#FactCheck: AI-Generated Audio Falsely Claims COAS Admitted to Loss of 6 Jets and 250 Soldiers

Introduction

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India officially became part of the US-led Pax Silica project on February 20, 2026, at the India AI Impact Summit in New Delhi. This was a significant milestone in India’s involvement in global technology and supply chain cooperation. India joined a coalition of advanced economies by signing the Pax Silica Declaration in a move aimed at strengthening coordination over technology supply chains on which artificial intelligence, semiconductors, critical minerals and advanced manufacturing rely. The entry of India into the global technology landscape is indicative of India’s growing role in the global technology order and reflects broader shifts in how countries are responding to the geopolitics of silicon and AI infrastructure.

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What Is Pax Silica and Why It Matters

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The United States Department of State introduced Pax Silica as a strategic program launched in December 2025. It seeks to establish safe, resilient and innovation-driven supply chains for emerging technologies that are the foundations of the AI era. This encompasses activities ranging from mining and refining of rare earths, gallium and germanium to semiconductor manufacturing, the creation of advanced computing hardware and energy infrastructure. The project describes cooperation as a method of reducing what are termed as coercive dependencies on any one supplier or economy, thereby supporting sustained access to building blocks of state-of-the-art technology.

Pax Silica derives its name from the Latin terms for 'peace' and the substrate material of 'silicon', meaning that the coalition aims at achieving stability and prosperity by working together in supply chains of technology. Early signatories were the United States, Japan, South Korea, Australia, the United Kingdom, Israel, Singapore, the Netherlands, Greece, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. India was the twelfth member to sign the declaration.

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India’s Strategic Interests in Pax Silica

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The move to join Pax Silica is both a diplomatic and economic decision. The incorporation of India into a network led ostensibly by the Western bloc and containing developed economy players in the technological supply chain creates the messaging that it wants to be more deeply integrated into the global high-tech ecosystems. 

India currently relies on importing a large proportion of the chips for its electronics production sector, while its domestic manufacturing capacity remains limited. Pax Silica membership could provide Indian firms with advanced manufacturing equipment, process expertise and joint ventures with their partners, who have already developed the fabrication capabilities.

The signing of the declaration was done by the current Union Minister of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) , the Union Minister, who noted that India is expanding its technological capabilities and future ambitions. He observed that the Indian engineers already play a role in designing advanced semiconductor chips and that the increase in semiconductor capacity will demand a professional workforce. He also emphasised that the availability of international tools and alliances would help accelerate India’s growth in this sector.

Another strategic area is the critical minerals. India is estimated to have significant rare earth reserves, but the resources remain largely underdeveloped. The diversification strategy of Pax Silica in terms of supply and processing routes provides India with an opportunity to have joint ventures and infrastructure projects that could help unlock domestic mineral potential within the country.

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Supply Chains, AI, and Geopolitical Context

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Pax Silica has emerged within a broader geopolitical and supply chain context rather than as a purely economic initiative. The last few years have placed a strain on global technology supply chains with disruptions caused by pandemics, trade tensions, export controls, and the concentrated control of some components of the value chain. China currently dominates in the refinement of rare earths as well as in a variety of legacy semiconductor manufacturing. The concentration has raised concerns about resilience and strategic autonomy among the technology-producing democracies.

This initiative is based on the premise that a diversified and trusted supply chain will make the economic security of countries participating in Pax Silica more secure in case of a trade embargo or as a tool of political leverage. The voluntary and non-binding framework by the coalition only provides a guide to cooperation instead of a binding commitment, though it highlights an acknowledgement of risk and opportunity in global technology markets.

Such concerns as strategic autonomy and the extent of India’s involvement in the initiative have been expressed by those who criticise it, particularly because the coalition is perceived to be partially designed to respond to Chinese dominance in the most important technological sectors. Some analysts have also suggested that India will have to balance its participation in Pax Silica by taking special care of its own interests and alliances outside this coalition.

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Economic and Industrial Implications for India

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Joining Pax Silica offers India potential benefits on multiple fronts.

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Strengthening Innovation and Manufacturing Ecosystems

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India's membership will allow cooperation in semiconductor production, development of advanced computing infrastructure and implementation of AI. The government and industry players could attract investments through partnerships, technology transfer and joint R&D. India’s emerging design and fabrication projects could use a greater international integration in this venture.

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Talent and Skills Development

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A recurring theme among Indian policymakers is the issue of a skilled workforce. As the world semiconductor and AI sector is expected to need millions of specialists in the next 10 years, India’s large talent pool presents an opportunity to produce local talent that is capable of catering to local demands as well as international supply needs. Initiatives linked to Pax Silica have the potential to establish training pathways and institutional bridges that facilitate workforce preparedness.

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Diversification of Supply Partnerships

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In the case of India, the diversification of suppliers and partners goes beyond the availability of materials and technologies. It also implies reducing exposure to supply shocks and enhancing resilience in important industries such as consumer electronics, automotive manufacturing, defence systems and digital infrastructure, all of which rely on semiconductors and advanced computing hardware.

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Broader Industrial Readiness and Domestic Challenges

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India’s participation in Pax Silica highlights the domestic conditions required to support advanced technology manufacturing. A conducive environment will depend on reliable infrastructure, regulatory stability, specialised industrial clusters and sustained policy coordination across government and industry. Semiconductor and AI hardware production are resource-intensive, requiring significant energy, water and chemical management, making environmental safeguards and sustainable industrial planning essential to prevent long-term ecological strain.

At the same time, India faces gaps in its human resource development ecosystem. While engineering talent is abundant, specialised training in semiconductor fabrication, materials science and advanced manufacturing remains limited. Additionally, the relative lack of applied research and development initiatives aimed at reducing technological and financial risks may constrain large-scale industrial expansion, underscoring the need for stronger industry–academia collaboration and targeted innovation support.

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Conclusion: A Strategic Step into the AI Era

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India’s formal entry into the Pax Silica initiative at the 2026 India AI Impact Summit reflects a thoughtful recalibration of its global technology engagement. By aligning with a coalition aimed at securing the supply chains that make modern digital economies possible, India has signalled its intent to be more than just a consumer of technology. It seeks to help shape the infrastructure, partnerships and norms that will define the next generation of AI, semiconductors and critical technologies.

While questions around strategic autonomy and long-term dependencies remain important considerations, Pax Silica offers India access to networks, capabilities and collaborative frameworks that can accelerate its semiconductor ambitions and broaden its role in the global tech order. The move underscores how technology cooperation today increasingly interacts with geopolitics, economic strategy and national aspirations for growth and innovation.

Sources

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• https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/technology/tech-news/what-is-pax-silica-and-why-does-india-joining-the-ai-supply-chain-alliance-matter/articleshow/128594775.cms
• https://paxsilica.org/f/pax-silica-securing-the-foundations-of-the-ai-era
• https://www.businesstoday.in/india/story/ai-impact-summit-2026-india-set-to-join-us-led-pax-silica-today-517167-2026-02-20
• https://www.business-standard.com/india-news/pax-silica-india-joins-us-supply-chain-initiative-ai-impact-summit-2026-126022000339_1.html

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Introduction

For more than 10 years, WhatsApp has been designed around one seemingly trivial but impactful idea: your phone number is your digital identity. This concept offered simplicity in terms of contact discovery and onboard- ing but inevitably exposed users to fraud, spam and the everyday necessity of sharing personal phone numbers with complete strangers in group chats and conversations. On June 29th Meta finally revealed a major move: you’ll now be able to choose and reservate a WhatsApp username and communicate without sharing your phone number.  

This shift to a username based identity marks the company catching up to platforms like Telegram and Signal, which have utilized this functionality for years. 

However, while presented as a push towards greater privacy for the millions using its platform, this new change has already created some alarm around impersonation, cybersquatting, and identity theft. The issues became amplified when, according to reports, the Indian Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology advised WhatsApp to halt the implementation of the new features while it clarifies details, shifting a mundane app update into a high-stakes discussion on digital privacy, platform responsibility, and government regulation.

How does the mechanism work?

“WhatsApp’s username is an added pseudonym layer on its current phone number architecture, not a replacement,” Meta said in a statement on Thursday, as reported by TechCrunch. A WhatsApp username is a three to 35-character name containing lower case letters, numbers, periods and underscores that must contain at least one letter and “should not look like a website address.” The feature will allow you to “reserve a unique identifier that you can share as an alternative to your phone number in WhatsApp Settings - Accounts - Username.”

It said the usernames will work in parallel with a username key which can serve as a passphrase to initiate conversation “with a recipient before sending a message for the first time.”

“The change - which will have some additional, protective measures like reserving usernames for people of public interest or those that would cause impersonation, and rate limits on claiming names - can help maintain phone number protection, while offering people more choices,” Meta said. WhatsApp said usernames will replace phone numbers as the primary way to initiate new chats, but will not be publicly searchable: “Anyone you message would need your exact username, and would still need you to respond.”

The Genuine Privacy Case 

The upside is real. Phone numbers double as keys to two-factor authentication, banking apps and SIM-swap fraud, so handing one to a new acquaintance, a group chat of strangers or a customer-support bot has always carried quiet risk. Numbers harvested from public groups already fuel spam and scam campaigns, and a username-first model narrows that exposure considerably. 

For journalists, small business owners and anyone who fields messages from people they've never met, decoupling identity from a number that also unlocks their bank account is a meaningful, overdue shift – and one that WhatsApp's closest competitors adopted years ago without major incident. 

The Scammer's Paradise Scenario

The trouble lies in what a username removes. A phone number was never just an identifier; it was also a rough verification signal and, for law enforcement, a traceable data point. Security reporters testing the reservation system found that lookalike handles mimicking prominent Indian politicians, film stars and the Reserve Bank of India remained available to claim. Crypto executive Changpeng Zhao's own failed bid to capture his desired handle highlighted the first-come, first-served danger of the rollout and led researchers to advise people to manually activate the optional username key that Meta leaves disabled by default. 

The Mozilla Foundation was unvarnished about the tradeoff, noting that impersonation from fake accounts and scams are an “inevitable consequence” of a design that abandons the “implicit signal of authenticity” that comes from owning a phone number. 

Indian entrepreneur Ankur Warikoo called the rollout a potential “disaster” if robust enforcement against fraud isn’t immediately applied because scammers could register handles a few characters removed from a popular brand or public figure to launch investment and payment schemes, a concern mirrored by cyber security researchers who observed that many users neglect to check verification badges before trusting an account.

India's Regulatory Scrutiny of WhatsApp's Username Feature

So far the strongest reaction comes from New Delhi. The Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) issued an official notice to Meta's compliance office that it should “temporarily suspend the feature” in the country pending further consultations and “provided an explanation in three days”. The cited concerns involve “digital arrest” fraud, a rapid boom category that involves crooks impersonating investigators like those with India's CBI, judges or customs agents to extort victims, in addition to standard concerns around phishing and bank or government impersonation. 

A subtler concern, for India’s government anyway, is “traceability.” 

At present, say officials, an Indian mobile number is a launching pad to determine whether a given suspect is a domestic or international actor, while a username and foreign SIM would leave authorities nowhere to begin. The Department of Telecommunications independently voiced concerns over how the change intersects with its SIM-binding regulations and over WhatsApp's lag time for such requests. The MeitY notice, the legal basis for which, incidentally, is in contention with some digital rights groups, specifically invokes Section 79 of the IT Act and various IT Rules from 2021 and provisions on identity theft and impersonation that target individual criminals rather than the tech tools. Not everyone, however, shares MeitY’s reading of the legal ground: the Internet Freedom Foundation says that Section 79 “deal with liability of intermediary” and “does not confer on the government power to license the features of a product,” while arguing the relevant criminal statutes were designed to criminalize impersonators, not tech platforms whose services are misused, echoing concerns that killed a similar government advisement about AI models last spring. 

In the meantime, Meta says usernames are unavailable in the country for now and the multilayered safeguards it designed were always intended for exactly this level of risk.

Conclusion 

WhatsApp's username feature is neither a total privacy upgrade nor a major security problem; instead, it reallocates risk, reducing phone number exposure while adding a risk of identity spoofing and misuse. Whether it pays off will hinge on the strength of Meta's crackdown on fraudulent usernames, the uptake of extra security features like the username key and whether the company can adequately satisfy regulatory concerns about traceability and user safety. Until all those questions are fully settled, users may want to use the feature tentatively, secure a desired username, enable any other protections and be watchful about new contacts.

References

1. https://blog.whatsapp.com/its-time-to-reserve-your-whatsapp-username
2. https://www.businesstoday.in/technology/news/story/whatsapp-usernames-why-indias-top-creators-fear-scams-impersonation-and-identity-theft-540359-2026-07-02
3. https://www.outlookindia.com/national/outlook-explains-why-is-the-indian-government-worried-about-whatsapp-usernames
4. https://techcrunch.com/2026/06/29/whatsapp-now-lets-you-reserve-usernames/
5. https://bestmediainfo.com/mediainfo/mediainfo-digital/whatsapp-says-username-feature-not-live-yet-after-meity-asks-meta-to-pause-rollout-12124813 

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Introduction
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In June 2026, the Government of India temporarily restricted access to Telegram amid concerns that the platform had been used to facilitate examination related malpractice, including the alleged circulation of leaked question papers during the NEET UG re examination. The move reignited a familiar debate about the responsibility of digital platforms for unlawful activities carried out through them.

Critics of such restrictions raise a fundamental question: if a traffic accident occurs on a road, do we shut down the road? If theft takes place inside a shopping mall, do we close the entire mall? By the same logic, is it reasonable to block a communication platform because some individuals misuse it? These questions lie at the heart of a broader conflict between state interests in maintaining public order and the protection of digital rights, privacy, and freedom of communication in an increasingly interconnected world.

The controversy surrounding Telegram therefore extends beyond a single examination or messaging application. It raises a deeper and more pressing question: who should bear responsibility for illegal acts committed through encrypted digital platforms, and where should the law draw the line between effective enforcement and the preservation of fundamental digital freedoms?

Beyond mere communication for millions of students in India, Telegram is a classroom in the digital sense, an archive for their notes, practice papers, lecture recordings, and community groups that hundreds of millions of candidates refer to every single day. Therefore, why on a routine day in June 2026 did the messaging app top every other channel? Temporary internet restriction on the platform had become necessary to stop examination-related malpractice like leakage of question papers and was temporarily suspended, with reports suggesting that this move by the government was on the occasion of the NEET-UG re-examination.

This ban once again brings up a bigger question that cannot be contained within one particular examination. When has it become okay to hold a communication platform responsible and accountable for illegal acts committed over it? Or are the perpetrators solely to blame, and the service can be prohibited? Ultimately, where is the line drawn between public interest, law enforcement, and digital rights and privacy? 

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End-to-End Encryption: Architecture and Benefits
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At the heart of these discussions of Telegram and other apps lies a technology referred to as "end-to-end encryption" or "E2EE." Quite literally, it means a message is locked with cryptography on the sender's device and can only be unlocked by the intended recipient. Not even the tech platform running the communication app can decipher it for everyone else; it just looks like random gibberish.

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The Process
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This kind of modern communication relies on public key cryptography. Each person has a public key they can share with anyone and a private key that stays only on their devices. When they send you a message, it is scrambled with crypto that can be unlocked by only your private key. WhatsApp and Signal, for example, use the Signal Protocol, which features "perfect forward secrecy" and is designed to protect communications from ever being unlocked even if one key is compromised. Telegram's approach is a bit unique. By default, Telegram messages aren't encrypted with end-to-end crypto; this only comes via an optional feature called "Secret Chats," a key difference in the regulatory debate.

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The Dark Side: Crime, Misuse, and the Moderation Dilemma

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The very features that make end-to-end messaging popular among everyday people are privacy, speed, anonymity, and mass reach which also make end-to-end messaging popular among criminals. That, unfortunately, is the catch for policymakers globally: The technology designed to protect innocent users is also the technology that facilitates criminal activity.

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3.1 Criminal Abuse

Telegram, in particular, has frequently come under fire for its role in hosting a spectrum of criminal activities, most notably in the recent controversy in India regarding NEET-UG 2026 examination papers where channels allegedly advertised leaked question papers for enormous sums, convincing desperate candidates. In these instances, messages could be altered or deleted using Telegram’s message editing feature, fabricating evidence of prior leaks. However, this extends to illicit marketplaces, drug trafficking, financial fraud, money laundering, and distributing other prohibited content. Telegram's usage in disseminating extremist propaganda and aiding criminal organizations is also frequently cited, leading to bans or restrictions in countries ranging from Brazil to Nepal to Somalia to Vietnam.

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3.2 The Moderation Dilemma

But the difficulty is not just with misuse; it’s also about effective moderation. Moderation, however, requires content transparency. Strong encryption is built to obscure just that. Many end-to-end messaging services like Signal and WhatsApp emphasize that even if they wanted to, they would have been able to decipher the content of a user’s message due to their architecture. Telegram has been in scrutiny for years due to its limited cooperation with law enforcement agencies because its default chats are not completely end-to-end encrypted, though there has been an attempt by Pavel Durov, the platform’s founder, to increase cooperation following his 2024 arrest in France.

This gives policymakers the following challenge: How can governments require increased access to fight crime without forcing tech companies to weaken security for everyone? As cryptographers point out, a specific "backdoor" intended to allow access to law enforcement officials can be easily exploited by hackers, foreign governments, and any other actor with nefarious intent.

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Comparison of Regulatory Approaches Worldwide

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4.1 Authoritarian Countries' Responses

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China, for instance, has had the app blocked as part of its strategy to control access to the internet since 2015, and Iran did so in 2018 when the app was used to help organize protests against the government. An infamous Russian bid to block Telegram in 2018 turned into a cautionary story. Trying to censor the service disrupted the IPs of millions of computers, including significant services like those run by Amazon and Google. The move was met by a surge of users turning to VPNs to get access. It’s an expensive, disruptive, and incomplete form of censorship.

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4.2 Democratic Countries' Approaches

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Democratic jurisdictions generally prefer targeted interventions. Telegram was suspended in Brazil in 2022 and 2023, though again, only in response to a judge’s order in relation to particular investigations, and was lifted when it came into compliance. The EU’s approach has been to build on an established approach of regulation by use of a broader legislative framework, including the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act, aimed at platform liability rather than outlawing encryption outright.

 Meanwhile, the proposed scanning of encrypted communications has run into strong judicial headwinds, with the European courts stressing the danger of backdoors to privacy.

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4.3 The United Kingdom Approach

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The UK offers a middle way. With its Investigatory Powers Act, the government can oblige tech companies to collaborate in legitimate investigations. But this came to a head earlier this year with the case of Apple and the government's attempts to force it to unlock encrypted iCloud backups. Apple not only refused to reduce its encryption but also decided instead to disable some of its features for British users. This has created a problem for democracies across the world: how to balance access for investigators against the need to maintain the security that makes our systems safer.

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Judicial and Legislative Perspectives: India and Beyond

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In the Indian context, to have a perspective about the legal frameworks concerning content moderation, let’s explore some of the foundational decisions from the Supreme Court. Three decisions have laid the building block for digital rights laws: the first being Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015), where Section 69A of the IT Act, 2000, was upheld, but only by laying rigorous conditions on the review process and chance of challenging the said decision. Another important decision in this sphere is Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) which stated that the right to privacy is fundamental in nature under Article 21 of the Constitution and stipulated the constitutional requirements of legality, legitimacy, and proportionality against the state’s interventions in fundamental rights. The most recent important case law to consider, in this context, would be Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020) which set certain limitations, such as any internet shut-downs or orders have to be temporary, proportional, and have scope for appeal. Further, the Supreme Court demanded transparency around any and all orders of blocking.

These principles of proportionality and legal limitations are highly pertinent to the Telegram issue, especially since Section 69A confers powers to block information in case of concerns about public order, national security, etc., but activists often cite this power to target specific content rather than entire platforms like Telegram. The ban on Telegram in June 2026 and disabling of message editing will force authorities to justify not only their statutory authority but also the need for proportionate means.

These aspects are amplified by IT Rules, 2021, which mandate that some instant messaging platforms may require identification of the ‘first originator’ of messages, and the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, to protect digital personal data by ensuring it does not undermine national security exceptions to this end. 

Moreover, the use of encryption to ensure secure and private communications is becoming an important point of legal discourse globally. Recently, the European Court of Human Rights in Podchasov v. Russia (2024) held that mandating decryption on devices as a tool of investigative power constituted a disproportionate interference with an individual's right to privacy implying that while states may indeed have authority to regulate communication and digital services, any such measures limiting the scope of encryption will have to meet strict requirements of legality, necessity, and proportionality to be legally justifiable.

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Constitutional Validity of the Ban

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The government's case for a constitutional ban on Telegram rests upon its ability to satisfy the proportionality framework established by Puttaswamy and Anuradha Bhasin.

1. Legitimate aim:  The state's strong suit. This is the government's best argument. Protection of the integrity of NEET-UG, a high-stakes test with close to 2.4 million students, can indeed be a legitimate state objective. Given that there is evidence of channels that allegedly were involved in selling leaked question papers, the action is presumably justifiable under section 69A for preventing the incitement or occurrence of public disorder or preventing cognizable offenses.
2. Necessity: The National Testing Agency (NTA) itself admitted that localized removal of suspicious accounts on Telegram had already mitigated the risks, while Telegram insisted that it had independently taken down numerous channels. The fact that the block affected more than 150 million users in India, where the medium is widely used for personal communication and is also utilized on other platforms like WhatsApp, Discord, and Instagram to a similar or higher extent, raises the responsibility to justify a strict platform-wide ban. Moreover, there is a significant legal question regarding the state’s authority under section 69A to direct Telegram to disable its message-editing capability.
3. Proportionality and process: The block, even though it was temporary and intended to ensure fairness in the examination system, severely undermined legitimate uses of the platform by students who used it to share educational materials and organize study groups. Moreover, the opaqueness around the section 69A order is itself hard to reconcile with the transparency requirements set out in Anuradha Bhasin. 

Thus, while the objectives of preventing exam fraud may be legitimate, the necessity and proportionality of single platform-wide bans remain highly suspect under Indian constitutional law.

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Policy Recommendations and the Path Forward

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The Telegram controversy points to the need for a better balancing act in platform governance in India. Firstly, instead of blanket platform shutdowns, action should target specific channels, bots, or URLs, as may be the case. Secondly, any attempt to dictate changes to features, such as disabling message editing, should be based on specific statutory provisions, not an expansive reading of Section 69A. Furthermore, there is a dire need for increased transparency; blocking orders must state the justification for the order, what is being blocked, and for how long, as far as possible. In the long run, stricter cross-border cooperation via streamlined MLATs, or through the appointment of local legal representatives by foreign platforms, would facilitate easier enforcement. Ultimately, all major blocking decisions must be accompanied by proportionality assessments. Lastly, India must resist pressure to provide access to encryption backdoors; while this might ease investigative burdens, doing so would severely jeopardise the cybersecurity of India, its businesses, and citizens.

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Conclusion

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The Telegram ban is an example of the tricky equilibrium between protection of public interest and protection of digital liberties in our hyper-connected world. While the intent to counter exam fraud is justifiable, a blanket ban on any platform has much broader implications on questions of necessity, proportionality and transparency. India has a well-developed constitutional and legal framework to deal with this issue already, and the challenge will be to see if those powers are used appropriately.

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References

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Cases:

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• Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) 5 SCC 1 — Supreme Court of India
• Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1 — Supreme Court of India (Nine-Judge Bench)
• Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020) 3 SCC 637 — Supreme Court of India
• Podchasov v. Russia, European Court of Human Rights (Application No. 33696/19, February 2024)
• Apple Inc. v. United States (In re Search of an Apple iPhone, C.D. Cal. 2016)
• Telegram Messenger Inc. v. Union of India & Anr., Delhi High Court (June 2026) — Sub judice

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Legislation & Rules:

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• Information Technology Act, 2000 (India) — Sections 69A, 79
• IT (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking Access to Information by Public) Rules, 2009
• IT (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021
• Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (India) & DPDP Rules, 2025
• EU Digital Services Act, 2022 (Regulation 2022/2065)
• EU Digital Markets Act, 2022 (Regulation 2022/1925)
• EU Child Sexual Abuse Regulation (CSAR) Proposal — In Trilogue, June 2026
• UK Investigatory Powers Act, 2016

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Policy Sources:

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• Internet Freedom Foundation, Statement on Telegram Block, 16 June 2026
•  European Commission, ProtectEU Security Strategy, June 2025
•  MeitY Section 69A Blocking Order re: Telegram (June 2026)
•  NTA Press Release on NEET-UG 2026 Re-Examination, 16 June 2026

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