#FactCheck - Edited Video Falsely Claims as an attack on PM Netanyahu in the Israeli Senate
Executive Summary:
A viral online video claims of an attack on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the Israeli Senate. However, the CyberPeace Research Team has confirmed that the video is fake, created using video editing tools to manipulate the true essence of the original footage by merging two very different videos as one and making false claims. The original footage has no connection to an attack on Mr. Netanyahu. The claim that endorses the same is therefore false and misleading.
Claims:
A viral video claims an attack on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the Israeli Senate.
Fact Check:
Upon receiving the viral posts, we conducted a Reverse Image search on the keyframes of the video. The search led us to various legitimate sources featuring an attack on an ethnic Turkish leader of Bulgaria but not on the Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, none of which included any attacks on him.
We used AI detection tools, such as TrueMedia.org, to analyze the video. The analysis confirmed with 68.0% confidence that the video was an editing. The tools identified "substantial evidence of manipulation," particularly in the change of graphics quality of the footage and the breakage of the flow in footage with the change in overall background environment.
Additionally, an extensive review of official statements from the Knesset revealed no mention of any such incident taking place. No credible reports were found linking the Israeli PM to the same, further confirming the video’s inauthenticity.
Conclusion:
The viral video claiming of an attack on Prime Minister Netanyahu is an old video that has been edited. The research using various AI detection tools confirms that the video is manipulated using edited footage. Additionally, there is no information in any official sources. Thus, the CyberPeace Research Team confirms that the video was manipulated using video editing technology, making the claim false and misleading.
- Claim: Attack on the Prime Minister Netanyahu Israeli Senate
- Claimed on: Facebook, Instagram and X(Formerly Twitter)
- Fact Check: False & Misleading
Related Blogs
Executive Summary
A video of Prime Minister Narendra Modi is being widely shared on social media with the claim that he warned about rising sugar prices, stating that if the supply crisis worsens, sugar prices could reach ₹130 per kg. In the viral clip, PM Modi can allegedly be heard speaking about the increase in sugar prices. However, a research done by the research wing of the CyberPeace revealed that the claim made with the viral video is false. The research found that the viral video is AI-generated and has been edited to spread misleading information on social media.
Claim:
On August 22, 2026, a video was shared on the social media platform Facebook with the caption: “Can sugar prices reach ₹120-₹130? Know what the government report says and the main reasons behind it. What is your opinion?”
https://www.facebook.com/reel/4384024895144864
FactCheck
To verify the truth behind the viral claim, a keyword search was conducted on Google. No reliable news reports or official announcements were found confirming that PM Modi made any such statement regarding sugar prices. Keyframes extracted from the viral clip were subjected to a reverse image search using Google Lens. This led to the original video uploaded on the official YouTube channel of PMO India on August 15, 2026. In the nearly 1-hour and 39-minute long Independence Day address, PM Modi did not mention sugar prices anywhere during his speech.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aDHjd3GUU7Y
To further verify the authenticity of the video, it was scanned using the AI detection tool HIVE Moderation. The results indicated a 94% probability that PM Modi's speech in the video is AI-generated.
The audio of the viral video was analyzed using Resemble AI. The tool's analysis confirmed that the audio was AI-generated, indicating that the original voice track had been manipulated/cloned.
Conclusion:
Our research confirms that the claim associated with the viral video is false. The video has been created using AI tools and edited to mislead the public.
Introduction
In the evolving landscape of cybercrime, attackers are not only becoming more sophisticated in their approach but also more adept in their infrastructure. The Indian Cybercrime Coordination Centre (I4C) has issued a warning about the use of ‘disposable domains’ by cybercriminals. These are short-lived websites designed tomimic legitimate platforms, deceive users, and then disappear quickly to avoid detection and legal repercussions.
Although they may appear harmless at first glance, disposable domains form the backbone of countless online scams, phishing campaigns, malware distributionschemes, and disinformation networks. Cybercriminals use them to host fake websites, distribute malicious files, send deceptive emails, and mislead unsuspecting users, all while evading detection and takedown efforts.
As India’s digital economy grows and more citizens, businesses, and public services move online, it is crucial to understand this hidden layer of cybercrime infrastructure.Greater awareness among individuals, enterprises, and policymakers is essential to strengthen defences against fraud, protect users from harm, and build trust in thedigital ecosystem
What Are Disposable Domains?
A disposable domain is a website domain that is registered to be used temporarily, usually for hours or days, typically to evade detection or accountability.
These domains are inexpensive, easy to obtain, and can be set up with minimal information. They are often bought in bulk through domain registrars that do not strictly verify ownership information, sometimes using stolen credit cards or cryptocurrencies to remain anonymous. They differ from legitimate temporary domains used for testing or development in one significant aspect, which is ‘purpose’. Cybercriminals use disposable domains to carry out malicious activities such as phishing, sextortion, malware distribution, fake e-commerce sites, spam email campaigns, and disinformation operations.
How Cybercriminals Utilise Disposable Domains
1. Phishing & Credential Stealing: Attackers tend to register lookalike domains that are similar to legitimate websites (e.g., go0gle-login[.]com or sbi-verification[.]online) and trick victims into entering their login credentials. These domains will be active only long enough to deceive, and then they will disappear.
2. Malware Distribution: Disposable domains are widely used for ransomware and spyware operations for hosting malicious files. Because the domains are temporary, threat intelligence systems tend to notice them too late.
3. Fake E-Commerce & Investment Scams: Cyber crooks clone legitimate e-commerce or investment sites, place ad campaigns, and trick victims into "purchasing" goods or investing in scams. The domain vanishes when the scam runs out.
4. Spam and Botnets: Disposable domains assist in botnet command-and-control activities. They make it more difficult for defenders to block static IPs or trace the attacker's infrastructure.
5. Disinformation and Influence Campaigns: State-sponsored actors and coordinated troll networks use disposable domains to host fabricated news articles, fake government documents, and manipulated videos. When these sites are detected and taken down, they are quickly replaced with new domains, allowing the disinformation cycle to continue uninterrupted.
Why Are They Hard to Stop?
Registering a domain is inexpensive and quick, often requiring no more than an email address and payment. The difficulty is the easy domain registrations and the absence of worldwide enforcement. Domain registrars differ in enforcing Know-Your-Customer (KYC) standards stringently. ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) has certain regulations in place but enforcement is inconsistent. ICANN does require registrars to maintain accurate Who is information (the “Registrant Data Accuracy Policy”) and to act on abuse complaints. However, ICANN is not an enforcement agency. It oversees contracts with registrars but cannot directly police every registration. Cybercriminals exploit services such as:
- Privacy protection shields that conceal actual WHOIS information.
- Bulletproof hosting that evades takedown notices.
- Fast-flux DNS methods to rapidly alter IP addresses
Additionally, utilisation of IDNs ( Internationalised Domain Names) and homoglyph attacks enables the attackers to register visually similar domains to legitimate ones (e.g., using Cyrillic characters to represent Latin ones).
Real-World Example: India and the Rise of Fake Investment Sites
India has witnessed a wave of monetary scams that are connected with disposable domains. Over hundreds of false websites impersonating government loan schemes, banks or investment websites, and crypto-exchanges were found on disposable domains such as gov-loans-apply[.]xyz, indiabonds-secure[.]top, or rbi-invest[.]store. Most of them placed paid advertisements on sites such as Facebook or Google and harvested user information and payments, only to vanish in 48–72 hours. Victims had no avenue of proper recourse, and the authorities were left with a digital ghost trail.
How Disposable Domains Undermine Cybersecurity
- Bypass Blacklists: Dynamic domains constantly shifting evade static blacklists.
- Delay Attribution: Time is wasted pursuing non-existent owners or takedowns.
- Mass Targeting: One actor can register thousands of domains and attack at scale.
- Undermine Trust: Frequent users become targets when genuine sites are duplicated and it looks realistic.
Recommendations Addressing Legal and Policy Gaps in India
1. There is a need to establish a formal coordination mechanism between domain registrars and national CERTs such as CERT-In to enable effective communication and timely response to domain-based threats.
2. There is a need to strengthen the investigative and enforcement capabilities of law enforcement agencies through dedicated resources, training, and technical support to effectively tackle domain-based scams.
3. There is a need to leverage the provisions of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 to take action against phishing websites and malicious domains that collect personal data without consent.
4. There is a need to draft and implement specific regulations or guidelines to address the misuse of digital infrastructure, particularly disposable and fraudulent domains, and close existing regulatory gaps.
What Can Be Done: CyberPeace View
1. Stronger KYC for Domain Registrations: Registrars selling domains to Indian users or based in India should conduct verified KYC processes, with legal repercussions for carelessness.
2. Real-Time Domain Blacklists: CERT-In, along with ISPs and hosting companies, should operate and enforce a real-time blacklist of scam domains known.
3. Public Reporting Tools: Observers or victims should be capable of reporting suspicious domains through an easy interface (tied to cybercrime.gov.in).
4. Collaboration with Tech Platforms: Social media services and online ad platforms should filter out ads associated with disposable or spurious domains and report abuse data to CERT-In.
5. User Awareness: Netizens should be educated to check URLs thoroughly, not click on unsolicited links and they must verify the authenticity of websites.
Conclusion
Disposable domains have silently become the foundation of contemporary cybercrime. They are inexpensive, highly anonymous, and short-lived, which makes them a darling weapon for cybercriminals ranging from solo spammers to nation-state operators. In an increasingly connected Indian society where the penetration rate of internet users is high, this poses an expanding threat to economic security, public confidence, and national resilience. Combating this problem will need a combination of technical defences, policy changes, public-private alliances, and end-user sensitisation. As India develops a Cyber Secure Bharat, monitoring and addressing disposable domain abuse must be the utmost concern.
References
- https://www.bitcot.com/disposable-domains
- https://atdata.com/blog/evolution-of-email-fraud-rise-of-hyper-disposable-domains/
- https://www.cyfirma.com/research/scamonomics-the-dark-side-of-stock-crypto-investments-in-india/
- https://knowledgebase.constantcontact.com/lead-gen-crm/articles/KnowledgeBase/50330-Understanding-Blocked-Forbidden-and-Disposable-Domains?lang=en_US
- https://www.meity.gov.in/
- https://intel471.com/blog/bulletproof-hosting-fast-flux-dns-double-flux-vps
Introduction
Misinformation is, to its basic meaning, incorrect or misleading information, it may or may not include specific malicious intent and includes inaccurate, incomplete, misleading, or false information and selective or half-truths. The main challenges in dealing with misinformation are defining and distinguishing misinformation from legitimate content. This complexity arises due to the rapid evolution and propagation which information undergoes on the digital platforms. Additionally, balancing the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression with content regulation by state actors poses a significant challenge. It requires careful consideration to avoid censorship while effectively combating harmful misinformation.
Acknowledging the severe consequences of misinformation and the critical need to combat misinformation, Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 has implemented key measures to address misinformation in India. These new provisions introduced under the new criminal laws in India penalise the deliberate creation, distribution, or publication of inaccurate information. Previously missing from the IPC, these sections offer an additional legal resource to counter the proliferation of falsehoods, complementing existing laws targeting the same issue.
Section 353 of the BNS on Statements Conducing to Public Mischief criminalises making, publishing, or circulating statements, false information, rumours, or reports, including through electronic means, with the intent or likelihood of causing various harmful outcomes.
This section thus brings misinformation into its ambit, since misinformation has been traditionally used to induce public fear or alarm that may lead to offences against the State or public tranquillity or inciting one class or community to commit offences against another. The section also penalizes the promotion of enmity, hatred, or ill will among different religious, racial, linguistic, or regional groups.
BNS also prescribes punishment of imprisonment for up to three years, a fine, or both for offences under section 353. Interestingly, a longer imprisonment of up to 5 years along with a fine has been prescribed to curb such offences in places of worship or during religious ceremonies. The only exception that may be availed under this section is granted to unsuspecting individuals who, believing the misinformation to be true, spread misinformation without any ill intent. However, this exception may not be as effective in curbing misinformation, since at the outset, the offence is hard to trace and has multiple pockets for individuals to seek protection without any mechanism to verify their intent.
The BNS also aims to regulate misinformation through Section 197(1)(d) on Imputations, assertions prejudicial to national integration. Under this provision, anyone who makes or publishes false or misleading information, whether it is in the form of spoken words, written, by signs, in visible representations, or through electronic communication, therefore, results in jeopardising the sovereignty, unity, integrity, or security of India is liable to face punishment in the form of imprisonment for up to three years, a fine, or both and if it occurs in a place of worship or during religious ceremonies, the quantum of punishment is increased to imprisonment for up to five years and may include a fine. Additionally, Section 212 (a) & (b) provides against furnishing false information. If a person who is legally obligated to provide information to a public servant, knowingly or reasonably believes that the information is false, and still furnishes it, they now face a punishment of six months imprisonment or a fine up to five thousand rupees or both. However, if the false information pertains to the commission or prevention of an offence, or the apprehension of an offender, the punishment increases to imprisonment for up to two years, a fine, or both.
Enforcement Mechanisms: CyberPeace Policy Wing Outlook
To ensure the effective enforcement of these provisions, coordination between the key stakeholders, i.e., the law enforcement agencies, digital platforms, and judicial oversight is essential. Law enforcement agencies must utilize technology such as data analytics and digital forensics for tracking and identifying the origins of false information. This technological capability is crucial for pinpointing the sources and preventing the further spread of misinformation. Simultaneously, digital platforms associated with misinformation content are required to implement robust monitoring and reporting mechanisms to detect and address the generated misleading content proactively. A supporting oversight by judicial bodies plays a critical role in ensuring that enforcement actions are conducted fairly and in line with legal standards. It helps maintain a balance between addressing misinformation and upholding fundamental rights such as freedom of speech. The success of the BNS in addressing these challenges will depend on the effective integration of these mechanisms and ongoing adaptation to the evolving digital landscape.
Resources:
- Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/250883_english_01042024.pdf
- https://www.foxmandal.in/changes-brought-forth-by-the-bharatiya-nyaya-sanhita-2023/
- https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/spreading-fake-news-could-land-people-in-jail-for-three-years-under-new-bharatiya-nyaya-sanhita-bill/articleshow/102669105.cms?from=mdr
