#FactCheck- Viral Photo Claiming PM Modi Met ‘Cockroach Janata Party’ Founder Abhijeet Dipke Is AI-Generated

Introduction

On September 27, 2024, the Indian government took a significant step toward enhancing national security by amending business allocation rules through an extraordinary gazette notification. This amendment, which assigns specific roles to different Union Ministries and Departments regarding telecom network security, cybersecurity, and cybercrime, aims to clarify and streamline efforts in these critical areas. With India's evolving cybersecurity landscape, the need for a structured regulatory framework is pressing, as threats grow in complexity. Recent developments, such as the July 2024 global cyber outage and increasing cyber crimes like SMS scams, highlight the urgency of such reforms. Under Article 77 clause (3), the President amended the Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961, to designate clearer responsibilities, reinforcing India's readiness to tackle emerging digital threats.

Key Highlights of the Gazette Notification

• Telecom Networks Security: A new entry ‘1A’ matters relating to the security of telecom networks" has been added under the Department of Telecommunications, highlighting an increased focus on securing the nation's telecom infrastructure.
• Cyber Security Responsibilities: Cyber security responsibilities have been added as a new entry under the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY), "5B. This assigns responsibility to MeitY for cybersecurity issues, concerning the Information Technology Act of 2000, giving the ministry the mandate to support other ministries or departments regarding cybersecurity matters.
• Oversight for Cyber Crime: Under the Ministry of Home Affairs, Department of Internal Security, a new entry "36A Matters relating to Cyber Crime" is introduced. This emphasises that the MHA will handle cybercrime issues, highlighting the government's attention toward enhancing internal security against cyber threats.
• Cyber Security Strategic Coordination: Any matter related to the "overall coordination and strategic direction for Cyber Security," has been given to the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS). This consolidates the role of the NSCS in guiding cybersecurity strategies at the national level.

Impact on Policy and Governance 

The amendments introduced through the notification are poised to significantly enhance the Indian government's cybersecurity framework by clarifying the roles of various ministries. The clear separation of responsibilities, telecom network security to the Department of Telecommunications, cybercrime to the Ministry of Home Affairs, and overall cyber strategy to the National Security Council Secretariat could seen as better coordination between ministries. This clarity is expected to reduce bureaucratic delays, allowing for quicker response times in addressing cyber threats, cybercrimes, and telecom vulnerabilities. Such efficient handling is crucial, especially in the evolving landscape of digital threats. These changes have been largely welcomed as it recognises the potential for improved regulatory oversight and faster policy implementation and a step forward in bolstering India’s cyber resilience. 

Conclusion 

The Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961 amendments mark a critical step in strengthening India's cybersecurity framework. By setting out specific responsibilities for telecom network security, cybercrime, and overall cybersecurity strategy among key ministries, the government seeks to improve coordination and reduce bureaucratic delays. This policy shift is poised to enhance India’s digital resilience, providing a foundation for rapid responses to emerging cyber threats. However, success hinges on effective implementation, resource allocation, and collaboration across ministries. Addressing concerns like potential jurisdictional overlap and ensuring the inclusion of bodies like NCIIPC will be pivotal to ensuring comprehensive cyber protection. The complexity of cyber crimes and threats is evolving every day and the government's ability and preparedness to handle them with regulatory insight is a high priority.

References

• https://egazette.gov.in/(S(4r5oclueuwrjypfvr5b4vtzg))/ViewPDF.aspx 
• https://www.ptinews.com/story/national/govt-specifies-roles-on-matters-related-to-security-of-telecom-network-cyber-security-and-cyber-crime/1856627
• https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/centre-to-further-streamline-mechanism-to-deal-with-cyber-security-cyber-crime/article68694330.ece
• https://telecom.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/policy/govt-specifies-roles-on-matters-related-to-security-of-telecom-network-cyber-security-and-cyber-crime/113754501 

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In the vast, interconnected cosmos of the internet, where knowledge and connectivity are celebrated as the twin suns of enlightenment, there lurk shadows of a more sinister nature. Here, in these darker corners, the innocence of childhood is not only exploited but also scarred, indelibly and forever. The production, distribution, and consumption of Child Sexual Abuse Material (CSAM) have surged to alarming levels globally, casting a long, ominous shadow over the digital landscape. 

In response to this pressing issue, the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) has unfurled a comprehensive four-part advisory, a beacon of hope aimed at combating CSAM and safeguarding the rights of children in this digital age. This advisory dated 27/10/23 is not merely a reaction to the rising tide of CSAM, but a testament to the imperative need for constant vigilance in the realm of cyber peace.

The statistics paint a sobering picture. In 2021, more than 1,500 instances of publishing, storing, and transmitting CSAM were reported, shedding a harsh light on the scale of the problem. Even more alarming is the upward trend in cases reported in subsequent years. By 2023, a staggering 450,207 cases of CSAM had already been reported, marking a significant increase from the 204,056 and 163,633 cases reported in 2022 and 2021, respectively.

The Key Aspects of Advisory

The NHRC's advisory commences with a fundamental recommendation - a redefinition of terminology. It suggests replacing the term 'Child Pornography' with 'Child Sexual Abuse Material' (CSAM). This shift in language is not merely semantic; it underscores the gravity of the issue, emphasizing that this is not about pornography but child abuse. 

Moreover, the advisory calls for the definition of 'sexually explicit' under Section 67B of the IT Act, 2000. This step is crucial for ensuring the prompt identification and removal of online CSAM. By giving a clear definition, law enforcement can act swiftly in removing such content from the internet.

The digital world knows no borders, and CSAM can easily cross jurisdictional lines. NHRC recognizes this challenge and proposes that laws be harmonized across jurisdictions through bilateral agreements. Moreover, it recommends pushing for the adoption of a UN draft Convention on 'Countering the Use of Information and Communications Technologies for Criminal Purposes' at the General Assembly.

One of the critical aspects of the advisory is the strengthening of law enforcement. NHRC advocates for the creation of Specialized State Police Units in every state and union territory to handle CSAM-related cases. The central government is expected to provide support, including grants, to set up and equip these units. 

The NHRC further recommends establishing a Specialized Central Police Unit under the government of India's jurisdiction. This unit will focus on identifying and apprehending CSAM offenders and maintaining a repository of such content. Its role is not limited to law enforcement; it is expected to cooperate with investigative agencies, analyze patterns, and initiate the process for content takedown. This coordinated approach is designed to combat the problem effectively, both on the dark web and open web.

The role of internet intermediaries and social media platforms in controlling CSAM is undeniable. The NHRC advisory emphasizes that intermediaries must deploy technology, such as content moderation algorithms, to proactively detect and remove CSAM from their platforms. This places the onus on the platforms to be proactive in policing their content and ensuring the safety of their users. 

New Developments 

Platforms using end-to-end encryption services may be required to create additional protocols for monitoring the circulation of CSAM. Failure to do so may invite the withdrawal of the 'safe harbor' clause under Section 79 of the IT Act, 2000. This measure ensures that platforms using encryption technology are not inadvertently providing safe havens for those engaged in illegal activities. 

NHRC's advisory extends beyond legal and law enforcement measures; it emphasizes the importance of awareness and sensitization at various levels. Schools, colleges, and institutions are called upon to educate students, parents, and teachers about the modus operandi of online child sexual abusers, the vulnerabilities of children on the internet, and the early signs of online child abuse. 

To further enhance awareness, a cyber curriculum is proposed to be integrated into the education system. This curriculum will not only boost digital literacy but also educate students about relevant child care legislation, policies, and the legal consequences of violating them. 

NHRC recognizes that survivors of CSAM need more than legal measures and prevention strategies. Survivors are recommended to receive support services and opportunities for rehabilitation through various means. Partnerships with civil society and other stakeholders play a vital role in this aspect. Moreover, psycho-social care centers are proposed to be established in every district to facilitate need-based support services and organization of stigma eradication programs. 

NHRC's advisory is a resounding call to action, acknowledging the critical importance of protecting children from the perils of CSAM. By addressing legal gaps, strengthening law enforcement, regulating online platforms, and promoting awareness and support, the NHRC aims to create a safer digital environment for children. 

Conclusion 

In a world where the internet plays an increasingly central role in our lives, these recommendations are not just proactive but imperative. They underscore the collective responsibility of governments, law enforcement agencies, intermediaries, and society as a whole in safeguarding the rights and well-being of children in the digital age. 

NHRC's advisory is a pivotal guide to a more secure and child-friendly digital world. By addressing the rising tide of CSAM and emphasizing the need for constant vigilance, NHRC reaffirms the critical role of organizations, governments, and individuals in ensuring cyber peace and child protection in the digital age. The active contribution from premier cyber resilience firms like Cyber Peace Foundation, amplifies the collective action forging a secure digital space, highlighting the pivotal role played by think tanks in ensuring cyber peace and resilience. 

References:

• https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/nhrc-issues-advisory-regarding-child-sexual-abuse-material-on-internet-101698473197792.html
• https://ssrana.in/articles/nhrcs-advisory-proliferation-of-child-sexual-abuse-material-csam/
• https://theprint.in/india/specialised-central-police-unit-use-of-technology-to-proactively-detect-csam-nhrc-advisory/1822223/

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With AI touching new milestones everyday an increasing need for making it secure is also arising. As these AI companies increase their operations and position in the market as providers of powerful tools in the market. A recent concern due to Anthropic's recent privacy policy update which will be effective from July 8, 2026 shows how companies have begun expanding the amount of personal information they collect in the name of safety, compliance, and trust. While they are being demonstrated as measures to improve safety of users and prevent abuse, it raises important questions about privacy, biometric data, surveillance, data retention, and user autonomy, some of which we will be addressing in this article.

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Identity Verification of consumers

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One of the most notable update to Anthropic's privacy policy is the category of "Verification Data." According to the policy, users may be asked to verify their age or identity in certain circumstances. Depending on the verification method, Anthropic may collect:

• Images of government-issued identity documents;
• Information appearing on those documents, including identification numbers and date of birth for age verification;
• Photographs or videos of the user;
• Facial geometry templates, which may constitute biometric data under certain legal frameworks; and
• The outcome of the verification process.

At first, this may appear similar to the Know Your Customer (KYC) procedures employed by banks or financial institutions but Claude is not a banking service. It is a consumer AI platform. The issue is not that verification exists, but that the circumstances under which it may be required remain undefined.

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THE PROBLEM WITH “CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES”

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The policy refers to verification being required in "certain circumstances." The public notification from Anthropic mentions that these circumstances may include access to particular features, routine platform integrity checks, abuse prevention mechanisms, policy enforcement activities, or legal compliance obligations. The ambiguity of this phrase raises important concerns. From a user perspective, it is difficult to determine, When verification may be triggered ? Whether verification applies only to suspicious accounts ? Whether access to future features may depend upon verification ? Whether users in particular regions will face more frequent verification requirements ? Whether verification requests may increase as AI regulation expands ? This broad language and discretionary power that the company has along with flexibility in the hands of the company creates uncertainty for users who may have initially joined a platform expecting only an email address and payment information to be required.

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Government IDs collection: A new risk category

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Almost all AI services have operated without collecting government-issued identity documents. Once a company begins processing such information, the privacy implications change dramatically. Because government issued IDs contain: Full legal names, Dates of birth, Identification numbers, Addresses, Photographs and information regarding nationality. When companies collect these documents, they will have an important database of highly sensitive personal information. Even if the company itself does not retain the documents indefinitely, the existence of a verification process introduces additional privacy and security risks. As per Anthropic has stated that identity verification is conducted through third-party providers such as Persona. According to article on the official site titled ‘Identity verification on Claude’, Persona stores the identity documents and selfie data, while Anthropic retains access to verification records when necessary.  From the user's perspective, several important realities remain: First, the data still exists somewhere. Second, another third party organization is now involved in processing highly sensitive personal information. Third, Anthropic retains the ability to access verification records under certain circumstances. Therefore, although Anthropic may not directly maintain copies of every uploaded identity document, the practical result remains that sensitive information enters a broader ecosystem of entities and systems. Identity documents today are among the most valuable forms of personal information from the perspective of fraudsters, cybercriminals, and malicious actors. Therefore, any system that handles such documents becomes an attractive target for attack.

More information on persona’s government ID verification- https://withpersona.com/blog/what-is-government-id-verification 

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The Biometric Dimension

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Another significant aspect of the update is the reference to facial geometry templates. Unlike passwords, biometric identifiers cannot easily be changed if compromised. A person can replace a password or even obtain a new identification card, but they cannot simply obtain a new face. Facial geometry templates are sensitive because they enable automated identity matching. Although these templates, as claimed, are not equivalent to photographs, they are nevertheless derived from unique physical characteristics of a person. In many jurisdictions, including parts of the European Union and several U.S. states, biometric data receives enhanced legal protection because of its permanence and sensitivity, let us see how it unfolds in these jurisdictions.

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The Unanswered Retention Question

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It is unclear in the policy as to how long the data will be retained because retention limits serve as one of the most important safeguards in modern privacy law, they have given another vague answer that “They're bound to protect it with industry-standard security controls and delete it in line with the retention limits we've set and applicable law.” The longer sensitive information remains stored, the greater the likelihood of unauthorized access, misuse, accidental disclosure, or legal compulsion.

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Court Orders and Government Access

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Anthropic may be required to disclose information pursuant to valid legal processes such as subpoenas, court orders, warrants, or regulatory directives. The existence of identity verification records means that future requests could potentially be linked to verified identities rather than pseudonymous accounts. This does not mean governments receive unrestricted access to user data. However, it does mean that once identity verification information exists within a company's ecosystem, it may become subject to lawful disclosure requirements. The privacy implications are therefore materially different from those associated with anonymous or pseudonymous AI usage.

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Shifting Responsibility onto Users

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Another concern is that the privacy policy states that users are responsible for ensuring they possess the necessary rights, permissions, or authority when uploading files, connecting third-party services, or instructing Claude to retrieve information. Anthropic is effectively informing users that they bear responsibility for ensuring that uploaded or connected data is lawfully accessible. As AI assistants gain greater capabilities, this transfer of responsibility from platform to user is likely to become increasingly common. Beyond individual privacy, Anthropic's verification policy also raises larger questions about data sovereignty and the cross-border movement of sensitive personal information. In India, the Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India judgment recognized privacy as a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution, affirming that individuals have the right to informational self-determination and control over their personal data. Yet, under Anthropic's verification framework, an Indian user may be required to upload a government-issued identity document and biometric information, which are processed by Persona, a U.S.-based identity verification company acting on behalf of Anthropic. Although users voluntarily consent to this process, it nevertheless results in highly sensitive identity information crossing national borders and entering the control of foreign private entities governed primarily by foreign contractual arrangements and multiple legal regimes. While governments issue identity documents as sovereign instruments of citizenship, their verification and processing are increasingly outsourced to multinational technology companies. Questions arise not only about how securely such information is handled, but also about which country's laws ultimately govern access, retention, disclosure, and accountability when personal data leaves the jurisdiction in which it originated. Under the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, cross-border transfer of personal data is generally permitted unless the Central Government specifically restricts transfers to certain jurisdictions. Therefore, a foreign company processing identity documents is not, by itself, unlawful but this legality does not eliminate legitimate concerns. Users realistically have limited bargaining power and little practical understanding of how long their identity documents, biometric templates, or verification records will be retained, who within the corporate ecosystem may access them, or how they may be disclosed pursuant to foreign legal processes. 

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Conclusion

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The policy is commendable in some respects because it openly identifies the categories of information that may be collected rather than obscuring them behind vague terminology. However, important concerns remain regarding the extent of verification triggers, the handling of biometric information, the absence of clearly disclosed retention periods, and the long-term implications of linking AI accounts to government-issued identities. As AI systems become more integrated into daily life, these questions will likely become central issues in debates about digital privacy, surveillance, autonomy, and the future governance of artificial intelligence.

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