Combating Global Cybercrime and the Role of the United Nations Ad Hoc Group

Introduction

For years, Indian companies could get away with vague privacy promises. That window closed on 13 November 2025, when the government notified the Digital Personal Data Protection Rules, giving teeth to the broad principles Parliament had passed back in 2023 under the DPDP Act. The Rules turned soft commitments into specific, auditable duties, and a lot of organisations are only now realising how much that actually changes.

Start with Section 8(4). It requires every Data Fiduciary to put "appropriate technical and organisational measures" in place. Most readers skim past "organisational" and focus on the technical half, but that's a mistake, because the word is doing real work. It's asking for defined roles, written policies, staff training, and someone actually watching whether any of it holds up over time, not just firewalls and encryption keys. Section 8(5) goes further, demanding reasonable security safeguards against breaches, and Rule 6 spells out exactly what that phrase means in practice: encrypt data at rest and in transit, restrict access on a need to know basis, require multi factor authentication, log and monitor activity, run regular vulnerability checks, bind your data processors contractually to the same standard, and keep relevant logs for at least a year.

Then there's Rule 7, and this is where the clock starts running. Once a Data Fiduciary becomes aware of a breach, the Data Protection Board must be told without delay, and a full report has to follow within 72 hours covering what happened, when, why, what's being done about it, and confirmation that affected individuals were notified. Unlike GDPR, there's no minimum severity threshold here. A breach affecting ten people triggers the same obligation as one affecting ten million. And CERT-In's existing six hour reporting window under its 2022 Directions still applies separately, which means a serious incident can trigger two overlapping regulatory clocks running side by side.

Put all of this together and a pattern emerges. The law assumes an organisation already knows what it's protecting, has actually protected it, kept usable records the whole way through, and can explain clearly what happened the moment something breaks. That coordination job belongs to Governance, Risk and Compliance, or GRC for short. GRC decides who's accountable, which risks actually matter, which controls address them, and how anyone checks whether compliance is real rather than assumed. Skip that structure and security work tends to splinter into a pile of disconnected tasks nobody truly owns.

GRC gives a legal duty somewhere to live. Forensic readiness is what lets an organisation prove, months or years later, that the duty was actually being met.

The Role of Governance, Risk and Compliance

On paper, most cybersecurity programmes look fine. There's an incident response plan somewhere, access control rules exist, logging is "in place," and someone has a title that says they're responsible for security. None of that gets tested until something actually breaks. A phishing compromise, a ransomware infection, a leaked database, a hijacked admin account, whatever the trigger, the questions that follow are always the same, and they're not comfortable ones. What happened, exactly, and when did it start? Which systems, which data, were actually touched? Were the controls the organisation claims to run genuinely functioning at that moment, or just described in a slide deck somewhere? And can anyone produce records solid enough to answer those questions with confidence rather than a shrug?

This is the exact seam where GRC and digital forensics meet. GRC lays out what's expected, who's responsible, and what evidence a control should be generating in the background. Digital forensics is the craft of taking whatever technical traces actually exist and turning them into an account of events that will hold up to scrutiny. Passing an audit was never really the point. Being able to stand in front of a regulator, mid incident, and show that the processes described on paper were real, active, and generating trustworthy evidence, that's the actual bar.

Why Compliance Alone Falls Short

Compliance, in the narrow sense, just means meeting whatever legal, contractual, or internal requirement applies. But a policy sitting in a document repository proves nothing about what actually happens on a Tuesday afternoon when someone requests admin access. A written incident response plan says nothing about whether the team can actually execute it under real pressure, at 2am, with a ransomware note on every screen. A logging policy is close to worthless if the logs it promises were switched off somewhere along the way, or overwritten, or scattered across systems that were never synchronised to the same clock.

NIST's Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 essentially built this concern into its core structure, placing "Govern" alongside Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover as one of five equal functions rather than background paperwork sitting off to the side. India's own regulatory posture pushes in the same direction. CERT-In's 2022 Directions require certain incidents to be reported within six hours of discovery, and its guidance for government entities leans heavily on documented incident handling and disciplined evidence practices. The underlying message from both is identical: figure out, before anything goes wrong, whether the evidence you'll eventually need is actually going to exist when someone asks for it.

Where GRC and Forensics Actually Connect

A good GRC programme spells out what's supposed to happen. Forensic readiness is what lets you later prove what actually did.

Access control is a useful example here. On the GRC side, an organisation might require least privilege access, multi factor authentication, periodic reviews of who holds privileged accounts, and prompt removal of access once someone leaves or changes roles. On the forensic side, none of that means anything without the underlying records that let investigators actually test it, authentication logs, MFA usage history, privilege change records, and account activity trails. The table below lines up a few common GRC controls against the specific evidence needed to show they were genuinely operating.

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A Practical Scenario: After a Ransomware Incident

Picture a mid-sized company waking up to find half its file servers encrypted. There's an incident response plan somewhere in the shared drive, technically, but nobody's actually run through it in over a year. The security team isolates the obviously compromised endpoint and starts escalating. Now the forensic side of the house has to reconstruct what happened, working backward through endpoint telemetry, authentication logs, firewall events, email traffic, and file activity, hunting for the original point of entry, how the attacker escalated privileges, how they moved sideways through the network, what data they actually touched, and finally how the ransomware got deployed.

This is where the quality of everything collected beforehand suddenly matters a great deal. If server clocks were never properly synchronised, the timeline investigators build might not line up cleanly enough to trust. If logs only ever lived locally on individual machines rather than being pulled centrally, some of them are probably gone by now. If nobody ever bothered logging administrator actions, there are going to be real, unexplained gaps in the story. And if whatever evidence does exist wasn't collected the right way, its integrity can be challenged later, sometimes fatally, in a legal or regulatory proceeding. CERT-In actually ran a programme on exactly this in July 2026, "Inside the Breach," covering system artefacts, investigative technique, and chain of custody requirements, precisely because this is where real investigations tend to succeed or quietly fall apart.

Building a Forensic Ready GRC Programme

For an organisation starting more or less from scratch, forensic readiness doesn't need to be bolted on as some separate initiative. It can be built straight into the GRC programme that already exists. Start by identifying the systems, applications, cloud services, and privileged accounts that actually matter. Map the real risks and regulatory requirements onto the controls meant to address them. Then get specific about what evidence each control should be generating, and how that evidence gets protected and kept over time. Time synchronisation, centralised logging, tightly controlled access to security records, and clear ownership of preservation, escalation, and investigation all need to exist well before an incident, not be improvised during one. And none of it means much until it's actually been tested, through tabletop exercises and simulated incidents rather than assumed to work because it's written down somewhere. NIST SP 800-61 Revision 3 frames incident response as one continuous loop of preparation, detection, response, recovery, and improvement, rather than a series of separate boxes to check.

There's one question worth asking of every important control an organisation runs: could you actually prove this was working at the moment an incident happened? If the honest answer is no, what you have is a compliance process on paper, and a forensic readiness gap sitting quietly underneath it.

Conclusion

Cyber readiness was never really about how many policies sit in a binder or how many boxes get ticked in an audit. It shows up, or doesn't, in the hours right after something breaks, when an organisation has to move fast, preserve evidence that can actually stand up to scrutiny, explain clearly what happened, and prove that governance and technical controls were genuinely working together rather than just coexisting on paper. GRC sets the direction, the accountability, the risk priorities, and the compliance expectations. Digital forensics does the work of preserving and interpreting the technical evidence once something actually happens. Forensic readiness sits in between the two, making sure they're actually talking to each other long before an incident forces the conversation. The practical task for most organisations comes down to something simple to say, if not always simple to build: design controls that hold up under real incident response, not just an auditor's checklist. The strongest compliance posture was never the one with the thickest binder. It's the one that can back every document up with evidence, on the day it actually matters.

References

1. Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, Sections 8(4), 8(5), 8(6). https://www.meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/Digital%20Personal%20Data%20Protection%20Act%202023.pdf
2. Digital Personal Data Protection Rules, 2025, Rules 6 and 7, notified 13 November 2025. https://www.meity.gov.in
3. National Institute of Standards and Technology, The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0, CSWP 29, 2024. https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/cswp/29/the-nist-cybersecurity-framework-csf-20/final
4. Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In), Directions under Section 70B of the Information Technology Act, 2000, dated 28 April 2022. https://www.cert-in.org.in/Directions70B.jsp
5. Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In), Guidelines on Information Security Practices for Government Entities. https://www.cert-in.org.in/Downloader?fileName=CIPS-2026-0014.pdf&pageid=5&type=2
6. National Institute of Standards and Technology, SP 800-86: Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response, 2006. https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/86/final
7. International Organization for Standardization, ISO/IEC 27037:2012, Guidelines for identification, collection, acquisition and preservation of digital evidence. CERT-In, "Inside the Breach: Advanced Cyber Forensics & Incident Investigation," 31 July 2026. https://www.cert-in.org.in/s2cMainServlet?pageid=PRSTNVIEW03&reCode=CIWS-2026-3569
8. National Institute of Standards and Technology, SP 800-61 Rev. 3: Incident Response Recommendations and Considerations for Cybersecurity Risk Management, 2025. https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/61/r3/final
9. Matters.ai, "DPDP Breach Notification: 72-Hour Rule & ₹200 Cr Penalty." https://www.matters.ai/article/dpdp-breach-notification MediaNama, "Data Breach Reporting Timeline of DPDP Rules 2025 Explained." https://www.medianama.com/2025/11/223-data-breach-reporting-timeline-of-dpdp-rules-2025-explained/

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Introduction

Charity and donation scams have continued to persist and are amplified in the digital era, where messages spread rapidly through WhatsApp, emails, and social media. These fraudulent schemes involve threat actors impersonating legitimate charities, government appeals, or social causes to solicit funds. Apart from targeting the general public, they also impact entities such as reputable tech firms and national institutions. Victims are tricked into transferring money or sharing personal information, often under the guise of urgent humanitarian efforts or causes.

A recent incident involves a fake WhatsApp message claiming to be from the Indian Ministry of Defence. The message urged users to donate to a fund for “modernising the Indian Army.” The government later confirmed this message was entirely fabricated and part of a larger scam. It emphasised that no such appeal had been issued by the Ministry, and urged citizens to verify such claims through official government portals before responding.

Tech Industry and Donation-Related Scams

Large corporations are also falling prey. According to media reports, an American IT company recently terminated around 700 Indian employees after uncovering a donation-related fraud. At least 200 of them were reportedly involved in a scheme linked to Telugu organisations in the US. The scam echoed a similar situation that had previously affected Apple, where Indian employees were fired after being implicated in donation fraud tied to the Telugu Association of North America (TANA). Investigations revealed that employees had made questionable donations to these groups in exchange for benefits such as visa support or employment favours.

Common People Targeted

While organisational scandals grab headlines, the common man remains equally or even more vulnerable. In a recent incident, a man lost over ₹1 lakh after clicking on a WhatsApp link asking for donations to a charity. Once he engaged with the link, the fraudsters manipulated him into making repeated transfers under various pretexts, ranging from processing fees to refund-related transactions (social engineering). Scammers often employ a similar set of tactics using urgency, emotional appeal, and impersonation of credible platforms to convince and deceive people.

Cautionary Steps

CyberPeace recommends adopting a cautious and informed approach when making charitable donations, especially online. Here are some key safety measures to follow:

1. Verify Before You Donate. Always double-check the legitimacy of donation appeals. Use official government portals or the official charities' websites. Be wary of unfamiliar phone numbers, email addresses, or WhatsApp forwards asking for money.
   
   
2. Avoid Clicking on Suspicious Links
   Never click on links or download attachments from unknown or unverified sources. These could be phishing links/ malware designed to steal your data or access your bank accounts.
   
   
3. Be Sceptical of Urgency Scammers bank on creating a false sense of urgency to pressure their victims into donating quickly. One must take the time to evaluate before responding.

4. Use Secure Payment Channels Ensure that one makes donations only through platforms that are secure, trusted, and verified. These include official UPI handles, government-backed portals (like PM CARES or Bharat Kosh), among others.
   
   
5. Report Suspected Fraud In case one receives suspicious messages or falls victim to a scam, they are encouraged to report it to cybercrime authorities via cybercrime.gov.in (1930) or the local police, as prompt reporting can prevent further fraud.
   

Conclusion

Charity should never come at the cost of trust and safety. While donating to a good cause is noble, doing it mindfully is essential in today’s scam-prone environment. Always remember: a little caution today can save a lot tomorrow.

References

• https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/misleading-message-circulating-on-whatsapp-related-to-donation-for-armys-modernisation-govt/articleshow/120672806.cms?from=mdr
• https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/technology/tech-news/american-company-sacks-700-of-these-200-in-donation-scam-related-to-telugu-organisations-similar-to-firing-at-apple/articleshow/120075189.cms
• https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/hyderabad/apple-fires-some-indians-over-donation-fraud-tana-under-scrutiny/articleshow/117034457.cms
• https://www.indiatoday.in/technology/news/story/man-gets-link-for-donation-and-charity-on-whatsapp-loses-over-rs-1-lakh-after-clicking-on-it-2688616-2025-03-04 

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Executive Summary:

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Social media has been overwhelmed by a viral post that claims Indian Railways is beginning to install solar panels directly on railway tracks all over the country for renewable energy purposes. The claim also purports that India will become the world's first country to undertake such a green effort in railway systems. Our research involved extensive reverse image searching, keyword analysis, government website searches, and global media verification. We found the claim to be completely false. The viral photos and information are all incorrectly credited to India. The images are actually from a pilot project by a Swiss start-up called Sun-Ways.

Claim:

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According to a viral post on social media, Indian Railways has started an all-India initiative to install solar panels directly on railway tracks to generate renewable energy, limit power expenses, and make global history in environmentally sustainable rail operations.

Fact check:

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We did a reverse image search of the viral image and were soon directed to international media and technology blogs referencing a project named Sun-Ways, based in Switzerland. The images circulated on Indian social media were the exact ones from the Sun-Ways pilot project, whereby a removable system of solar panels is being installed between railway tracks in Switzerland to evaluate the possibility of generating energy from rail infrastructure.

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We also thoroughly searched all the official Indian Railways websites, the Ministry of Railways news article, and credible Indian media. At no point did we locate anything mentioning Indian Railways engaging or planning something similar by installing solar panels on railway tracks themselves.

Indian Railways has been engaged in green energy initiatives beyond just solar panel installation on program rooftops, and also on railway land alongside tracks and on train coach roofs. However, Indian Railways have never installed solar panels on railway tracks in India. Meanwhile, we found a report of solar panel installations on the train launched on 14th July 2025, first solar-powered DEMU (diesel electrical multiple unit) train from the Safdarjung railway station in Delhi. The train will run from Sarai Rohilla in Delhi to Farukh Nagar in Haryana. A total of 16 solar panels, each producing 300 Wp, are fitted in six coaches. 

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We also found multiple links to support our claim from various media links: Euro News, World Economy Forum, Institute of Mechanical Engineering, and  NDTV.   

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Conclusion:

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After extensive research conducted through several phases including examining facts and some technical facts, we can conclude that the claim that Indian Railways has installed solar panels on railway tracks is false. The concept and images originate from Sun-Ways, a Swiss company that was testing this concept in Switzerland, not India. 

Indian Railways continues to use renewable energy in a number of forms but has not put any solar panels on railway tracks. We want to highlight how important it is to fact-check viral content and other unverified content.

• Claim: India’s solar track project will help Indian Railways run entirely on renewable energy.‍
• Claimed On: Social Media‍
• Fact Check: False and Misleading

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