has collaborated with Google.org to run a pan-India awareness-building program and comprehensive multilingual digital resource hub with content available in up to 15 Indian languages to empower over 40 million netizens in building resilience against misinformation and practising responsible online behaviour. This step is crucial in creating a strong foundation for a trustworthy  Internet and secure digital landscape.  

Myth vs Reality Register by ECI

The Election Commission of India (ECI) has launched the 'Myth vs Reality Register' to combat misinformation and ensure the integrity of the electoral process during the general elections 2024. The 'Myth vs Reality Register' can be accessed through the Election Commission's official website (https://mythvsreality.eci.gov.in/). All stakeholders are urged to verify and corroborate any dubious information they receive through any channel with the information provided in the register. The register provides a one-stop platform for credible and authenticated election-related information, with the factual matrix regularly updated to include the latest busted fakes and fresh FAQs. The ECI has identified misinformation as one of the challenges, along with money, muscle, and Model Code of Conduct violations, for electoral integrity. The platform can be used to verify information, prevent the spread of misinformation, debunk myths, and stay informed about key issues during the General Elections 2024.

The ECI has taken proactive steps to combat the challenge of misinformation which could cripple the democratic process. EC has issued directives urging vigilance and responsibility from all stakeholders, including political parties, to verify information before amplifying it. The EC has also urged responsible behaviour on social media platforms and discourse that inspires unity rather than division. The commission has stated that originators of false information will face severe consequences, and nodal officers across states will remove unlawful content. Parties are encouraged to engage in issue-based campaigning and refrain from disseminating unverified or misleading advertisements.

Conclusion

The steps taken by the ECI have been designed to empower citizens and help them affirm the accuracy and authenticity of content before amplifying it. All citizens must be well-educated about the entire election process in India. This includes information on how the electoral rolls are made, how candidates are monitored, a complete database of candidates and candidate backgrounds, party manifestos, etc. For informed decision-making, active reading and seeking information from authentic sources is imperative. The partnership between government agencies, tech platforms and civil societies helps develop strategies to counter the widespread misinformation and promote online safety in general, and electoral integrity in particular. 

References 

• https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2017375

• https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2016941#:~:text=To%20combat%20the%20spread%20of,the%20ongoing%20General%20Elections%202024
• https://www.business-standard.com/elections/lok-sabha-election/ls-elections-2024-ec-uses-social-media-to-nudge-electors-to-vote-124040700429_1.html
• https://blog.google/intl/en-in/company-news/outreach-initiatives/supporting-the-2024-indian-general-election/
• https://blog.google/intl/en-in/partnering-indias-success-in-a-new-digital-paradigm/

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