#FactCheck - Viral Claim About Nitish Kumar’s Resignation Over UGC Protests Is Misleading

Introduction

In India, the rights of children with regard to protection of their personal data are enshrined under the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 which is the newly enacted digital personal data protection law of India. The DPDP Act requires that for the processing of children's personal data, verifiable consent of parents or legal guardians is a necessary requirement. If the consent of parents or legal guardians is not obtained then it constitutes a violation under the DPDP Act. Under section 2(f) of the DPDP act, a “child” means an individual who has not completed the age of eighteen years. 

Section 9 under the DPDP Act, 2023

With reference to the collection of children's data section 9 of the DPDP Act, 2023 provides that for children below 18 years of age, consent from Parents/Legal Guardians is required. The Data Fiduciary shall, before processing any personal data of a child or a person with a disability who has a lawful guardian, obtain verifiable consent from the parent or the lawful guardian. Section 9 aims to create a safer online environment for children by limiting the exploitation of their data for commercial purposes or otherwise. By virtue of this section, the parents and guardians will have more control over their children's data and privacy and they are empowered to make choices as to how they manage their children's online activities and the permissions they grant to various online services. 

Section 9 sub-section (3) specifies that a Data Fiduciary shall not undertake tracking or behavioural monitoring of children or targeted advertising directed at children. However, section 9 sub-section (5) further provides room for exemption from this prohibition by empowering the Central Government which may notify exemption to specific data fiduciaries or data processors from the behavioural tracking or target advertising prohibition under the future DPDP Rules which are yet to be announced or released. 

Impact on social media platforms

Social media companies are raising concerns about Section 9 of the DPDP Act and upcoming Rules for the DPDP Act. Section 9 prohibits behavioural tracking or targeted advertising directed at children on digital platforms. By prohibiting intermediaries from tracking a ‘child's internet activities’ and ‘targeted advertising’ - this law aims to preserve children's privacy. However, social media corporations contended that this limitation adversely affects the efficacy of safety measures intended to safeguard young users, highlighting the necessity of monitoring specific user signals, including from minors, to guarantee the efficacy of safety measures designed for them.

Social media companies assert that tracking teenagers' behaviour is essential for safeguarding them from predators and harmful interactions. They believe that a complete ban on behavioural tracking is counterproductive to the government's objectives of protecting children. The scope to grant exemption leaves the door open for further advocacy on this issue. Hence it necessitates coordination with the concerned ministry and relevant stakeholders to find a balanced approach that maintains both privacy and safety for young users.

Furthermore, the impact on social media platforms also extends to the user experience and the operational costs required to implement the functioning of the changes created by regulations. This also involves significant changes to their algorithms and data-handling processes. Implementing robust age verification systems to identify young users and protect their data will also be a technically challenging step for the various scales of platforms. Ensuring that children’s data is not used for targeted advertising or behavioural monitoring also requires sophisticated data management systems. The blanket ban on targeted advertising and behavioural tracking may also affect the personalisation of content for young users, which may reduce their engagement with the platform.

For globally operating platforms, aligning their practices with the DPDP Act in India while also complying with data protection laws in other countries (such as GDPR in Europe or COPPA in the US) can be complex and resource-intensive. Platforms might choose to implement uniform global policies for simplicity, which could impact their operations in regions not governed by similar laws. On the same page, competitive dynamics such as market shifts where smaller or niche platforms that cater specifically to children and comply with these regulations may gain a competitive edge. There may be a drive towards developing new, compliant ways of monetizing user interactions that do not rely on behavioural tracking.

CyberPeace Policy Recommendations

A balanced strategy should be taken into account which gives weightage to the contentions of social media companies as well as to the protection of children's personal information. Instead of a blanket ban, platforms can be obliged to follow and encourage openness in advertising practices, ensuring that children are not exposed to any misleading or manipulative marketing techniques. Self-regulation techniques can be implemented to support ethical behaviour, responsibility, and the safety of young users’ online personal information through the platform’s practices. Additionally, verifiable consent should be examined and put forward in a manner which is practical and the platforms have a say in designing the said verification. Ultimately, this should be dealt with in a manner that behavioural tracking and targeted advertising are not affecting the children's well-being, safety and data protection in any way. 

Final Words

Under section 9 of the DPDP Act, the prohibition of behavioural tracking and targeted advertising in case of processing children's personal data - will compel social media platforms to overhaul their data collection and advertising practices, ensuring compliance with stricter privacy regulations. The legislative intent behind this provision is to enhance and strengthen the protection of children's digital personal data security and privacy. As children are particularly vulnerable to digital threats due to their still-evolving maturity and cognitive capacities, the protection of their privacy stands as a priority. The innocence of children is a major cause for concern when it comes to digital access because children simply do not possess the discernment and caution required to be able to navigate the Internet safely. Furthermore, a balanced approach needs to be adopted which maintains both ‘privacy’ and ‘safety’ for young users.

References

• https://www.meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/Digital%20Personal%20Data%20Protection%20Act%202023.pdf 
• https://www.firstpost.com/tech/as-govt-of-india-starts-preparing-rules-for-dpdp-act-social-media-platforms-worried-13789134.html#google_vignette
• https://www.business-standard.com/industry/news/social-media-platforms-worry-new-data-law-could-affect-child-safety-ads-124070400673_1.html

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Introduction

In an era where digitalization is transforming every facet of life, ensuring that personal data is protected becomes crucial. The enactment of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (DPDP Act) is a significant step that has been taken by the Indian Parliament which sets forth a comprehensive framework for Digital Personal Data. The Draft Digital Personal Data Protection Rules, 2025 has recently been released for public consultation to supplement the Act and ensure its smooth implementation once finalised. Though noting certain positive aspects, there is still room for addressing certain gaps and multiple aspects under the draft rules that require attention. The DPDP Act, 2023 recognises the individual’s right to protect their personal data providing control over the processing of personal data for lawful purposes. This Act applies to data which is available in digital form as well as data which is not in digital form but is digitalised subsequently. While the Act is intended to offer wide control to the individuals (Data Principal) over their personal information, its impact on vulnerable groups such as ‘Persons with Disabilities’ requires closer scrutiny. 

Person with Disabilities as data principal

The term ‘data principal’ has been defined under the DPDP Act under Section 2(j) as a person to whom the personal data is related to, which also includes a person with a disability. A lawful guardian acting on behalf of such person with disability has also been included under the ambit of this definition of Data Principal. As a result, a lawful guardian acting on behalf of a person with disability will have the same rights and responsibilities as a data principal under the Act. 

• Section 9 of the DPDP Act, 2023 states that before processing the personal data of a person with a disability who has a lawful guardian, the data fiduciary must obtain verifiable consent from that guardian, ensuring proper protection of the person with disability's data privacy.
• The data principal has the right to access information about personal data under Section 11 which is being processed by the data fiduciary.
• Section 12 provides the right to correction and erasure of personal data by making a request in a manner prescribed by the data fiduciary. 
• A right to grievance redressal must be provided to the data principal in respect of any act or omission of performance of obligations by the data fiduciary or the consent manager. 
• Under Section 14, the data principal has the right to nominate any other person to exercise the rights provided under the Act in case of death or incapacity. 

Provision of consent and its implication

The three key components of Consent that can be identified under the DPDP Act, are:

• Explicit and Informed Consent: Consent given for the processing of data by the data principal or a lawful guardian in case of persons with disabilities must be clear, free and informed as per section 6 of the Act. The data fiduciary must specify the itemised description of the personal data required along with the specified purpose and description of the goods or services that would be provided by such processing of data. (Rule 3 under Draft Digital Personal Data Protection Rules)

• Verifiable Consent: Section 9 of the DPDP Act provides that the data fiduciary needs to obtain verifiable consent of the lawful guardian before processing any personal data of such a person with a disability.  Rule 10 of the Draft Rules obligates the data fiduciary to adopt measures to ensure that the consent given by the lawful guardian is verifiable before the is processed. 
• Withdrawal of Consent: Data principal or such lawful guardian has the option to withdraw consent for the processing of data at any point by making a request to the data fiduciary.   

Although the Act includes certain provisions that focus on the inclusivity of persons with disability, the interpretation of such sections says otherwise. 

Concerns related to provisions for Persons with Disabilities under the DPDP Act:

• Lack of definition of ‘person with disabilities’: The DPDP Act or the Draft Rules does not define the term ‘persons with disabilities’. This will create confusion as to which categories of disability are included and up to what percentage.  The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 clearly defines ‘person with benchmark disability’, ‘person with disability’ and ‘person with disability having high support needs’. This categorisation is essential to determine up to what extent a person with disability needs a lawful guardian which is missing under the DPDP Act.   
• Lack of autonomy: Though the definition of data principal includes persons with disabilities however the decision-making authority has been given to the lawful guardian of such individuals. The section creates ambiguity for people who have a lower percentage of disability and are capable of making their own decisions and have no autonomy in making decisions related to the processing of their personal data because of the lack of clarity in the definition of ‘persons with disabilities’. 
• Safeguards for abuse of power by lawful guardian: The lawful guardian once verified by the data fiduciary can make decisions for the persons with disabilities. This raises concerns regarding the potential abuse of power by lawful guardians in relation to the handling of personal data. The DPDP Act does not provide any specific protection against such abuse.
• Difficulty in verification of consent: The consent obtained by the Data Fiduciary must be verified. The process that will be adopted for verification is at the discretion of the data fiduciary according to Rule 10 of the Draft Data Protection Rules. The authenticity of consent is difficult to determine as it is a complex process which lacks a standard format. Also, with the technological advancements, it would be challenging to identify whether the information given to verify the consent is actually true. 

CyberPeace Recommendations

The DPDP Act, 2023 is a major step towards making the data protection framework more comprehensive, however, the provisions related to persons with disabilities and powers given to lawful guardians acting on their behalf still need certain clarity and refinement within the DPDP Act framework. 

• Consonance of DPDP with Rights of Persons with Disabilities (RPWD) Act, 2016: The RPWD and DPDP Act should supplement each other and can be used to clear the existing ambiguities. Such as the definition of ‘persons with disabilities’ under the RPWD Act can be used in the context of the DPDP Act, 2023. 
• Also, there must be certain mechanisms and safeguards within the Act to prevent abuse of power by the lawful guardian. The affected individual in case of suspected abuse of power should have an option to file a complaint with the Data Protection Board and the Board can further take necessary actions to determine whether there is abuse of power or not. 
• Regulatory oversight and additional safeguards are required to ensure that consent is obtained in a manner that respects the rights of all individuals, including those with disabilities. 

References:

• https://www.meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/Digital%20Personal%20Data%20Protection%20Act%202023.pdf
• https://www.meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/259889.pdf 
• https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/15939/1/the_rights_of_persons_with_disabilities_act%2C_2016.pdf 
• https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/consent-disability-rights-and-data-protection-3143441
• https://www.pacta.in/digital-data-protection-consent-protocols-for-disability.pdf
• https://www.snrlaw.in/indias-new-data-protection-regime-tracking-updates-and-preparing-for-compliance/ 

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Introduction

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Artificial Intelligence (AI) is fast transforming our future in the digital world, transforming healthcare, finance, education, and cybersecurity. But alongside this technology, bad actors are also weaponising it. More and more, state-sponsored cyber actors are misusing AI tools such as ChatGPT and other generative models to automate disinformation, enable cyberattacks, and speed up social engineering operations. This write-up explores why and how AI, in the form of large language models (LLMs), is being exploited in cyber operations associated with adversarial states, and the necessity for international vigilance, regulation, and AI safety guidelines.

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The Shift: AI as a Cyber Weapon

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State-sponsored threat actors are misusing tools such as ChatGPT to turbocharge their cyber arsenal.

• Phishing Campaigns using AI- Generative AI allows for highly convincing and grammatically correct phishing emails. Unlike the shoddily written scams of yesteryears, these AI-based messages are tailored according to the victim's location, language, and professional background, increasing the attack success rate considerably. Example: It has recently been reported by OpenAI and Microsoft that Russian and North Korean APTs have employed LLMs to create customised phishing baits and malware obfuscation notes.
  
  
• Malware Obfuscation and Script Generation- Big Language Models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT may be used by cyber attackers to help write, debug, and camouflage malicious scripts. While the majority of AI instruments contain safety mechanisms to guard against abuse, threat actors often exploit "jailbreaking" to evade these protections. Once such constraints are lifted, the model can be utilised to develop polymorphic malware that alters its code composition to avoid detection. It can also be used to obfuscate PowerShell or Python scripts to render them difficult for conventional antivirus software to identify. Also, LLMs have been employed to propose techniques for backdoor installation, additional facilitating stealthy access to hijacked systems.
  
  
• Disinformation and Narrative Manipulation
  State-sponsored cyber actors are increasingly employing AI to scale up and automate disinformation operations, especially on election, protest, and geopolitical dispute days. With LLMs' assistance, these actors can create massive amounts of ersatz news stories, deepfake interview transcripts, imitation social media posts, and bogus public remarks on online forums and petitions. The localisation of content makes this strategy especially perilous, as messages are written with cultural and linguistic specificity, making them credible and more difficult to detect. The ultimate aim is to seed societal unrest, manipulate public sentiments, and erode faith in democratic institutions.

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Disrupting Malicious Uses of AI – OpenAI Report (June 2025) 

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OpenAI released a comprehensive threat intelligence report called "Disrupting Malicious Uses of AI" and the “Staying ahead of threat actors in the age of AI”, which outlined how state-affiliated actors had been testing and misusing its language models for malicious intent. The report named few advanced persistent threat (APT) groups, each attributed to particular nation-states. OpenAI highlighted that the threat actors used the models mostly for enhancing linguistic quality, generating social engineering content, and expanding operations. Significantly, the report mentioned that the tools were not utilized to produce malware, but rather to support preparatory and communicative phases of larger cyber operations.

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AI Jailbreaking: Dodging Safety Measures

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One of the largest worries is how malicious users can "jailbreak" AI models, misleading them into generating banned content using adversarial input. Some methods employed are:

• Roleplay: Simulating the AI being a professional criminal advisor
• Obfuscation: Concealing requests with code or jargon
• Language Switching: Proposing sensitive inquiries in less frequently moderated languages
• Prompt Injection: Lacing dangerous requests within innocent-appearing questions

These methods have enabled attackers to bypass moderation tools, transforming otherwise moral tools into cybercrime instruments.

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Conclusion

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As AI generations evolve and become more accessible, its application by state-sponsored cyber actors is unprecedentedly threatening global cybersecurity. The distinction between nation-state intelligence collection and cybercrime is eroding, with AI serving as a multiplier of adversarial campaigns. AI tools such as ChatGPT, which were created for benevolent purposes, can be targeted to multiply phishing, propaganda, and social engineering attacks. The cross-border governance, ethical development practices, and cyber hygiene practices need to be encouraged.  AI needs to be shaped not only by innovation but by responsibility.

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References

• https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/02/14/staying-ahead-of-threat-actors-in-the-age-of-ai/
• https://www.bankinfosecurity.com/openais-chatgpt-hit-nation-state-hackers-a-28640
• https://oecd.ai/en/incidents/2025-06-13-b5e9
• https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/security-insider/meet-the-experts/emerging-AI-tactics-in-use-by-threat-actors
• https://www.wired.com/story/youre-not-ready-for-ai-hacker-agents/
• https://www.cert-in.org.in/PDF/Digital_Threat_Report_2024.pdf
• https://cdn.openai.com/threat-intelligence-reports/5f73af09-a3a3-4a55-992e-069237681620/disrupting-malicious-uses-of-ai-june-2025.pdf

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